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Java Sugar, an Industrial Project and the 'Oriental 
Cuba', 1830-85
This is a book about cane sugar and the transformation of an Indonesian island into 
the 'Oriental Cuba' during the middle decades of the nineteenth century. Between 
the 1830s and the 1880s, sweetener manufacture in Dutch-controlled Java — the 
crown jewel of the erstwhile Netherlands Indies — drew decisively away in matters of 
technology and sugar science from other Asian centres of production which had once 
equaled or, more often, surpassed it in terms of both output and know-how. Along 
with its larger and altogether more famous Caribbean counterpart, Java's industry 
came to occupy a position at the apex of the trade in what had become by this 
date a key global commodity. Along with the beet sugar producers of (post-1870) 
Imperial Germany, Cuba and Java accounted for a little over one-third of the world's 
recorded output of the industrially manufactured kind of sugar usually referred to as 
'centrifugal'.
'Industrially manufactured' is the key phrase here, since during the third quarter 
of the nineteenth century, it was these two island producers that became the prime 
centres of industrialised manufacture of cane sugar in their respective hemispheres. 
In neither case has this fact always been grasped. Cuba, along with the United States, 
was the nineteenth century's greatest holdout of slave-based commodity production, 
and the institution of slavery there outlasted its American counterpart for the better 
part of two decades, only coming to a (de facto) end in the 1880s. As a result, the 
industrial dimension of the Cuban 'project' in sugar has been obscured by notions — 
now largely exploded — that slavery and technological advance were incompatible.
In respect to Java, the focus of the present discussion, the parallel development 
of industrialised sugar manufacture has been obfuscated for reasons not dissimilar 
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to those operating with regard to its Caribbean antipode. At least until recently, a 
parallel historiography charting a different kind of servility likewise had the effect 
of obscuring the industrial evolution of sugar. This occurred due to a near-exclusive 
concentration on the role played in the expansion of its production by commandeered 
inputs of land and labour under the aegis of the so-called Cultuurstelsel or System of 
[State] Cultivations. Inaugurated by the Indies Government in 1830, enduring — 
albeit in modified and reduced form — for some fifty years thereafter, and notorious 
for its brutality and compulsion, the Cultuurstelsel put its stamp not only on the 
people of Java but also on our understanding of the sugar industry that grew up under 
its mantle. As will be argued in the pages that follow, this 'understanding' is in need 
of a far-reaching overhaul.
The Industrial Project in Sugar in Java in the Mid-Nineteenth Century: 
Preliminary Facts and Explanations
Java had begun the nineteenth century as one of a number of centres — in fact, a 
rather minor one — of pre-industrial, artisan sugar production located in tropical and 
sub-tropical Asia from the Indian subcontinent through to the China Sea. It ended 
the century not only as the largest by far of Asia's producer-exporters of sugar, but also 
as the sole example of the large-scale sustained industrialisation of sugar manufacture 
anywhere in the East. On the face of it, the island was not a likely place for an 
'industrial project' in sugar to take hold. Java was far away from the commodity's 
main markets in Europe and North America (markets ostensibly far better served by 
New World producers). It also had a rural economy and social formation so heavily 
dominated by a rice-growing peasantry that the 'plantations' generally thought vital 
for the successful raising of cane stood little chance of being established. Moreover, as 
if that was not enough, the island was under the control of a small, poverty-stricken 
European state that seemed incapable of providing the necessary capital for any such 
venture.
Yet the project not only took hold there during the middle decades of the 
nineteenth century, but also flourished to an extent not yet fully reflected in the 
relevant literature. In line with the view that the Cultuurstelsel was more incubus than 
incubator with respect to modern economic growth, literature has often assumed that 
the 'real' modernisation of Java sugar only began toward the very end of the century, 
reflecting a new wave of metropolitan interest and investment. As this book will 
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demonstrate, however, key developments began much earlier. Beginning rather slowly 
in the 1830s and accelerating fairly rapidly in the decades that followed, Java's long-
established place in the history of Asian sugar manufacture was totally transformed 
during the third quarter of the nineteenth century.
Globally, sugar stood on the cutting edge of the 'first' industrial revolution in 
metallurgy, technology and the science that accompanied it, and these developments 
formed the vital context for what happened on Java. By 1885 — the date of a crisis 
in the international sugar economy which shook the industry to its foundations (and 
the end-point for the present study) — the island could boast scores of sugar factories. 
Continuous, fully industrialised production took place in these factories in tandem 
with most of the major technological advances and appurtenances of contemporary, 
state-of-the-art manufacture. Already well before that, by the late 1850s, a substantial 
number of the colony's one hundred or so factories had taken on board many of the 
key contemporary advances in the technology and science of sugar manufacture.
In setting out to explain how this came about, the book falls into three main 
parts. The first three chapters deal with what can properly be called an 'industrial 
revolution' in sugar manufacture worldwide which took place during a 'long' 
nineteenth century extending from the French Revolution to the outbreak of the 
First World War. Using a variety of settings, these chapters discuss the impact of 
that 'revolution' on Java and the way in which sugar was made on the island. In 
the second part, the book first sets out to analyse the agrarian basis for that project, 
and, in particular, the unique configuration of an industrial sugar complex that was 
embedded in a much larger rice-based 'peasant' economy and society. The agrarian 
base for the production of raw material forged over the mid-century decades did 
much to explain why an industrial project in sugar was feasible in Java, but does not 
account for why it actually happened. For that, both finance and entrepreneurs were 
necessary. The second part then attempts to elucidate both the 'money trail' itself and 
how a colonial (and to an extent cosmopolitan) bourgeoisie of sugar manufacturers 
and merchants came to be located along that trail. The third and final section of 
the book concludes with a summary of the state of the sugar industry in Java — in 
respect, above all, to the technology of manufacture — in the decade or so prior to 
the international sugar crisis of 1884.
Chapter One begins by discussing the significance for Java of an industrial 
revolution in sugar manufacture which began around 1780 and culminated shortly 
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before the outbreak of the First World War. This revolution had the potential for 
impacting on cane sugar manufacture throughout Asia, just as it did in the Atlantic 
Zone, which has been more widely written about. Indeed, a number of industrial 
projects in sugar made their appearance at various locations in the East from the 
1820s onward. The Dutch colony of Java was one of these. In total, these ventures 
in the industrial manufacture of sugar had the capacity to radically alter the entire 
international sugar economy by introducing bulk supplies of Asian-made sugar into 
commodity circuits that had depended hitherto almost exclusively on supplies from 
the Americas. In fact, however, most of the ventures proved over time either abortive 
or, after enjoying some initial success, sank into obsolescence, not to be revived until 
the next century. This left Java very much on its own as the sole Asian centre of 
production in which the industrial project was sustained and ongoing from the mid-
nineteenth century through to the century's end.
Chapters Two and Three set out to describe the rise of the industrial project in 
Java sugar in terms, first and foremost, of the men and machines that came to define 
it with regards to technology, science and expertise. 'Creole' seems an appropriate 
term here, since it is contended that the 'diffusion' of technology which underlay the 
progress of the industrial project in Java was a matter of local adaptation as well as 
simple adoption. The critical argument here, however, is that the degree of progress 
made in the manufacture of sugar in Java between the 1830s and the mid-1880s was 
such as to place the industry roughly on par with the 'best practice' internationally. In 
other words, earlier representations of Java sugar manufacture in the mid-nineteenth 
century as both wanting in expertise and technologically backward are substantially 
incorrect. The weakness of such representations stems both from a misunderstanding 
of the real character of the advance of the machinery in contemporary sugar production 
worldwide, and from an uncritical acceptance of a polemical contemporary literature 
hostile to the Cultuurstelsel and its every manifestation.
Chapter Four discusses the agrarian basis for the industrial project. That 
project would have been impossible without the supplies of raw material and labour 
that were underwritten by a colonial Government anxious to ensure that commodity 
production flourished — and that the profits of the Indies flowed back to Holland. 
In terms of the cultivation of cane and factory labour, mid-century Cuba owed 
its ascent in the international sugar economy to the plantation slavery of captive 
Africans. Contemporary developments in Java, however, eschewed both plantations 
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and the slave or indentured workforces that were their usual concomitant. Instead, 
they were predicated on a different kind of servility based on the requisitioning of 
peasant fields — on which sugar cane was planted in rotation with peasant crops — 
and a commandeering of locally available peasant labour on the basis of its purported 
corvée obligations to the state.
As has long been recognised, this requisition and commandeering was feasible 
because of the colonial Government's ability to harness a labour-service regime of 
some antiquity which it inherited from the pre-colonial state. In turn, as is emphasised 
here, the effectiveness of that regime was dependent — to a degree at least — on the 
presence among the rural working population not only of myriad petty landholders 
but also of significant numbers of largely or totally landless households, which were 
dependent on their labour power alone for their subsistence. An important part 
of the present argument, however, concerns what may be termed 'peasantisation'. 
During the mid-century decades, in great swathes of rural Java — on the book's 
reading of the situation — people became more 'peasant-like' to an extent that clearly 
advantaged the industrial project. In sum, the agrarian basis for sugar production was 
a mixture of the new and the old, one in which the exploitation of long-standing ways 
of mobilising rural resources took place in tandem with fairly far-reaching changes in 
the way in which rural society was structured.
Yet, as we will see in Chapter Five, the industrial project was dependent for its 
success on substantially more than a unique agrarian base. Indeed, a key factor — one 
without which it is difficult to imagine that the project would have been sustained over 
time — was the emergence over the mid-century decades of an 'Indies bourgeoisie' 
from within the bowels of the Indies state's Cultuurstelsel. To be sure, the relation 
between the industrial project in sugar and the various institutions of the state in 
Java in the mid-nineteenth century is a problematic one. Not least of the difficulties 
is that even the formal distinction between industry and 'state' was ill-defined. State 
officials in the Residencies — both Dutch and Javanese — were themselves in charge 
of the cultivation of cane and were often directly involved in the supervision of its 
production. They were also responsible for providing the industry with much of the 
labour that it required during the manufacturing season or 'Campaign'. Moreover, 
the state was initially the main financier of sugar production and the major market for 
the Contractors' output. In this respect, as we shall see, some of the tensions between 
'industry' and 'state' might be more accurately delineated as tensions between various 
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production sectors of an industry in which the industry/state dichotomy was itself 
largely meaningless.
Nonetheless, within this framework, recent scholarly work has heavily qualified 
lingering but fanciful notions of mid-century Java as being in the thrall of a colonial 
'bureaucratic state' whose 'monopolistic' practices and outlook effectively blocked the 
emergence of 'private' entrepreneurial capital. Taking up and developing this critique, 
the argument presented here is that — in however contingent a fashion — the 
Cultuurstelsel nurtured the presence in Java of an influential group of colonial sugar 
factory owners and top managers. Together with their close and essential associates 
in the colony's more substantial mercantile houses, and their friends and relatives 
in the Indies Government service, they constituted a bourgeoisie that maintained 
close ties with its metropolitan counterparts. Always potent, these ties significantly 
underpinned the local bourgeoisie's base on the colonial 'periphery' and were of 
vital importance when the suddenly plummeting world price of sugar threatened the 
industrial project with financial disaster in the mid-1880s.
Chapter Six takes up the history of the advance of steam and steel in sugar 
manufacture in Java in the mid-nineteenth century and reviews the state of technology 
and science in the industry in the decade prior to the crisis of the mid-1880s. In 
essence, this chapter argues that by the early 1880s the Java industry was, in most 
important respects, fully on a par with other major sectors of the international sugar 
economy. By the same token, in respect to the technology and science of manufacture, 
it had drawn away decisively from its erstwhile counterparts elsewhere in Asia.
The chapter sets out to sustain this argument through an analysis of 
contemporary information relating to the appearance, during the 1870s and early 
1880s, of significant quantities of new, up-to-the-minute equipment, including 
larger, more powerful mills for grinding the cane and, above all, various forms of 
Multiple Effect apparatus, which transformed operations in the boiling house from 
about 1870 onward even more than the Vacuum Pan had done some decades earlier. 
(Both of these forms of apparatus will be described in more detail in this chapter.) Of 
necessity, moreover, technological advance went hand-in-hand with advance in the 
chemistry of manufacture, such that the 'sugar chemist' and the factory laboratory 
began to make their appearance, in however embryonic a fashion, alongside the new 
machines. There were strong influences here from the German beet sugar industry, 
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yet Java also had its own 'tradition' of sugar science that dated from initiatives taken 
by the Dutch Colonial Office and the Indies Government in the 1840s and 1850s.
In an important sense, however, neither advanced technology nor its 
accompanying science could have been so smoothly — or effectively — incorporated 
into the Java sugar industry had it not been for the unique metamorphosis that 
the colony's sugar factories underwent during the period between the 1850s and 
the 1880s. In most major sectors of the international sugar economy during the 
second half of the nineteenth century, the great strides made in sugar milling and 
in the subsequent processing of cane-juice needed, if they were to be successfully 
implemented, to be accompanied by a whole-scale reconstruction of the industry. 
Existing units of production — particularly the mill-cum-plantation — often proved 
too small to sustain the scale, let alone the expense, of what was now required of sugar 
manufacturers.
In Java, howevever, this was not the case, for reasons to do first and foremost 
with the flexible matrix set up (in however contingent a fashion) for proto-industrial 
sugar production under the aegis of the Cultuurstelsel. This matrix allowed for 
expansion without the necessity for reconstruction. As a result, the Java industry was 
able to benefit from a history of continuous — and continuously evolving — sugar 
manufacture dating in some cases back to the 1830s. To an extent that was highly 
unusual globally, the new systems of manufacture — from the Vacuum Pan through 
to the Multiple Effect and beyond — could be grafted effectively onto the existing 
units of production. The upshot was that when crisis came in the mid-1880s, in 
the form of the collapse of the world price for industrially manufactured sugar, the 
industry was quite literally well-equipped to meet it.
The book's conclusion takes up the industry's story from this potentially 
terminating event through to the period of the project's late colonial heyday — and 
beyond. In explaining how the industrial project rode the crisis of the mid-1880s 
and entered on a period of unprecedented expansion, it draws attention to four 
main factors. The first and most necessary of these related to markets, where the key 
development was the prospect of mass sales for Java sugar elsewhere in Asia itself 
— sales that compensated for the loss of most of the markets in the West, which 
had sustained Java during the middle decades of the nineteenth century. A second 
factor related to the industry's ability — in the wake of the dismantlement of the 
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Cultuurstelsel — to hold down or depress the cost of its access to both the rural 
resources and the factory workforce on which it depended for its supplies of raw 
material. On this basis it created a super-efficient 'agro-industry' that was uniquely 
productive in the field in global terms. This was bolstered by an equally exceptional 
programme of Research and Development that drew many of its (initial) strengths 
from metropolitan Holland's own proximity to the great beet sugar industry of 
Imperial Germany.
A third factor in explaining the industrial project's survival is linked to 
this exceptional productivity, in so far as it helped account for profits that could 
be reinvested in expanding the industry's operations. This was a point of critical 
importance in allowing the project to continue, because the inflow of metropolitan (or 
other overseas) capital into Java sugar was fairly minimal in contrast to the situation 
prevailing in other major sectors of colonial commodity production in the Indies. 
In consequence — and this is the fourth and final factor — the industrial project 
was able to continue the 'tradition' it had established in the mid-century decades of 
constantly updating its factories (and building new ones) in line with global advances 
in the technology of manufacture.
The upshot of these developments post-1880 was that in terms of productivity 
and total output, the industrial project continued (with some interruptions) on an 
upward trajectory until the very eve of the inter-war depression that began in 1930. 
Thereafter, things began to fall apart, as is briefly narrated in the book's final pages. 
The focus of the present volume, however, is on the formation of the industrial project 
rather than on its eventual fate — which is another story.
Part I




1 Java's Singular Trajectory:Steam, Steel and the Industrial Project in Sugar
During the course of the 'long' nineteenth century, sugar reinvented itself as an 
industrially manufactured product. Together with the applied sciences that sustained 
them, steam and steel — beginning, initially, as iron — characterised a sugar 
'revolution' that took place globally during a period that began around 1780 and 
reached its apogee circa 1914.
The term 'revolution' seems appropriate even though the time span was 
lengthy. Much has been written about this revolution in the context of cane sugar 
in the Caribbean and the New World in general (the production areas, that is to 
say, which since the sixteenth century had supplied the commodity to the Atlantic 
Zone and its hinterland). Nonetheless, the revolution also had a significant impact 
throughout Asia and the Indian Ocean, in areas as diverse as Mauritius, the Indian 
subcontinent and South-East Asia (and in the neighbouring north-east of Australia).
In Dutch controlled Java, however, the impact was particularly pronounced and 
sustained. There, a singular industrial project — singular in respect to its combination 
of scale, output and technological-scientific advance — took shape during the middle 
decades of the nineteenth century and reached a precocious florescence toward the 
century's end. Indeed, by the 1880s the developed state of manufacturing on Java 
placed the island well ahead of any of its erstwhile counterparts elsewhere in Asia 
or its Indian Ocean counterparts and roughly on par with the most advanced sugar 
industries of the New World. The Dutch colony had become, in effect, the 'Oriental 




Figure 1: Java in the colonial era: showing the main sugar-growing areas.
Source: Courtesy of the author
Figure 2: Java: the Garden of the East.
Source: Courtesy of the author
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Sugar's Reinvention as an Industrially Manufactured Commodity
Until the nineteenth century, the commodity we know as 'sugar' was derived 
exclusively from the sugar cane, which in turn was selectively bred from grasses found, 
it seems most likely, on the south-eastern fringes of Asia, possibly New Guinea.1 The 
use of cane to make sugar appears to have originated in various regions of Asia in pre-
modern times, and to have been transmitted from there to the Middle East, then into 
the Mediterranean and eventually from there into the New World.
For centuries, sugar was manufactured worldwide by artisans using essentially 
handicraft techniques. In some places, it still is. Though these techniques varied 
considerably from place to place as well as over time, there were some essential 
similarities. The sucrose content of sugar cane — the part vital for making sugar — 
was extracted by devices that crushed the cane, either through some variation of the 
pestle-and-mortar principle or through combinations of rollers between which the 
cane was ground, utilising manual labour, animals (horses, oxen and so on) or water 
power as the motive force. The resultant juice, thin and full of impurities that would 
adversely affect its conversion into sugar, had then to be cleansed and reduced through 
a combination of boiling it and then adding substances that would cause impurities 
to rise to the surface (or sink to the bottom) of the cauldrons or pans in which these 
processes took place. Only then could the thickened cane-juice be brought to near 
'setting' point, again over the same direct heat source — a fire or a furnace — which 
had been used to cleanse and reduce the juice. It could then be poured off into casks, 
hogsheads, pots or other containers, where it was drained of extraneous liquid and 
allowed to set (to some degree at least) into a transportable, saleable form.
In some of the more advanced forms of handicraft production (as in parts of 
East Asia, for example), settling took place in conical pots covered at the top in wet 
clay, the water from which percolated down through the setting sugar, in so doing 
purging the upper layers of the sugar of the molasses (the part of the sugar that would 
not 'set'). When the pot was smashed and the sugar cone revealed, its upper layers 
were white ('clayed'), its lower layers brown. Whatever methods of manufacture were 
1 For substantiation, elaboration and qualification of the information in this and the 
following two paragraphs, see Jock H Galloway, The Cane Sugar Industry: An Historical 
Geography from its Origins to 1914, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1989, pp. 11-18; 
and Peter Griggs, Global Industry, Local Innovation: The History of Cane Sugar Production in 
Australia, 1820-1995, Bern, Peter Lang, 2011, pp. 15-17.
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used, they were all immensely time-consuming, highly labour-intensive, and very 
heavily dependent on the individual skill and experience of the artisans in charge. 
No wonder that sugar, in the early modern era, was a relatively rare and distinctly 
expensive commodity.
Beginning sometime in the late 1700s, however, this began to change. It did so 
in the context of what is often referred to as the 'first' industrial revolution, predicated 
on steam power, new forms of metallurgy and their accompanying sciences. The 
resultant radical change to the way in which sugar was manufactured had three major 
dimensions. One dimension related to far-reaching improvements in the grinding of 
cane. The second concerned revolutionary advances in cleansing and reducing cane-
juice and processing it into 'sugar'. The third dimension, which was very importantly 
and closely allied to these developments, resided in the transformation of sugar 
manufacture from an art into a science.
We can begin with the appearance of steam-driven mills with iron or steel 
crushers; these achieved an unprecedented increase in extraction rates. The first 
stationary steam engine to be used in 'the colonies' was erected in Cuba in 1797, 
and a little over a decade later, steam-operated sugar-mill engines began to appear, 
eventually in rather large numbers, in both Cuba and the British Caribbean. These 
were exported mainly by the British engineering firms of Boulton and Watt (119 
engines between 1803 and 1825) and the predecessor of Fawcett Preston, Fawcett 
and Littledale (148 engines between 1813 and 1825). The export of such apparatus 
meant that in the Caribbean 'by the mid-nineteenth century steam-power was an 
embedded technology in the more advanced sugar producing islands'.2 From the 
1820s onward, moreover, the stationary steam engine was also making its appearance 
in the Indian subcontinent, though not initially in the context of sugar production.3 
That development dated from the 1830s and 1840s4, and was subsequently paralleled 
2 Jennifer Tann, 'Steam and Sugar: The Diffusion of the Stationary Steam Engine to the 
Caribbean Sugar Industry, 1770-1840', History of Technology, vol. 19, 1997, pp. 63-84, here 
pp. 71-5; Galloway, Cane Sugar Industry, pp. 135-41.
3 Jennifer Tann & John Aitkin, The Diffusion of the Stationary Steam Engine from Britain 
to India, 1790-1830, Indian Economic and Social History Review, vol. 29, no. 2, 1992, 
pp. 199-214.
4 Andrew Ratledge, Competing for the British Sugar Bowl: East India Sugar 1792-1865: 
Politics, Trade and Sugar Consumption, Saarbrücken, VDM Verlag Dr Müller, 2009.
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elsewhere in Asia. As we shall see, in Java itself stationary steam engines to power the 
grinding mills for cane only became common at a somewhat later date.
Nonetheless, equally crucial advances took place in the boiling house as well 
as in the mill. Indeed, substantial improvements in the process of cleansing cane-
juice and concentrating it to a quasi-solid state were at least as important as the 
initial business of extracting juice from cane itself. Most of these advances in the 
boiling house originated from inventions designed to solve the problems of sugar 
refineries, rather than having been invented by the producers of the raw form of the 
commodity. That is to say, much of the original stimulus for the sugar revolution 
came from metropolitan businesses that melted down raw sugar and reconstituted it 
in a commercially more convenient and palatable form. These businesses were found, 
by the early nineteenth century, in numerous locations in Western Europe — London 
and Amsterdam and Hamburg, for example — and subsequently in North America, 
where New York became the key centre.
Even so, colonial producers of raw sugar — the kind that was bought by 
refineries — were not slow to take up the new technologies of manufacture. The 
same or very similar methods to those used in sugar refining could be appropriated 
by the plantation sugar industries in the 'peripheries' of the New World and of Asia.
In addition to supplying the refineries with an improved product, however, 
there was a further and eventually crucial dynamic at work here. During the course 
of the nineteenth century, sugar, unique among global commodities in this respect, 
began to be manufactured to similar standards and appearance from two totally 
different forms of raw material: cane and beet. Beet was a latecomer on the scene. 
Scarcely heard of as a commercially viable source of sucrose at the beginning of the 
century, it started to gain a substantial market share from the 1850s onward.
In northern Europe, beet sugar manufacture took off on a grand scale, and 
(post-1870) Imperial Germany emerged as the largest singular producer-exporter of 
this form of the commodity. There were global forces at work here. During the second 
half of the nineteenth century, northern European grain farmers found themselves 
drawn into the vortex of a world market increasingly fed by the production of the 
vast and newly 'opened-up' North American plains (and their lesser counterparts in 
the Antipodes). One of the upshots was that European farmers increasingly turned to 
sugar beet as one form of economic salvation.
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In turn, this had major consequences for the international sugar economy. 
Colonial producers of cane sugar had begun to find themselves in increasing 
competition from sugar made from beet. Moreover, competition was not limited 
to markets. It extended, equally critically, into the sphere of manufacture, since the 
nascent beet sugar industries of Germany, the Low Countries and northern France 
sought to secure an edge over their colonial cane sugar rivals by utilising all the latest 
inventions that the first industrial revolution had placed in their way.5 In consequence, 
colonial producers of cane sugar were forced to follow suit — or were driven into the 
backwoods of the international sugar economy.
The combined result of these several developments, in both the manufacture of 
raw sugar and its subsequent refining, placed sugar on the very cutting edge of global 
industrialisation. What had been a technologically somewhat retrograde industry, 
one that relied on crude methods predicated on heavy inputs of manual labour, 
was transformed in the more advanced sectors into an exemplar of ever-improving 
technological achievement on par with virtually anything that the industrial revolution 
might create in relation to any other major commodity.
At the risk of some oversimplification, three complementary major inventions 
were involved. Chronologically speaking, the first was the Vacuum Pan, a piece of 
equipment designed to obviate the danger of liquid sugar scorching over direct heat 
during the final stages of its conversion into a semi-solid mass — a problem inherent 
to varying degrees in the forms of 'open-pan' manufacture which preceded it. The 
Pan took the form of
a slightly flattened sphere of copper, provided inside at the lower part with 
a coil of steam pipe, and also a vacuum jacket. An air-pump creates a partial 
5 For the discussion in the following paragraphs, see Margaret Leidelmeijer, Van Suikermolen 
tot Grootbedrijf: Technische Vernieuwing in de Java-Suikerindustrie in de Negentiende Eeuw, 
Amsterdam, NEHA, 1997, pp. 39-68; Bill Albert & Adrian Graves (eds), Crisis and Change 
in the International Sugar Economy, 1860-1914, Norwich, ISC Press, 1984, especially pp. 1-8; 
Noel Deerr, The History of Sugar, vol. 2, London, Chapman and Hall, 1950, pp. 534-95; 
Jon Curry-Machado, Cuban Sugar Industry: Transnational Networks and Engineering Migrants 
in Mid-Nineteenth Century Cuba, New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2011, pp. 23-47; Curry-
Machado, '"Rich Flames and Hired Tears": Sugar, Sub-Imperial Agents and the Cuban 
Phoenix of Empire', Journal of Global History, vol. 4, no. 1, 2009, pp. 33-56; Martijn Bakker, 
Ondernemerschap en Vernieuwing: De Nederlandse Bietsuikerindustrie 1858-1919, Amsterdam, 
Stichting Het Nederlandsch Economisch-Historisch Archief, 1989, pp. 15-26, 135-63; 
Roger Munting & John Perkins, 'The Cane-Beet Sugar Rivalry in the 19th Century', in Roger 
Munting & Tamas Szmrecsanyi (eds), Competing for the Sugar Bowl, St. Katharinen, Scripta 
Mercaturae Verlag, 2000, pp. 1-15; Galloway, Cane Sugar Industry, pp. 120-42.
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vacuum, and a condens-
er, through which the 
steam from the boiling 
juice passes on its way to 
the air pump, by rapidly 
condensing the vapour, 
greatly helps to increase 
the vacuum.6
The Vacuum Pan enabled 
the final stages of 'cooking' 
the sugar to take place 
at a significantly lower 
temperature than was the 
case in the old open-pan 
method. When all went 
well, the new apparatus not 
only afforded significant savings in fuel costs but also produced more sugar of a 
better quality than previously by virtue of the fact that it increased the proportion 
of crystalisable sugar in relation to the quantity of molasses.7 Early versions of the 
Vacuum Pan first appeared in European sugar refineries around 1820 — and within 
less than a decade were taken up by progressive raw sugar manufacturers worldwide.
Almost contemporaneously, moreover, further technological progess began to 
be made, along with a steadily evolving chemistry of sugar manufacture, in respect to 
the process of cleansing ('defecating') and partially evaporating cane-juice before it 
reached the Vacuum Pan for the penultimate stage of its transformation into sugar.8 
6 George Martineau, Sugar, London, Pitman, c. 1910, p. 66.
7 See e.g. AH Adamson, Sugar Without Slaves: The Political Economy of British Guiana, 1838-
1904, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1972, pp. 171-2; HC Prinsen Geerligs, Cane Sugar 
and the Process of its Manufacture in Java, Manchester, Roberts, 1898, pp. 39-40; Griggs, 
Global Industry, Local Innovation, pp. 182-3.
8 I would like to thank Dr Margaret Leidelmeijer for her sage advice on the importance of 
Figure 3: The heart of the 
industrial sugar factory: the 
Vacuum Pan.
Source: Courtesy of the author
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For the most part, during the middle decades of the century, this vital stage of the 
manufacturing process took place (in the industry's more advances sectors, at least) 
in steam-heated open pans of one kind or another, in a process that remained more 
an art than a science.
Other possibilities, however, were being actively explored from the 1820s 
onward. In particular, a further sophistication of advances in 'boiling house' technology 
in the mid-nineteenth century was the provision of an external serpentine or rack of 
copper pipes which utilised the heated vapour coming off the boiling sugar inside the 
Vacuum Pan in order to condense juice prior to the final stages of processing. This 
'double effect' process was most closely associated with the French firm of Derosne 
et Cail. It was not without its operational problems, however, particularly when used 
in cane sugar manufacture, where the juice was more viscous and hence more easily 
burnt than beet. Moreover, its other disadvantages — as expounded upon by one 
Dutch authority circa 1860 — were several-fold, not least the need for singularly 
skilled workmen, and the presence of a knowledgeable engineer in case things went 
wrong. (The writer advised his readers to opt instead for 'simple' Vacuum Pans 
coupled with 'orthodox' open-pan cleansing and concentration of the juice in the 
preceding stages of manufacture.)9
Even so, the principle the Double Effect utilised — that is, the taking of steam 
generated in one part of the process and using it to heat the juice at another — had 
a great future. Indeed, the prototypes of earlier decades evolved into the full-fledged 
Multiple Effect, the second great advance in the technology of sugar manufacture 
in the mid-nineteenth century. Noel Deerr, whose pioneering History of Sugar has 
stood the test of time, categorised the Multiple Effect as having 'a place among the 
world's great inventions'.10 When it finally came into its own in the 1860s — its 
evolution had taken place over the better part of twenty years — the Multiple Effect, 
variously known as 'Double Effet', 'Triple Effet' or 'Quadruple Effet' (or in English as 
Double Effect, Triple Effect and Quadruple Effect), conquered the world. Described 
succinctly:
mid-century developments — both technological and scientific — in cleansing and reducing 
cane-juice prior to its arrival at the Vacuum Pan. For her discussion of these and related issues, 
see Leidelmeijer, Grootbedrijf, pp. 147-230.
9 WL de Sturler, Handboek voor den landbouw in Nederlandsch Oost-Indië, Leiden, Sythoff, 
1863, p. 1134.
10 Deerr, vol. 2, p. 562.
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[i]t replaced the old set of open pans with a set of closed vessels … Steam 
heating was used throughout, and as the atmospheric pressure was reduced in 
succeeding cylinders, the steam from the first was used to boil the sugar in the 
second [and so on] … Because boiling under vacuum now permitted a lower 
temperature throughout the entire process of evaporation, the formation of 
molasses was minimalized and a much greater quantity of crystallisable sugar 
produced.11
In a nutshell, the Multiple Effect offered huge savings in fuel costs, greatly simplified 
the operation of the production line (thereby reducing labour costs) and, above all, 
perhaps, confirmed — through the level of control over the production process it 
conferred on a skilled operator — that sugar-making was indeed now a science rather 
than an art.
Initially designed, like the Vacuum Pan before it, for operation in refineries, 
the Multiple Effect was at first considered far too bulky and expensive for use in raw 
sugar production.12 By the late 1860s, however, that was precisely where it began 
to be found, in rapidly increasing numbers. As was also the case with the Vacuum 
Pan, the Multiple Effect presupposed a familiarity with steam/vacuum technology 
and the presence of a sufficient supply of experientially trained technicians. In Java, 
at least, this appears (as we shall see in subsequent chapters) not to have been a 
major problem, thanks to a global 'diaspora' of the requisite personnel — and to the 
adaptive capacities of elements of the skilled local workforce.
Along with the Vacuum Pan and the Multiple Effect came a third major 
advance in the technology of manufacture in the mid-nineteenth century, one which 
gave its name to the type of sugar that industrialised factories began to produce 
11 Adamson, Sugar Without Slaves, p. 187.
12 According to the noted sugar expert Noel Deerr, while the apparatus began to evolve in 
the 1840s, 'for the next twenty years progress was slow' and it was only from around 1870 
onward that the Multiple Effect began to become wide-spread in either beet or cane sugar 
production (vol. 2, pp. 562-72). This view is supported by reliable contemporary testimony. 
Peter Soames knew about this apparatus, but in relation to cane sugar regarded it as applicable 
only in 'very large works' and so left it out of his account (Treatise on the Manufacture of Sugar 
from Sugar Cane, London & New York, Spon, 1872, pp. 58ff.). A decade later, Lock et al. 
regarded the introduction of fully-fledged Multiple Effect procedures as recent: '… [I]t is 
not long since that the French house of Cail & Cie introduced a great improvement in the 
economy of the Vacuum Pans, by working them in sets of 2 or 3, known as "double effet" and 
"triple effet" respectively'. See CGW Lock, GW Wigner & RH Harland, Sugar Growing and 
Refining, London & New York, Spon, 1882, pp. 269-73.
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worldwide. This advance took the form of the Centrifuge, a device for spinning the 
sugar crystals free of the remaining molasses at the very end of the production line.13 
Invented in the 1840s and rapidly taken up throughout the industry, the Centrifuge 
resembled nothing so much as a modern top-loading washing machine. Usually, there 
was a set of Centrifuges in each factory. They revolutionised the final stages of sugar 
manufacture and refining by doing away with cumbersome and often wasteful, highly 
labour-intensive methods for separating sugar crystals from the residue of the boiled-
down and clarified juices. Thereafter, sugar produced by this means was ubiquitously 
referred to as 'centrifugal'.
In short, the Centrifuge rendered redundant — or drove into the backwoods 
of the international sugar economy — a wide variety of 'pre-industrial' methods for 
'setting' sugar into a commercially viable, transportable and convenient form. Prior 
to that, even in the most advanced of 'industrial' factories, sugar had generally been 
laboriously and slowly drained of its molasses, after which it needed to be further 
dried. The Centrifuge not only did a better job but also a speedier one, cutting down 
considerably on the number of workers required. Those workers who were required, 
however, had to be singularly adept: in Java, they were mostly women.
Industrialised Sugar Manufacture in Nineteenth-century Asia
Though the Vacuum Pan, the various forms of Multiple Effect apparatus and the 
Centrifuge eventually came to characterise the large-scale, commercially oriented 
production of cane (and beet) sugar worldwide during the course of the nineteenth 
century, they did not do so at an internationally consistent pace. As far as the 
manufacture of cane sugar was concerned in the West, Cuba developed as the standout 
industry during the middle decades of the nineteenth century. Cuba was followed 
by a number of other producers elsewhere in the Caribbean area and on the North 
American mainland. In Asia, however, it was Java that evolved quite uniquely in this 
respect. Among Asia's other long-established sugar industries, the Dutch colony was 
by no means the only one in which the industrial project was essayed during the 
period between the 1840s and 1880s. Nonetheless, as things transpired, it emerged as 
the one most able to adopt, adapt and — above all — sustain the project. The upshot 
was to put the island's industry in the position of a world leader in the technologically 
13 For a detailed history of its mid-century evolution, see Deerr, vol. 2, pp. 573-7.
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industrialised manufacture of the commodity, decades ahead of any of its erstwhile 
counterparts in its own and adjacent regions.
Sugar manufacture in Asia had a fundamentally pre-industrial character 
prior to the nineteenth century. In the Indian subcontinent, Siam, the Philippines, 
southern China, Formosa and elsewhere, cane sugar was manufactured by methods 
that demanded high inputs of labour and a great deal of experiential, 'rule-of-thumb' 
knowledge. To be sure, machines of a kind played some part. Throughout East 
and South-East Asia, cane was ground in simple mills comprised of two (or three) 
vertically set rollers, generally made of wood or stone, and set in motion by cattle 
roped to an overhead beam. As mentioned earlier, this technology had worldwide 
currency in one form or another, having most probably originated in Southern China 
in the course of the sixteenth century.14
By the late eighteenth century, however, Asia as a whole lagged behind the 
Caribbean in proto-industrial innovation.15 There were some scattered exceptions. 
In Ryukyu — a remote and relatively minor production area immediately to the 
south of Japan — water power was apparently harnessed to an innovative three-
roller mill early in the eighteenth century.16 In Java, a solitary mill 'constructed in 
14 The development (in southern China) and rapid dissemination early in the sixteenth 
century of a new style of geared, vertical two-roller mill which considerably improved the 
efficiency with which cane was expressed is discussed in J & C Daniels, 'The Origin of the 
Sugar Cane Roller Mill', Technology and Culture, vol. 29, no. 3, 1988, pp. 493-535. Roller 
milling of this kind does not appear, however, to have extended beyond East and South-East 
Asia. Early modern sugar production in India was dominated by the (generally less efficient) 
mortar press or kohlu, usually worked by oxen, while in some parts of the subcontinent the 
more usual method was for cane to be milled with hand-operated rollers. See Shahid Amin, 
Sugar Cane and Sugar in Gorakphur, Delhi, Oxford University Press, 1984, pp. 53-6.
15 The major technological advances in the New World industry prior to the mid-nineteenth 
century can be summarised as follows: (a) a more efficient vertical metal or metal-clad three-
cylinder mill was in common use by the early eighteenth century; (b) an improved system of 
open-pan sugar boiling, which saved on fuel and gave a greater degree of control over heat 
(the Jamaica or Spanish 'Train'), had been widely though not universally adopted by the late 
eighteenth century; (c) by the early nineteenth century, a very much more efficient milling 
system based on horizontal metal rollers set in a triangular configuration was coming into use 
(and appears to have had eighteenth-century prototypes in the more advanced sectors of New 
World sugar production). See Dale W Tomich, Slavery in the Circuit of Sugar: Martinique and 
the World Economy 1830-1848, Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1990, pp. 150-88; 
Galloway, Cane Sugar Industry, pp. 84-119.
16 Sucheta Mazumdar, Sugar and Society in China: Peasants, Technology, and the World Market, 
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the West Indian manner, with brass cylinders and put into motion by water' was a 
novelty when installed in one of the long-established production areas of the island's 
Northeast Coast late in the same century.17 Generally speaking, however, it looks as if 
neither the water-driven mill nor any equivalent of the 'Jamaica' or 'Spanish' train — 
that is to say, 'a series of semi-hemispherical vessels placed in line in a masonry flue 
with a furnace at one end' — had made their appearance in Asia on any scale prior 
to the nineteenth century.18
During the first half of the new century, however, progress was both rapid 
and fairly wide-spread. Like their counterparts in the New World, beginning around 
1830 sugar producers in South and South-East Asia — though not apparently in 
East Asia — set about implementing the industrial project in manufacture. They 
undertook such ventures in the subcontinent and on the Indian Ocean island of 
Mauritius — and in various other scattered locations between the Bay of Bengal and 
the South China Sea, including Siam, the Malay Peninsula, the Philippines and, of 
course, Java itself. They did this, moreover, at a time when Asian sugar production 
was being integrated increasingly into a world market for the commodity.
Asian sugar, it is true, had reached Western markets in intermittent and 
varying quantities since at least the early seventeenth century. Together with the 
output of Mesopotamia, it may have constituted the first manufactured sugar known 
in the ancient civilisations around the Mediterranean. Nonetheless, it was only in the 
nineteenth century that sugar from Asian producers began to play a significant part 
in world trade. It was only then, and initially in the Occident, that the commodity 
Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Asia Centre, 1998, pp. 174-5; Robert LeRoy Innes, 
'The Door Ajar: Japan's Foreign Trade in the Seventeenth Century', PhD Diss, University of 
Michigan, 1980, p. 511. Innes records both the invention in Okinawa of a three-roller mill 
(1669) and the successful connection of the rollers to a water-wheel (1717).
17 It was built at Jepara on Java's Northeast Coast in the 1790s, on the orders of the 
'progressive' Dutch Resident Dirk van Hogendorp. See E du Perron-de Roos, 'Correspondentie 
tussen Dirk van Hogendorp en Zijn Broeder Gijsbert Karl van Hogendorp', Bijdragen tot de 
Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde, vol. 102, nos. 1 & 2, 1943, pp. 125-273, here p. 199; 'Resident 
Doornik's Replies …', 28.10.1812, India Office Library, London, Mackenzie Collection 
(Private), vol. 7, p. 173. This mill may have had an equally rare counterpart in the West Java 
production area around Batavia, where a stone triple-roller mill, built in the 'American Style', 
was recorded by de Haan as having existed on the Tanjung-West estate circa 1785. See F de 
Haan, Oud Batavia, 2nd edn, vol. 1, Bandoeng, AC Nix & Co., 1935, pp. 325-6.
18 Deerr, vol. 2, p. 556. As Deerr's discussion makes clear, there is no absolute certainty on 
the point.
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in general became an item of mass consumption, due to the rapidly increasing 
penetration of sucrose into the diet of the industrial populations of Western Europe 
— above all, those of the United Kingdom. As a result, sugar from all over the world, 
Asia included, began to be drawn into European and North American commodity 
circuits on a hitherto unprecedented scale. In turn, this development stimulated 
attempts to foster the industrial project in sugar well beyond the confines of the 
Atlantic Zone.
Indeed, in the Indian subcontinent as early as the 1770s (and reflecting the 
precocity of the British market to which it was connected) Bengal was the scene of 
attempts to emulate the best of contemporary production in the New World. An 
even more significant development took place some sixty years later when, beginning 
in the mid-1830s, a further influx of British and local Indian capital occurred, as a 
result of a determination to take advantage of the recent equalisation of colonial sugar 
duties in the metropolis to realise the subcontinent's potential as the 'sugar bowl' of 
the United Kingdom. Extensive attempts to industrialise Indian sugar production 
with Vacuum Pans, steam mills and other state-of-the art manufacturing equipment 
got underway in Bengal, Madras and other prospectively favourable locations using 
the skills of some former slave-masters from the British Caribbean.19
A parallel development, on a smaller scale and at a somewhat later date, and 
involving both British and local Chinese capital, took place in Siam during the 
1860s.20 Later still, the ubiquitous Vacuum Pan was said to have reached Province 
Wellesley on the Malay Peninsula, where a moderate-sized sugar industry existed 
19 For sugar production in the Indian subcontinent during this period, see Ulbe Bosma, The 
Asian Sugar Plantation in India and Indonesia: Industrial Production 1770-2010, Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 2013, pp. 44-87; Amin, Gorakphur, pp. 32-80; PJ Marshall, 'The 
Bengal Commercial Society of 1775', Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research, vol. 42, 
1969, pp. 173-87; PJ Marshall, East Indian Fortunes, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1976; 
PJ Marshall, Bengal: The British Bridgehead, Eastern India 1740-1828, The New Cambridge 
History of India II, vol. 2, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1987, pp. 5-22, 34-9; 
Ratledge, British Sugar Bowl, passim.
20 On sugar in nineteenth-century Siam, see Suehiro Akira, Capital Accumulation in 
Thailand, 1855-1985, Tokyo, Centre for East Asian Cultural Studies, 1989; David Bruce 
Johnson, 'Rural Society and the Rice Economy in Thailand, 1880-1930', Yale University, 
PhD Diss, 1975, pp. 26-31; Sarasin Viraphol, Tribute and Profit: Sino-Siamese Trade 1652-




from around 1870 onward.21 Contemporaneously, in the maritime zone of South-
East Asia, a new production area for sugar was created in the western districts of the 
Philippine island of Negros, equipped with steam mills, Vacuum Pans and Centrifuges 
— and financed, at least initially, by British mercantile capital. One contemporary 
source from the 1850s, for example, noted the importation into the island of iron 
cattle mills, and also of a large steam-driven mill, 'with corresponding evaporating 
pans and "centrifugals" for curing'. The source reported that it could be
confidently state[d] that in the course of three years at least three other large 
steam mills will be erected … These improvements, though limited if compared 
with those of the great centres of sugar cultivation in other colonies, are what 
no one would have ventured to anticipate a few years ago as attainable in this 
quarter where the introduction of the steam mill … was looked upon as quite 
chimerical.22
At around the same time but further north, an already-established industry expanded 
considerably in the Pampanga districts of Luzon.23
21 See Soames, Treatise, p. 59, for the claim that there were Vacuum Pans in 'Province 
Wellesley opposite Penang', from where sugar went to the Chinese market. According to a 
recent study, the British-owned Penang Sugar Estates Limited 'from its beginnings … was 
one of the largest, most technologically sophisticated of the European-owned sugar producers 
in Malaya. Its original landholdings dwarfed the typical Chinese-owned sugar estate of 500 
acres or less, and they were several times the size of competing European firms, which usually 
worked only one plantation. A European visitor in the 1880s remarked that six of the nine 
large sugar estates in Province Wellesley were owned by the PSE [Penang Sugar Estates], 
making them the largest single producer of sugar in the region. PSE refineries, touted as "the 
last word in modernity", also processed the canes of smaller producers'. See Lynn Hollen Lees, 
'International Management in a Free-Standing Company: The Penang Sugar Estates, Ltd., 
and the Malayan Sugar Industry, 1851-1914', Business History Review, vol. 81, spring 2007, 
pp. 27-57. Unfortunately, the author (whose prime concern is with the organisation of the 
business) elides the making of raw sugar with the subsequent refining of such sugar. (Refineries 
do not — as her account implies — process cane.) It is extremely unlikely that the PSE would 
have had refineries on each of its estates, and quite possible that it did not possess a refinery 
at all. Professor Lees nonetheless provides the most detailed and authoritative account to date 
(pp. 42-7) of sugar production in nineteenth-century Malaya.
22 Robert MacMicking, Recollections of Manilla and the Philippines during 1848, 1849, and 
1850, edited and annotated by Morton J Netzorg, with an Appendix, 'Trade in Panay, 1857-67, 
Four Letters by Nicholas Loney', Manila, Filipiniana Book Guild Inc., 1967, pp. 246-9.
23 On developments in sugar production in the Philippines during the course of the 
nineteenth century, see Filomeno V Aguilar, Jnr, Clash of Spirits: The History of Power and 
Sugar Planter Hegemony on a Visayan Island, Honolulu, University of Hawai'i Press, 1998; 
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Most significant of all, however, was the development that took place on the 
island of Mauritius during the mid-century decades.24 Beginning in the 1840s, almost 
contemporaneous with developments in the Indian subcontinent (and, as we shall 
see, in Java itself ), a well-equipped sugar industry evolved on the island. It was well 
provided with Vacuum Pans and the other appurtenances of industrial production 
— and with supplies of 'cheap' indentured labour from India. Some Dutch colonial 
contemporaries wrote enviously of the fact that around 1860 'little' Mauritius was 
producing as much sugar as Java.25 Its industry was destined to be one of the very 
few in Asia, apart from the Dutch colony, which had a continuous history of (semi-)
industrialised sugar manufacture running through into the twentieth century.
John A Larkin, The Pampangans: Colonial Society in a Philippine Province, Berkeley & Los 
Angeles, University of California Press, 1972; Larkin, Sugar and the Origins of Modern 
Philippine Society, Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1993; VB Lopez-
Varga, The Socio-Politics of Sugar: Wealth, Power Formation and Change in Negros 1899-1985, 
Bacolod, University of St La Salle Press, 1989; Alfred W McCoy, 'A Queen Dies Slowly: 
The Rise and Decline of Iloilo City', in Alfred W McCoy & Ed C de Jesus, Philippine Social 
History, Quezon City, Ateneo de Manila University Press, 1982, pp. 297-360; McCoy, 'Sugar 
Barons: Formation of a Native Planter Class in the Colonial Philippines', Journal of Peasant 
Studies, vol. 19, no. 3, 1992, pp. 106-41.
24 According to A North Coombes (The Evolution of Sugarcane Culture in Mauritius 
with a Chapter on the Evolution of the Mauritian Sugar Factory, Mauritius, Department 
of Agriculture, 1937, p. 124), in 1862 some 56 of the island's 300 factories had installed 
Vacuum Pans, and most of them operated with Centrifuges. The majority of the factories 
without Vacuum Pans had installed steam-heated evaporating pans, and 277 of the factories 
had steam mills installed. Noel Deerr reported that the first Vacuum Pan was installed there 
in 1844 (vol. 2, pp. 561-2). JA Leon (On Sugar Cultivation in Louisiana, Cuba &c. and the 
British Possessions by an European and Colonial Sugar Manufacturer, London, Ollivier, 1848) 
remarked that Mauritius was the only British colonial plantation known to him 'where the 
modern process of making sugar has tolerably succeeded'. He cited 'Darruty's plantation', 
which was equipped with a Vacuum Pan, five double bottom clarifiers, five oblong steam 
evaporators, three cylindrical steam boilers, filters, Monte-jus, etc. For Mauritius in general, 
see Richard Allen, 'The Slender, Sweet Thread: Sugar, Capital and Dependency in Mauritius, 
1860-1936', The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, vol. 16, 1981, pp. 177-200; 
William Kelleher Storey, Science and Power in Colonial Mauritius, Rochester, NY, University 
of Rochester Press, 1997; and the series of articles by Ronald Lamousse, under the general title 
of 'The Economic Development of the Mauritius Sugar Industry', Revue Agricole et Sucrière 
de L'île Maurice, vol. 43, nos. 1, 2 & 4, 1964, pp. 23-38, 113-27, 354-72; and also vol. 44, 
no. 1, 1965, pp. 11-36.
25 That is, in 1860 Mauritius produced around 130 000 MT. See DC Steijn Parve, 'Nieuwe 
Uitvindingen Betreffende de Koloniale Suikerbereiding', Tijdschrijft voor Nederlandsch-Indië 
(Nieuwe Reeks), vol. 1, no. 2, 1867, pp. 392-408.
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In the event, however, none of these ventures achieved their full potential. 
The attempts to restructure cane production in the Indian subcontinent to suit 
the requirements of the industrial project had largely collapsed by 1850, not to be 
reinvigorated on any scale until the 1920s. Those entrepreneurs and investors who 
survived the debacle transferred their attentions to the production of indigo (which 
required very modest capital investment in its essentially pre-industrial technology).
By the 1870s, the Mauritius industry had entered a long period of stagnation 
and Mauritius had ceased to be a major producer in world terms, though it continued 
to supply substantial quantities of the commodity to the specialised Indian market. 
Indeed, by the century's end, its factories were authoritatively described as antiquated 
museum pieces.26 One key factor here was that the Mauritius manufacturers lacked 
the intimate contacts with bourgeois capital in the British metropolis which (as 
we shall see) characterised their Indies-Dutch counterparts in Java, while Indian 
capitalists seem to have been unwilling to fill in the gap.27 In the same decade, 
industrialised manufacture was largely abandoned in Siam, not to appear there again 
until the 1930s, while attempts to produce sugar on any scale on the Malay Peninsula 
petered out around 1900, in consequence of the better prospects of rubber and of 
competition from cheap imports from Java.28
A similar, though not identical, picture also held good for the Philippines. It 
would appear that the advance there of industrial technology was largely restricted 
to the milling of cane by steam-operated equipment and some few Vacuum Pans. 
The Multiple Effect looks to have made no appearance there — in what had become 
a cash-starved industry — prior to the American makeover in the early decades of 
the twentieth century after America's conquest of the ex-Spanish territory.29 In the 
26 Noel Deerr, as quoted in HC Prinsen Geerligs, 'Invoer en Fabrikatie 1904', ASNI, vol. 12, 
no. 2, 1904, pp. 13-28.
27 Richard B Allen, Slaves, Freedmen and Indentured Labourers in Colonial Mauritius, 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1999, pp. 22-3.
28 Lees, 'The Penang Sugar Estates', pp. 28, 54.
29 According to Deerr, a couple of Vacuum Pans were first installed in the Philippines in 
1879 (vol. 2, p. 562). Other sources, while indicating steam mills, have nothing to say about 
Vacuum Pans or the Multiple Effect before the early twentieth century. 'It is an astonishing 
fact', remarked an early twentieth-century American investigator, 'that so little attention is 
paid in Negros to the importance of skill and care in the manufacture of sugar, even by the 
present crude methods'. He estimated that not more than one plantation-owner in twenty 
was fully conversant with the sugar-manufacturing process. See Herbert S Walker, The Sugar 
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1890s, for example, the Negros industry's foremost apologist lamented that a system 
of industrialised centrales had yet to appear, arguing that it was 'because of his lack 
of capital' that the planter-manufacturer of Negros was forced to adopt 'quick and 
simple methods' which produced only a low-grade sugar from the excellent raw 
material available to the mills.30 Shortage of capital may also have been the chief 
factor in holding back the advance of industrialised manufacture in East Asia's main 
production areas in southern China and Formosa.31 As was the case in the Philippines, 
the fully-fledged industrial project in sugar had to wait until the twentieth century. 
This left Java very much on its own.
The Rise of Java Sugar on the World Market 1780-1885
The commodity production of sugar had a long history in Java. Indeed, it appears 
to have begun there around the beginning of the seventeenth century, or perhaps 
somewhat earlier. From the start, it had been directed toward overseas markets. 
The local taste for sweeteners was mainly catered for by the manufacture of sugar 
from the sap of the palm tree32, and sugar made from cane was largely an export 
Industry on the Island of Negros, Manila, Department of the Interior, Bureau of Science, 1910, 
pp. 111-12.
30 Robustiano Echauz, Sketches of the Island of Negros, 1894, translated and annotated by DV 
Hart, with an Introduction by John Larkin, Ohio, Ohio University, Centre for International 
Studies, Papers in International Studies, Southeast Asia Series, no. 50, 1978, p. 61.
31 Mazumdar, Sugar and Society in China, pp. 338-86. For Formosa, see Christopher M 
Isett, 'Sugar Manufacture and the Agrarian Economy of Nineteenth-Century Taiwan', 
Modern China, vol. 21, no. 2, April 1995, pp. 233-59. The sugar entering world markets from 
Formosa/Taiwan in significant quantities, especially by the 1880s, was 'pre-industrial' sugar, 
manufactured by 'traditional means'.
32 MAP Meilink-Roelofz, Asian Trade and European Influence in the Indonesian Archipelago 
between 1500 and about 1630, The Hague, Nijhoff, 1962, pp. 14, 242; K Glamann, Dutch-
Asiatic Trade, 1620-1740, The Hague, Nijhoff, 1958, pp. 155-6; Paul Wheatley, The Golden 
Khersonese: Studies in the Historical Geography of the Malay Peninsula before A.D. 1500, Kuala 
Lumpur, University of Malaya Press, 1961, pp. 66-8; Anthony Reid, Southeast Asia in the Age 
of Commerce, vol. 1: The Lands below the Winds, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1988, 
p. 31. Reid remarks of the situation in the region in the fifteenth to seventeenth centuries 
that 'as a sweetening … Southeast Asians themselves made greater use of brown sugar derived 
from boiling the sap of the Arenga or sugar palm, also native to the region and a prolific 
source of liquid sugar'. This still appears to have been substantially true at the beginning of 
the nineteenth century. TS Raffles (The History of Java, vol. 1, London, Black, Parbury and 
Allen, 1817, p. 97) says of Java that 'the sugar used by the natives is not prepared from the 
sugar cane, but from the aren and other palms'. According to H Deinum ('Bevolkingssuiker', 
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commodity, which was shipped out either via the Chinese junk trade on Batavia 
(or more rarely) on vessels owned by the VOC (the Dutch East India Company, 
or Verenigde Oostindische Compagnie). The China market was evidently of great 
importance. Like contemporary Formosa, Java functioned as an (albeit rather distant) 
'off-shore island': one that supplied the mainland with a commodity that was cheaper 
and quite possibly tastier than that produced in southern China itself.33 Along with 
China, the great ports of the Indian subcontinent and the Persian Gulf figured in 
the eighteenth-century destinations for the island's exports. In Europe, Java sugar 
generally competed only intermittently and often ineffectually with the output of the 
New World.34
Information on the output and export of cane sugar in eighteenth-century 
Java is sketchy and none-too-reliable. It is also necessary to distinguish between 
developments that took place in western parts of Java, particularly in the so-
called Ommelanden [hinterlands] around the VOC's base at Batavia, and those 
that took place elsewhere on the island, notably on the Pasisir [shore], effectively 
Java's Northeast Coast from Cirebon to Surabaya and beyond. Manufacture in the 
Ommelanden (and commensurate exports) is generally reckoned — the evidence is 
in CJJ van Hall & C van de Koppel, De Landbouw in de Indische Archipel, vol. 2A, The 
Hague, van Hoeve, 1948, p. 419) there are in Indonesia/South-East Asia three kinds of palm 
tree from which sugar is produced on a commercial scale. These are the Arenga Palm (Arenga 
saccharifera), the Siwilan or Lontar Palm (Borassus flabillifer) and Coco Palm (Cocos nucifera). 
This same source (pp. 419-24) has a brief description of the tapping and processing of palm 
sugar.
33 On the early sugar trade between Formosa/Taiwan and mainland China, see Mazumdar, 
Sugar and Society in China, pp. 41, 206-7, 264.
34 Glamann, pp. 157-66. From the mid-seventeenth century, Java sugar displaced Chinese 
sugar in the VOC's shipments to Europe, but the demand there for South-East Asian sugar 
was erratic in the extreme. It competed with Brazilian and Caribbean sugar only in fairly 
exceptional circumstances: at the end of the 1640s, for example, when the Portugese-Dutch 
conflict in Brazil reduced the latter's supplies to the Amsterdam market, and for a short period 
in the 1720s when nearly 70 per cent of the sugar exported from Batavia was sent to Holland. 
For much of the early modern period, however, South-East Asian sugar was regarded as ballast 
in the VOC's shipments to Amsterdam (i.e. it was not the prime commercial purpose of the 
voyage). Glamann notes that 'sugar, during the rest of the Company's lifetime, remained a 
commodity the main sales of which took place in Asia'. Nonetheless, at various times in the 
1780s and again in the 1790s, the VOC strongly encouraged the production of sugar in Java, 
largely with a view to meeting demand in Europe.
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not altogether consistent — to have peaked quite early in the eighteenth century and 
to have remained in the doldrums thereafter.35
As far as sugar production is concerned, the situation further east in the Pasisir is 
only really documented — and then only imperfectly — from quite late in the century, 
and output appears subsequently to have fluctuated fairly dramatically between 1800 
and 1830. A rough estimate would be that by the end of the 1820s, the Pasisir was 
annually producing/exporting around 55 000 piculs, or approximately 3300 metric 
tons [MT], a figure which (if reliable) came near to matching the 60 000 piculs said 
to have been manufactured (and presumably exported) contemporaneously in the 
Ommelanden and other parts of West Java.36 Even so, by international standards — 
and by those of contemporary Asia — this was a commercially insignificant amount.
35 Around 1710, there were some 131 mills operating in the Ommelanden, with a claimed 
potential productive capacity totalling approximately 6500 tons of sugar a year and an actual 
production of some 4000 tons (Glamann, p. 164). Subsequent output cannot be confidently 
quantified: it must be assumed to have been very much lower after the massacre of many of 
Batavia's Chinese settlers (who virtually ran the sugar industry) in 1740. During the 1750s, 
sugar production can scarcely have exceeded an annual average of 3750 tons. (The trade 
in sugar produced in the Batavia hinterland was monopolised by the VOC.) In the period 
1751-60, the company consigned a total of 32 250 tons of (apparently) Batavia sugar to its 
other Asiatic factories, and somewhere between 2500 and 5000 tons to factorij Nederland 
(Glamann, p. 166). These figures do not take into account what Glamann (p. 165) describes 
as 'a constant small sale in the Indonesian archipelago (including sales in Batavia)'. After the 
mid-century, production appears to have picked up somewhat, though the number of mills 
continued to fall; J Hooyman says there were only fifty-five in 1779 ('Verhandelingen over den 
Tegenwoordigen Staat van den Landbouw in de Ommelanden van Batavia', Verhandelingen 
van het Bataviaasch Genootschap van Kunsten en Wetenschappen, vol. 1, 1779, pp. 173-263, here 
p. 241), but the same author cites a production figure of nearly 7000 MT for 1767, which he 
evidently reckoned was a pretty good year (pp. 212-13). Peter Creutzberg (Indonesia's Export 
Crops, vol. 1 of Peter Boomgaard (ed.), Changing Economy in Indonesia, The Hague, Nijhoff, 
1975, p. 63) has annual exports from the Batavia Ommelanden at around 5000-6000 MT 
toward the end of the eighteenth century.
36 For an extended discussion, see Robert Van Niel, Java's Northeast Coast 1740-1840, Leiden, 
CNWS Publications, 2005, pp. 133-53; and de Haan, Oud Batavia, vol. 1, 1935, pp. 325-6. 
According to the data laboriously collected by Van Niel (Northeast Coast, appendix 13), sugar 
production in the Pasisir amounted to an all-time (and quite exceptional) recorded high of 
51 000 piculs in 1803, falling steeply to a little over 23 000 piculs in 1804 and to 20 829 
piculs in 1805. This would suggest that de Haan's figure of 20 000 piculs for 1815 is perfectly 
plausible. 55 000 piculs had been achieved in the Pasisir by the end of the 1820s as a whole, 
up from a purported 20 000 piculs in 1815. The West Java output circa 1829 appears to 
have fallen by 50 per cent over the previous decade and a half (de Haan, Oud Batavia, vol. 1, 
p. 324; Van Niel, Northeast Coast, p. 343).
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From the 1830s onward, however, the situation changed radically. Around 
the beginning of the decade, Java was exporting scarcely 7000 MT of sugar annually. 
Twenty years later (in 1851), the quantity had risen to well over 100 000 MT; by the 
early 1870s exports stood at twice that amount. And output continued to mount, so 
that by 1885, the end of the period with which we are concerned, exports stood at a 
figure in excess of 400 000 MT.37
Global comparisons are important in establishing the full extent of Javanese 
sugar's remarkable trajectory in the mid-nineteenth century. Early data on this score 
are scarce and notably incomplete, but one estimate is that total world production 
of sugar amounted toward the close of the eighteenth century to no more 263 000 
MT in total. (This was before the massive disruption to supply in the Atlantic Zone 
occasioned by the great slave revolt on St Domingue, though the estimate probably 
took no account, for example, of the massive amounts of sugar in the form of gur 
produced in India, or of China's unquantified output of the commodity).38 Similarly 
qualified, 'world' production was calculated at around 644 000 MT circa 1840, 
and had risen to something in the region of 1 million MT a decade later, before 
approaching 4 million MT by the mid-1880s. In short — taking the figures for 
known sugar production at their face value and assuming the certain fact that almost 
all Java's recorded output at this time was exported — during the middle decades of 
the nineteenth century Java had risen from a position of almost total inconsequence 
in the international sugar economy to one in which it accounted for around 10 per 
cent of the world's recorded sugar output.
That figure would be much higher — approaching 20 per cent — if cane sugar 
production alone was taken into account, for by 1885 some 50 per cent or more of 
the world's recorded output of the commodity took the form of (northern European) 
beet sugar. As we have just seen, the manufacture of sugar from beet had begun in 
Europe during the Napoleonic Wars, but it was not until the 1840s and 1850s that it 
began to be produced in commercially appreciable quantities with a thoroughly viable 
37 See Appendix 2, 'Java Sugar Production and Exports 1830-1885', in Creutzberg, 
pp. 63-76.
38 See Tomich, p. 15; PhG Chalmin, 'Important Trends in Sugar Diplomacy before 1914', in 
Albert & Graves, Crisis and Change, p. 12. As indicated above, the estimate must be regarded 
as no more than rough, and excludes much Asian sugar production that took place outside 
the European colonial sphere.
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technology. After that, its output increased exponentially, potentially threatening to 
wipe cane sugar off the market. It was, therefore, one of the significant outcomes of 
the industrial project in Java that Asian cane sugar, by far the greater part of it from 
the Dutch colony, came to play such a major role in world trade. Without it, sugar 
manufactured from beet would have dominated the international sugar economy from 
about 1880 onward. Even so, the continued high profile of industrially manufactured 
cane sugar was predicated on far-reaching changes in the world market.
During the formative period of the industrial project in sugar, throughout 
the middle decades of the nineteenth century, Java's main markets were in the 
West, initially primarily in Amsterdam and subsequently in London. From the late 
nineteenth century onward, Java's industrial sugar factories started to find that the 
bulk of their sales were beginning to take place elsewhere in Asia itself, as industrially 
manufactured and refined white sugar began to be preferred by consumers who had 
previously been supplied by indigenous handicraft-producers of non-centrifugal 
sugar. Indeed, by the 1920s, all the major outlets for Java sugar were located in Asia. 
Though this development took some time to become fully apparent, as early as the 
1880s the tipping point had already been reached in which less Java sugar went 'west 
of Suez' (the standard contemporary designation) than to markets elsewhere in the 
world. Until then, the island's output was firmly integrated into a global commodity 
chain that moved its raw sugar from colonial periphery to a (quasi-)metropolitan 
core in Holland and the United Kingdom, where it was subsequently processed (i.e. 
refined) for distribution to European consumers.
After that, however, this bilateral relationship broke down and was replaced 
by one in which (colonial) Dutch capital and Indonesian resources of land and 
labour were combined to produce a commodity marketed 'exogenously' elsewhere 
in the East. Java had begun the nineteenth century, as we have seen, as a minor 
sector in a vast Asian production area in which the commodity was manufactured 
by pre-industrial means in places as far-flung as Bengal in northern India and a 
group of islands immediately to the south of Japan. It ended the century, however, 
as the 'Oriental Cuba', the Asian powerhouse of industrial sugar manufacture on 
the very front rank of the international sugar economy. It is to the evolution of this 
powerhouse, in the form of the advent of steam and steel on a colonial frontier and 
the industrial factory to which it gave birth, that we now turn.

33
2 A Creole Prometheus: Steam, Paddle Boats and Sugar Factories
During the middle decades of the nineteenth century, Prometheus came to Java, and 
did so in the shape of the technologies of steam, iron and (eventually) steel. In so 
far, moreover, as it invoked colonial ingenuity and invention as well as metropolitan 
transfer, Prometheus took on a distinctively Creole, hybrid character.39 As one recent 
writer has remarked of technology (and much else):
the Netherlands East Indies is such an alluring place to study, because it appears 
to exist simultaneously at the further reaches of modernity and close to its most 
dynamic centre.40
His point provides an apt motif for what follows, specifically in its applicability to 
the men and machines not only of the colony's sugar industry in the mid-nineteenth 
century but also of the larger imperialism of which they formed an essential part. The 
history of the Dutch colonial presence in nineteenth-century Java has been occluded 
to a degree by notions of a Tempo Doeloe — literally a 'time past', but with similar 
connotations to the myth of the ante-bellum American South — which became the 
subject for a deal of post-colonial nostalgia in the Netherlands itself.41 On this reading, 
39 For the Creole character of the 'Old Indies World' in general, see Ulbe Bosma and Remco 
Raben, Being 'Dutch' in the Indies: A History of Creolisation and Empire, 1500-1920, translated 
by Wendie Shaffer, Athens, Ohio/ Singapore, Ohio University Press/ Singapore University 
Press, 2008.
40 Rudolph Mrazek, Engineers of Happy Land: Technology and Nationalism in a Colony, 
Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 2002, p. xv.
41 The locus classicus, with a very heavy emphasis on photographic evidence, is E Breton de 
Nijs [aka Rob Nieuwenhuijs], Tempo Doeloe: Fotografische Documenten uit het Oude Indie, 
1870-1914, Amsterdam, Querido, 1961; but see also EM Beekman, 'Introduction', Rob 
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a largely 'pre-modern' order prevailed in the colony during the middle decades of the 
nineteenth century and was swept away only toward the century's end by economic 
crises and a sharp increase in the inflow of European capital and, subsequently, of 
self-consciously 'expatriate' personnel. The colony was not the sort of place, in short, 
where an industrial project was likely to thrive: on the contrary, in such a location 
sugar production was likely to be a thoroughly old-fashioned affair.
In fact, nothing could be further from the truth. Metropolitan Holland itself 
may have been slow to take up the advances of the industrial revolution.42 In its Asian 
colony, however, Prometheus was clearly in evidence on the frontiers of Dutch power 
in the Indonesian archipelago by the middle decades of the century.43
Nieuwenhuijs, Mirror of the Indies: A History of Dutch Colonial Literature, translated by Frans 
van Roosevelt, Amherst, University of Massachusetts Press, 1982, pp. xiii-xxiii; Beekman, 
Troubled Pleasures: Dutch Colonial Literature from the East Indies, 1600-1950, New York, 
Clarendon Press, 1996. In the latter work Beekman built a fantastical picture of an Indies 
community 'that was anything but Dutch' (p. 328), characterised by 'constant conflict' 
between 'the vast network of officials of the colonial civil service' and the world of 'planters, 
merchants … settlers' (p. 335). The upshot of such imaginings was a confusing mélange that 
derives both from bad history and a simplistic approach to the contribution of imaginative 
literature to an understanding of colonial society. For a sophisticated modern re-analysis, see 
Joost Cote, 'Romancing the Indies: The Literary Construction of Tempo Doeloe', in Joost 
Cote & Loes Westerbeek (eds), Recalling the Indies: Colonial Culture & Postcolonial Identities, 
Amsterdam, Aksant, 2005, pp. 133-72. See also G Roger Knight, 'A Case of Mistaken Identity? 
Suikerlords and Ladies, Tempo Doeloe and the Dutch Colonial Communities in Nineteenth 
Century Java', Social Identities, vol. 7, no. 3, 2001, pp. 379-91.
42 This remains, nonetheless, an issue on which the jury is perhaps still out. As Keetie E 
Sluyterman remarks (in Dutch Enterprise in the Twentieth Century, London & New York, 
Routledge, 2005, pp. 23-6), '[t]he Netherlands were late in catching up with the opportunities 
shaped by the First Industrial Revolution: the use of steam power and mechanisation in the 
textile and machinery industry [and the] rise of modern manufacturing industry in Holland 
only began in the 1860s'. Other research, however, complicates the picture somewhat. For 
a succinct introduction, see Jan Luiten van Zanden & Arthur van Riel, The Strictures of 
Inheritance: The Dutch Economy in the Nineteenth Century, Princeton, NJ & Oxford, Princeton 
University Press, 2004, pp. 4-6.
43 For the role of steam navigation in cementing Dutch power in the erstwhile Netherlands 
Indies, see JNFM à Campo, Engines of Empire: Steam Shipping and State Formation in Colonial 
Indonesia, Hilversum, Verloren, 2005 (though Campo is predominantly concerned with a 
later period than that covered here). On the links between technology and imperial expansion 
in general, see the classic accounts in Daniel R Headrick, The Tools of Empire: Technology and 
European Imperialism in the Nineteenth Century, New York, Oxford University Press, 1981; 
Headrick, The Tentacles of Progress: Technology Transfer in the Age of Imperialism, 1850-1940, 
New York, Oxford University Press, 1988.
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Paddle Boats and Sugar Factories
In the West, the nineteenth-century advance of steam and steel came to be epitomised 
in the cotton mill, at least in so far as the sphere of large-scale commodity production 
was concerned. Worldwide, on the other hand, the major connotations of steam power 
in the mid-century decades arguably had more to do with transportation (including 
its military applications), in the form of railway engines and steam boats. Indeed, the 
heavily armed steamer became Imperialism's mobile 'weapon of mass destruction' par 
excellence. Steam-powered, ocean-going vessels began to ply international waters in 
the 1810s and became fully effective a decade later. Famously, the Savannah, using a 
(then commonplace) combination of steam and sail, crossed the Atlantic from New 
York to Liverpool in 1819. Prior to that, various pioneering steamers had begun to 
ply British coastal waters.44
Of course, in the global picture, railways as well as steamers mattered a great 
deal and, in some locations, did so in connection with the manufacture of sugar. In 
Cuba in particular — from the 1850s onward the greatest of all the world's cane sugar 
exporters — the railway grew along with sugar. Indeed, its precocious appearance there, 
as early as the 1830s, had everything to do with moving the commodity and virtually 
nothing to do with passenger transport.45 In Java, on the other hand, the railway was 
a relatively late arrival in the 1870s (after which it expanded exponentially). There, 
in the predominantly maritime world of the Indies archipelago, the mid-century 
connection between sugar and steam — figurative and literal — took the form of the 
paddle steamer and its 'screw'-propelled successor.
Even so, too exclusive a concentration on steamers and railways can be 
misleading. Along with the nautical application of steam and its use as motive power 
on the 'iron road', the stationary steam engine had also become an established presence 
globally during the middle decades of the nineteenth century (and in some locations 
well before that). This held not only for textiles (as in the Indian subcontinent and 
Japan) but also — and crucially — for sugar. In places as far apart as Java and Cuba or 
the Indian subcontinent and Guyana, the steam-operated sugar factory came to define 
44 John Kennedy, The History of Steam Navigation, Liverpool, Charles Birchall, 1903, 
pp. 11-36.
45 Gert J Oostindie, 'Cuban Railroads 1830-1868: Origins and Effects of Progressive 
Enterpreneurialism', Caribbean Studies, vol. 20, nos. 3-4, 1988, pp. 24-45; Curry-Machado, 
Cuban Sugar, p. 11.
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the land frontier of colonialism imperialism just as surely as the steamer marked it 
out at sea. The innards of the sugar factory and the paddle steamer — and, of course, 
the railway engine — had many similarities as far as technology was concerned, and 
all three operated with a certain degree of synchronicity on the colonial frontier. It 
was only around the mid-century that steam machinery started to become industry-
specific to such a degree that it began to create exclusive, specialist fields of experience 
and knowledge.46
In the Indies, the 'nautical' part of the story of steam, steel and sugar began 
in the mid-1820s. A pioneering steamer, built in Surabaya in East Java, was first put 
into commercial service to connect the main colonial cities along the island's north 
coast. This hybrid, Creole vessel, very much a local creation despite its metropolitan 
antecedents, was named Van der Capellen in honour of the colony's first Governor-
General. Built in Java by local workmen, using locally hewn teak, it was fitted with 
twin engines of 25 horsepower from the ubiqitious Liverpool firm of Fawcett Preston, 
the same firm that supplied steam-powered sugar mills in appreciable numbers to the 
Caribbean. Initially used for civilian purposes, the Van der Capellen was subsequently 
employed to carry troops and supplies during the Java War of 1825-30.47 Distracted 
by the war — a challenge to colonial hegemony in Central Java with potentially dire 
consequences for its power throughout the island — the Indies Government did not 
embark seriously and strenuously on fastening its grip on the Indonesian archipelago 
as a whole until the following decade. It was in this context that the Dutch quickly 
began to appreciate the utility of steam power — and of paddle steamers in particular.
The little steamers were valued for their manoeuvrability, their shallow draught 
and assured speed. Not the least of their attractions, moreover, was their capacity, 
particularly at night, for inspiring terror in those who had not hitherto encountered 
them. Names like Merapi (a very active volcano in Central Java), Vesuvius and Etna 
were richly evocative of the effect they were presumed to have. Writing in 1834, 
Johannes van den Bosch, by then installed in The Hague as Minister of Colonies 
after a stint as Governor-General in the Indies, took a firm grasp of the imperial 
advantages. To his successor, JC Baud, he commended a steam vessel he was about 
46 See e.g. Curry-Machado, Cuban Sugar, p. 55.
47 CA Gibson-Hill, 'The Steamers Employed in Asian Water, 1819-39', Journal of the 
Malayan Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society, vol. 27, 1954, pp. 131-4, 158. On Fawcett, see 
Tann, 'Steam and Sugar', pp. 71-5.
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to dispatch to the Indies in terms of its ability to carry a large body of troops 'in the 
face of the monsoon': in other words, he commended it for its ability to circumvent 
the limitations traditionally imposed on navigation 'above and below the winds'. In 
this particular instance, the Minister was over-sanguine in his expectations: the boat 
in question sank in deep water during its early trials near Rotterdam.48
The Minister's point, however, was a valid one and paddle steamers — at least 
those that managed to stay afloat — quickly proved their worth. Under the aegis 
of the van den Bosch-Baud regime at the Colonial Office, and no doubt with the 
encouragement of the technologically-minded Dutch monarch himself, the assembly 
of steamers in the Indies Government's own Surabaya dockyard, using mechanical 
parts sent out from Holland, soon began in earnest — though it was perhaps another 
decade before they began to prove their worth. After that, however, their story takes 
on a dynamic of its own. In 1846, and again two years after that, paddle steamers 
participated successfully in military expeditions against some of the petty states of 
the as-yet unconquered island of Bali. In 1849, they also made possible the rapid 
deployment of troops to suppress a major uprising in Java itself.49
Men and Machines in Sugar: Transnational Networks and Global 
'Diaspora'
Nonetheless, Prometheus's significance in the Indies was far from being confined to 
military conquest. It also extended into the field of economic conquest in the shape 
of sugar factories, whose own smoke-stacks, paralleling those of the paddle boats, 
became a ubiquitous feature of the lowlands of Java's eastern and central districts 
during the middle decades of the century. Beginning rather slowly a few years on 
either side of 1830, the majority of Java's one hundred or so colonial sugar factories 
could, within less than thirty years, boast the use of steam in at least part of their 
operations. These developments had far-reaching consequences for Java's position in 
what was increasingly becoming an international sugar economy.
48 See van den Bosch to Baud, 15.9.1834 & 15.12.1834, in JJ Westendorp Boerma (ed.), 
Briefwisseling tussen J van den Bosch en JC Baud, vol. 1, Utrecht, Kemink en Zoon, 1956, 
pp. 182-3, 189. For the ignominious end of this particular paddle steamer, see MG de Boer, 
Leven en Bedrijf van Gerhard Moritz Roentgen, Grondvester van de Nederlandsche Stoomboot-
Maatschappij, Thans Maatschappij voor Scheeps- en Werktuigbouw 'Fijenoord', 1823-1923, 
Groningen, Noordhoff, 1923, pp. 105-6.
49 KV, 1849, p. 25.
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Most immediately, they drew to Java several individuals with a degree of 
expertise in handling steam-operated machinery — and in the making of sugar with 
such machinery — that was not yet available locally. Whether they were indeed 
'mechanics' [mechanist] or 'engineers' [ingenieur] — the distinction seems to have 
been a fairly fluid one — was at this date largely a matter of semantics.50 The Dutch 
have a nicely-honed word for them: they were werktuigkundig, or 'knowledgeable 
with machines'. In other words, these were people who, by virtue of their experiential 
training in the foundries and shipyards of north-western Europe, were qualified to 
participate in the overseas, international transmission — and local adaptation — of 
the technology of industrialism. In the memorable phrase of a remarkable recent 
study of their presence in the Spanish Caribbean, they were people of 'versatile 
skills', recruited through agents, advertisements and, of course, the solicitation of 
relatives and friends who had gone before.51 Their presence in the Indies in dockyards, 
sugar factories and the like hence reflected a global 'diaspora'. It was one in which 
experientially qualified people — variously, engineers or mechanics, sugar makers, 
iron masters and skilled artisans — re-located to 'the colonies' in the hope of making 
their fortune or at least of enjoying a better, more adventurous life than was possible 
in the metropolis.
Those who worked in the sugar factories, in particular, gained something of a 
reputation for being 'difficult'. They were a 'problem' from the moment they landed, 
one high-placed colonial official contended in the mid-1840s: they made 'absurd' 
demands and then lapsed into 'idleness' when they failed to obtain what they wanted.52 
Indisputably, their rarity-value allowed them a charmed existence. For example, the 
Netherlands-born sugar boiler at one north Java sugar factory in the mid-1850s, 
a certain Andries Renninghof from Amsterdam, was dismissed for having taken to 
50 It was not long to remain so, however. See e.g. Conrad Dixon, 'The Rise of the Engineer 
in the Nineteenth Century', in Gordon Jackson & David M Williams (eds), Shipping, 
Technology, and Imperialism: Papers Presented to the Third British-Dutch Maritime History 
Conference, Farnham, Ashgate, 1996, pp. 231-41.
51 See the chapter entitled 'Engineering Migration' in Curry-Machado, Cuban Sugar, 
pp. 49-71. Although Curry-Machado's prime focus is Cuba and the Caribbean, what he says 
has major resonances for the contemporary situation in the industrialising sugar regions of 
Asia — and for Java in particular.
52 Marginal comments of the Director of Cultivations in E & L Saportas, 'Rapport over den 
toestand van het suiker fabriekwezen op Java', in Exh. 24.4.1847/28.
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the bottle and having trashed the house of a fellow employee on a drunken spree. 
Nonetheless, he was able to find immediate re-employment in another factory further 
along the coast — an opportunity which would surely not have presented itself in his 
native Holland (and he was still there a decade later). Indeed, it was apparent at this 
juncture that such people — at least when sober — were as much sought after as they 
were indispensable. In seeking a replacement, Renninghof's employers found that 
they were negotiating with a man who was 'meer mechanist dan suikerkooker' ['more a 
mechanic than a sugar boiler'], but took him on for want of anyone better qualified.53
Ambitious and foot-loose, they were prepared to follow overseas the crates 
of industrial machinery that were beginning to make their way to what once might 
have been considered the 'ends of the earth'. At times — in the 1830s and early 
1840s, at least — the 'ends of the earth' looked all the more attractive because of 
the downturn in the engineering sector of the economies of Western Europe. In the 
United Kingdom alone, in 1837-38, around one-third of the members of the Society 
of Journeymen Steam-Engine Makers were in receipt of relief from the Society, and 
in 1841-42 the figure was a little under one-quarter.54
Cuba — by the mid-nineteenth century the country with the biggest and 
most advanced cane sugar industry in the world — became the prime focus for such 
migrants, brought there (recruitment itself being very various) under the auspices of 
the Cuban elite who owned the island's sugar factories. The members of this Cuban 
elite had a far-reaching belief in the value and feasibility of technological innovation 
(made possible, in turn by the cheap labour of an enslaved African workforce), and 
were the world's biggest importers of steam-operated sugar machinery, the bulk of it 
initially of British origin but subsequently (from the 1840s onward) predominantly 
of North American manufacture.
Accordingly, Cuba's sugar owners had an internationally disproportionate need 
for skilled individuals to install, maintain and operate this machinery. Such people 
were mostly foreigners, brought there by transnational networks from a variety of 
engineering backgrounds. As has recently been remarked,
the more influential of the Cuban elite … displayed an active personal interest 
in international developments and took advantage of their periodic trips 
53 NFB, 10.7.1852/67; JVFB, 1852-3, pp. 23-5; NFB, 1.2.1854/109; Factorij to A'dam, 
26.4.1854/284.
54 Curry-Machado, Cuban Sugar, pp. 54-5.
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to Europe or North America in order to check up on the latest models and 
innovations.55
In short, their continuous search for improvements in sugar production took them 
beyond the confines of their own empire and brought them into contact with 
globally developing industrial centres.56 They were likewise important agents in the 
development of global migratory networks that extended beyond the shipment of 
involuntary workers to the provisioning of their factories with people well-versed in 
the ways of steam and steel.
Java, of course, was a good deal more distant from the industrial regions on 
either side of the north Atlantic than was its Caribbean antipode. Whereas it took 
only a matter of weeks to sail from the United Kingdom to Cuba (and less than that 
from New York or one of the other industrial centres of the United States), and many 
maquinistas took the opportunity of spending the industry's off-season in the States or 
in Europe57, it frequently took the better part of four months to travel from Western 
Europe to Java. Although this journey-time was more than halved late in the 1840s 
for those with the financial means to undertake the so-called Overland Route (see 
below), a combination of cost and voyage-duration made employment in 'the Indies' 
much more of a year-round occupation than was the case in the Caribbean. Even so, 
the colonial communities of mid-century Java were far from being as 'isolated' or 
'remote' as has sometimes been posited. As we shall see, there were many important 
parallels with Cuba in the way things played out in Java with respect both to the 
technology of sugar manufacture and to the provenance of the skilled individuals on 
whom its successful transfer — and adaptation — was predicated.
In the case of the Netherlands and its great Asian colony, moreover, there is 
a more specific, albeit (presently) largely submerged narrative here. It concerns the 
extent to which, as the nineteenth century progressed, a country like the post-1830 
Netherlands, which was by then devoid of its more industrialised 'Belgian' south and 
was significantly less developed in terms of steam and steel than the United Kingdom 
or the east coast of the United States, nonetheless began to 'graduate' technologically 
skilled [werktuigkundig] artisans through the agency, in both their metropolitan and 
55 Curry-Machado, Cuban Sugar, p. 40.
56 Curry-Machado, 'Cuban Phoenix', p. 35.
57 Curry-Machado, Cuban Sugar, pp. 75-6.
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colonial manifestations, of its military institutions and naval dockyards.58 In the 
context of the present discussion, it was the latter that were very much to the fore.
From Dockyard to Sugar Factory: Mr Lawson and Colonel Lucassen
A man like Alexander Lawson, a young man whose career progressed from paddle 
boats to sugar factories, was somebody who might hence have been encountered 
in Cuba or Mauritius or India — or virtually anywhere in the world where steam-
operated machinery had been, or was being, installed in the mid-century decades. 
As it was, he found himself in Java. Born in the Scottish coastal town of Dundee in 
1819, he was the youngest surviving child of some ten siblings.59 His father was in 
business there, latterly as a manufacturer of jute sacking and the employer of some 
fifty or so workmen — the steam-driven mills that turned jute into fabric being 
famously the main industry of nineteenth-century Dundee. Clearly a person of some 
substance, he was nonetheless a relatively small entrepreneur rather than one of the 
town's 'jute barons'.
His business was not big enough, perhaps, to attract or hold a younger son. 
For whatever reason, Alexander Lawson turned away from jute, and looked instead 
for an opening in the industries that this world commodity had attracted to the 
town. Foundries and shipyards were established in Dundee from the early nineteenth 
century onward to service its jute manufacturing enterprises. Given what we know of 
his subsequent career, it seems quite possible — though we do not know for certain — 
that Lawson served an apprenticeship in one of them. He may well have been trained, 
for example, by the Dundee Foundry Company or its successor Gourlay & Co, a 
mechanical engineering firm that traced its origins back to the 1790s.60
58 On the metropolitan aspect of this subject, see in particular Geert Verbong, 'Opleiding 
en Beroep', in HW Lintsen (ed.), Geschiedenis van de Techniek in Nederland: De Wording van 
een Moderne Samenleving 1800-1890, Part 5: Techniek, Beroep en Praktijk, Zutphen, Walburg 
Pers, 1994, pp. 21-83.
59 Alexander Lawson was born in Dundee (Scotland) on 1 July 1819 and died in Tegal 
(Java) on 18 July 1877. His parents were William Lawson (of Dundee) and Mary Hill. He 
married twice. His first wife was Harriet Aitkins (born in Dundee 1824, died in Tegal 1859), 
and his second wife was the Java-born Anna Maria Leroy (dates unknown). I am grateful 
for details of Lawson's background in Dundee, and for his family history prior to his arrival 
in Rotterdam, to Catherine McKay (personal communication, 2010), who has conducted 
extensive genealogical research on the family.
60 SGE Lythe, 'Shipbuilding at Dundee Down to 1914', Scottish Journal of Political 
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What is certain, however, is that Alexander Lawson did not stay long in his 
home-town. By 1846, at the latest, the twenty-seven-year-old had left Dundee and 
re-located to the Netherlands, to the Dutch port of Rotterdam. He was employed 
there by the Nederlandsche Stoomboot Maatschappij [Netherlands Steamboat 
Company] or NSBM, an engineering and shipbuilding firm with a yard at Feijenoord 
on the southern outskirts of the city. (The yard has long since gone, but its location 
is preserved in the name of one of Holland's most famous soccer teams.)61 By 1846, 
moreover, he was also a married man, the husband of Harriet Aitkins who appears, 
like Lawson himself, to have come from Dundee. Nonetheless, during that same year 
there was a major interruption to the young couple's married life — and when it was 
resumed, it was on the other side of the world. For in the middle of 1846, Alexander 
Lawson left Rotterdam and sailed to Java.
For some years, the NSBM had been in the business of building or supplying 
equipment for paddle steamers.62 However, it was still a fledgling operation, kept 
going perhaps because Anthony van Hoboken, the great Rotterdam merchant and 
ship-owner, had a stake in it63, but also because the Dutch kingdom was very short 
of such enterprises, especially after the secession of its 'Belgian' provinces in 1830. 
The NSBM under the direction of Gerhard Moritz Roentgen was hence something 
of a pioneering enterprise, heavily dependent on state patronage. In 1845-46, the 
company had been commissioned to construct two steam-operated paddle boats, 
the Onrust and the Borneo, for service in the Indies, and by the middle of 1846, 
the frames, engines and mechanical parts for the Onrust were ready for dispatch to 
Economy, vol. 11, no. 3, 1964, pp. 219-32. For a richly informative survey of engine-building 
in nineteenth-century Dundee, see http://www.steamindex.com/manlocos/manulist.htm 
(accessed 12 January 2009). I would like to thank Mr Bruce Dorward for kindly providing 
information on the engineering workshops and shipyards of nineteenth-century Dundee.
61 The information in this and the following two paragraphs (unless otherwise indicated) 
comes from VMK, 30.5.1846/21-305 & VMK, 2.11.1846/411 and the enclosures therein. 
On the origins of the NSBM, see Jan M Dirkzwager, 'A Case of Transfer of Technology: Ship 
Design and Construction in Nineteenth-Century Netherlands', in Gordon Jackson & David 
M Williams (eds), Shipping, Technology, and Imperialism: Papers Presented to the Third British-
Dutch Maritime History Conference, Farnham, Ashgate, 1996, pp. 189-210, here p. 190.
62 Their first such contract appears to have dated from 1834, and related to the paddle 
steamers Hecla and Eterna. See Bram Oosterwijk, Koning van de Koopvaart: Anthony van 
Hoboken (1756-1850), Rotterdam, Stichting Historische Publicaties Roterodamum, 1983, 
p. 198.
63 Oosterwijk, p. 271.
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Surabaya. Loaded on board the Dutch merchant ship Bato, the mechanical innards 
of the paddle boat left Rotterdam on 25 June, together with a group of eight 
machinisten en werklieden [mechanics and skilled operatives] who were to be in charge 
of completing the Onrust when it arrived at its destination, which would have been 
around mid-November 1846.
Lawson was the only non-Dutchman among them, and — as the team's leader 
— was also the most highly paid. He got a salary of 300 guilders a month, as opposed 
to his assistant's 200 guilders and the 4-6 guilders a day paid as wages to the others. 
Prior to departure, he arranged for more than a third of his salary to be paid to his 
wife, whom he left behind in Europe — temporarily, as it turned out. On board 
the Bato, he and his deputy, the twenty-two year old JF Mossel — who came from 
the town of Hellevoetsluis, down-river from Rotterdam itself — travelled first-class, 
whereas the remainder of the group were second-class passengers. All in all, his salary 
— two-thirds of that accorded a relatively high-ranking official such as an Assistant 
Resident in Government service in the colony to which he was sailing — and the style 
of his shipboard accommodation suggest that Lawson was a highly valued and skilled 
werktuigkundige. It also points to the way in which a young and ambitious 'engineer' 
could greatly improve his chances of advancing and making good money by opting 
to 'go out to the colonies'.
Back in Europe, for instance, it seems unlikely that a man in his late twenties 
— however able — would have been put in charge of a major project such as that 
which Lawson undertook in Surabaya, where his job was to supervise the assembly 
of the Onrust (and the later arriving Borneo) in the Indies Government's dockyard. 
To give it its full and proper title, the dockyard was called De Fabriek voor de Marine, 
het Stoomwezen en de Nijverheid [or the Factory for the Navy, Steam Power and 
Industry]. Located in Java's second and already most 'industrial' city, it was a sizeable 
establishment, whose 'new iron and copper foundaries left little to be desired'. A very 
few years after Lawson's arrival there, the dockyard was reckoned to have a workforce 
more than 800-strong, and its proud boast was to have assembled the Dutch warship 
Admiraal van Kingsbergen in the course of three-and-a-half-months from parts sent 
out from Holland.64
Work on the Onrust and Borneo took somewhat longer — indicative perhaps 
of the amount of manufacturing which actually had to take place in Surabaya despite 
64 KV, 1853, pp. 209-10.
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the notionally prefabricated nature of the steamers — and it was only around the 
middle of 1848 that they were nearing completion. The Onrust became part of what 
was, in effect, a colonial war-fleet. Around 1850, there were eleven such steamers.65 
The Borneo was put into service of a different yet equally imperial kind, carrying 
letters and passengers from Batavia to Singapore, there to connect with the newly 
developed Overland Mail route to Europe (see below).66
Lawson's work in Surabaya must have finished late in 1848. He did not, 
however, return to Rotterdam or Scotland. Instead — and having already arranged 
for Harriet Aitkins to come out to join him — he moved from dockyard to sugar 
industry. His skills were evidently sought after. Taking up what proved to be 
permanent residence in the Indies, Alexander Lawson became engineer in charge 
at two adjoining steam-operated sugar factories in Tegal Residency on the north 
coast of Central Java. Built only a few years earlier, in 1841-42, the Kemanglen and 
Doekoewringin sugar factories could lay claim to being among the technologically 
most sophisticated and up-to-date factories in the entire colony. Both were equipped 
with machinery from the celebrated French-Belgian manufacturers Derosne et Cail, 
a firm that also supplied equipment to the French beet sugar industry and to colonial 
sugar producers in the Caribbean.
The two factories in Tegal were owned by a retired Indies military man, Colonel 
Theodore Lucassen, who may well have got to hear of Lawson while the latter was 
still in Surabaya, where Lucassen's recently deceased father-in-law, the senior Indies 
official, DFW Pietermaat, had held the position of Resident.67 In any event, it was 
Lucassen personally who arranged for Lawson to be allowed to stay in Java and who 
arranged for his transfer to the north coast. Lawson, at this stage, was still a British 
subject, and leave to remain in the Dutch colony was not something that would 
have happened automatically. A deal of string-pulling would have been involved, 
something that should not have been too difficult for Lucassen, whose career and 
65 KV, 1853, pp. 36-8.
66 By 1849 the 'Nederlandsche Eskader' in the Indies had thirteen steamers, including the 
Onrust and Borneo; it used steamers for the speedy movement of troops to Banten 1849, 
and it used the steamers Batavia, Phoenix and Borneo to carry the mail between Batavia and 
Singapore (for the newly opened steamer route to Suez via Ceylon). For all this see KV, 1850 
pp. 15-26.
67 Susanna Pietermaat, Lucassen's second wife, was a daughter of DFW Pietermaat (1790-
1848), who was Resident of Batavia from 1834-37, and Resident of Surabaya from 1839-48. 
See NP, vol. 21, 1933-34, pp. 252-4.
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contacts in Java, extending back 
over a period of more than three 
decades, presumably still carried a 
certain weight in Batavia.
Indeed, string-pulling was 
Lucassen's forte. His ancestors were 
country gentry from the borderlands 
of the Netherlands and Germany, 
and he himself had been born in a 
castle [ridderslot].68 He subsequently 
entered the army early enough to be 
captured in Napoleon's campaign in 
Russia but was repatriated quickly 
enough to join the first Dutch 
military contingents dispatched to 
Java in 1816, when the colony was 
restored by the British. Once there, 
he evidently settled into the milieu 
of the 'Old Indies World' without 
too much difficulty, and in 1821 (at the age of twenty-nine) he married a sixteen-
year-old, colonial-born woman of a 'good' family. Lucassen pursued a military path 
— smoothed no doubt by the connections established during the Napoleonic era 
— which culminated in his appointment as Inspecteur en Chef Militaire Administratie 
[Inspector and Head of the Military Administration] in the Indies.
A keen breeder, Lucassen had five children by his first wife and a further seven 
by his second, Susanna ('Suzette') Pietermaat. Indeed, he claimed it was the plethora 
of offspring who were the driving force behind his need to obtain a sugar contract. A 
military pension alone was totally insufficient to maintain his brood in the bourgeois 
style to which his clan was becoming accustomed. At the beginning of the 1840s, 
knowing the right people and having an ambitious plan for constructing a sugar 
factory of advanced design in the colony that he had just left, he was able to obtain 
access to the Dutch king. Willem the First, even though on the verge of precipitately 
68 For the Lucassen family, see NP, vol. 5, 1914, pp. 269-77; & NP, vol. 53, 1967, 
pp. 168-78.
Figure 4: An industrial pioneer in Java 
sugar: Colonel Theodore Lucassen.
Source: Koninklijk Instituut voor Taal-, Land- 
en Volkenkunde, Leiden, no. 47A24
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abandoning his throne, was still very much the CEO of the Netherlands-Inc, 
and his patronage made all the difference. Schemes of that kind were dear to the 
headstrong monarch's heart, and he put pressure on the Colonial Office to secure a 
sugar contract for Lucassen — in the face of opposition from officials in Batavia, and 
despite Colonial Minister JC Baud's patent dislike of the man.69
Influence and Expertise: Theodore Lucassen and Hubertus Hoevenaar
Lucassen, contract in hand, arrived back in Java (not without mishap, including a 
shipwreck) in 1841. He was not alone, however, for he had brought with him to 
the colony a small contingent of mechanics and the like from northern France and 
the Low Countries. Two of them, indeed, were engineers or mechanics supplied by 
the same French firm, Derosne et Cail, which had also supplied the machinery.70 
Crucially, moreover, Lucassen had sailed to Java in the company of Hubertus 
Hoevenaar, the stepson of an old Netherlands associate and distant relative of 
Lucassen's, and members of Hoevenaar's immediate family, including his mother, 
Arnoudina Ringeling and his stepfather, Paulus Hoevenaar.71
69 C Fasseur, The Politics of Colonial Exploitation, translated and edited by RE Elson & Ary 
Kraal, Southeast Asia Program, Cornell University, Ithaca, NY, 1992, pp. 186-7; Leidelmeijer, 
Grootbedrijf, pp. 155-62; Baud to van den Bosch, 29.7.1835, in Westendorp Boerma, 
Briefwisseling, vol. 2, p. 180; Th. Lucassen to Baud, 27.3.1845, NA, Collectie Baud, 723.
70 The team of artisans and skilled operatives which Lucassen and his then associate, Otto 
Carel Holmberg de Beckfelt (who also built two sugar factories operating on Government 
Contract in the vicinity), brought with them to Tegal in 1841 consisted of Daniel Gilquin 
(born in Utrecht, 24 years old); Maurice Cellier (born in Astoune — as it appears to have been 
spelt — in France, 31 years old); Jules Daniel Boudaro (born in Paris, 28 years old); Louis 
Zoude (born in Doornik, Belgium, 22 years old); Michel Roux (born in Lyon, 25 years old); 
Hypolite Lachaume (born in St. Mequalt, as it appears to have been spelt, France, 27 years 
old); Louis Feray (date of birth unknown, France, 27 years old). See IB, 9.2.1842/20, MK, 
2630. It was Roux and Feray who were (or had been) employees of Derosne et Cail.
71 On the Ringeling and Hoevenaar families, see DNL, vol. 32, 1914, pp. 230-6 ; DNL, 
vol. 41, 1923, pp. 300, 360-1; NP, vol. 53, 1967, p. 169; ARM Mommers, 'Brabant van 
Generaliteitsland tot Gewest', Proefschrift, Rijksuniversiteit Leiden, 1953, p. 419; the 
Marriage Certificate of Hubertus Paulus Hoevenaar, 2 June 1813; the Death Certificate 
of Hubertus Paulus Hoevenaar, 3 January 1814; and the Marriage Certificate of Paulus 
Hubertus Hoevenaar, 3 April 1817, Gemeente Archief, Amsterdam. Hubertus Paulus 
Hoevenaar had lived (and died) on the Prinsengracht 'bij de Beerenstraat [sic] No. 271'. 
[Present-day street numbers around the intersection Prinsengracht/Berenstraat are in the 
high 400s. No. 271 would have been the wijknommer or ward-number.] Melanie Hoevenaar 
(born in Sablonville, Paris, 1831; died in Paris, 1881) was the daughter of Paulus Hubertus 
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The point about the younger Hoevenaar, however, was not his distant 
consanguinity with Lucassen (whose second wife, Susanna Antoinette Pietermaat 
[1814-84] was Arnoudina Ringeling's niece), but his direct experience in the 
industrial manufacture of sugar. Evidently intended as the corner-stone of the edifice 
that Lucassen was set on erecting in the colony, Hubertus Hoevenaar appears to have 
been brought out to Java because of what he knew rather than who he knew. His 
father, also called Hubertus Hoevenaar, had been a medical doctor with a practice on 
the Prinsengracht (one of Amsterdam's three 'grand canals' lined with the mansions 
of the rich — or, in the case of the Prinsengracht — with those of the merely well-
to-do). It may have been a disease from the adjacent Jordaan slums that killed the 
young man — he was scarcely twenty-eight — a few months prior to the birth of his 
only child in 1814. His mother, Arnoudina Ringeling (1792-1854), came from an 
Amsterdam family with Caribbean connections, and subsequently married her late 
husband's brother.
The Hoevenaars were not in origin, however, an urban family. Rather, they 
were country gentry from deeply rural Brabant, in the south-east of the Netherlands. 
Even so, Paulus Hoevenaar (Hubertus's stepfather) was said to have had some money 
invested in the great engineering firm Cockerill et Cie at Seraing in Belgium (money 
which he reportedly lost in the firm's temporary collapse in 1840). If this is correct, 
it may well explain why his stepson had been placed with the Belgian firm — at that 
time one of the largest engineering and iron-working firms in Western Europe — a 
few years earlier, presumably as a 'gentleman apprentice' of some kind.72
Hoevenaar (born in Geldermalsen, 1784), whom Arnoudina had married in 1817. Paulus 
Hoevenaar died in Tegal in 1844 (PC Bloys van Treslong Prins, Genealogische en Heraldische 
Gedenkwaardigheden Betreffende Europeanen op Java, vol. 1, Batavia, Albrecht, 1934, p. 1), 
and his widow subsequently returned to Europe, where she died (in Paris) in 1854. Melanie, 
however, continued living en famille in Tegal. See DNL, vol. 32, 1914, pp. 231-3. The father 
of Hubertus (senior) and Paulus Hoevenaar, Cornelis Theodorus Hoevenaar, was clearly a 
country gentleman and was variously described as 'without occupation' (on his younger son's 
death certificate) and subsequently as 'Vrederegter' ['Justice of the Peace'] at Boxtel, in the 
south-eastern part of the Netherlands (in his elder son's marriage certificate, 3 April 1817; 
likewise in the Amsterdam Stadsarchief ). Before that he had held office as a Sheriff [variously 
Schout or Schepen] at other towns in Brabant.
72 See the entry on Cockerill in the Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, edited by HCG 
Matthew and Brian Harrison, vol. 11, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2004; Suzy Pasleau, 
John Cockerill: Itineraire d'Un Geant Industriel, Alleur-Liege, Belgium, Editions Du Perron, 




The enterprise that the younger Hoevenaar joined in Java involved not only 
Lucassen, moreover, but also his erstwhile brother-in-law, Jonkheer Otto Carel 
Holmberg de Beckfelt, a newly ennobled ex-Indies official whose dealings in Court 
circles in The Hague bordered on the nefarious. We shall meet him again in a 
subsequent chapter. Like Lucassen he, too, manipulated his connections in Holland 
to obtain a concession to manufacture sugar on contract to the Indies Government. 
Neither Lucassen nor Holmberg, however, would have had either any real experience 
of making sugar or knowledge about the steam equipment used in its industrial 
manufacture, despite some airy assurances that they had 'inspected' sugar factories 
and machine ateliers in the beet sugar districts of northern France. Holmberg had led 
a charmed existence as a high-ranking Government official in Java for more than two 
decades (his chicanery having largely been rewarded by promotion), and Lucassen 
was an ex-military man whose position (Inspecteur en Chef Militaire Administratie) 
was essentially an administrative one, concerned with budgeting and supplies. He 
may indeed have had an excellent head for figures (he was later to be in dispute with 
Hoevenaar about account-keeping at the Tegal factories), but there is no evidence 
that he had any head for machines or any practical experience with steam engineering 
or the making of sugar.
Hubertus Hoevenaar, on the other hand, possessed these qualities in full. Not 
only had he worked for some years in Cockerill's factory at Seraing, but subsequently, 
in the autumn of 1839, he had found employment in the Campaign (the sugar-
manufacturing season) at the Arras sugar factories owned by Louis Francois-Xavier 
Crespel-Delisse, the key pioneering figure in the French beet sugar industry.73 In 
short, he had everything that his patrons so obviously lacked (barring money — 
Lucassen was later to claim that he had to pay off the young man's debts in Belgium 
before he could take him literally and metaphorically on board).
What Hubertus Hoevenaar did lack, however, on arriving in Java in 1842 
at the age of twenty-seven or twenty-eight, was a wife. Given the connection with 
Lucassen, the logical thing would have been for him to wed one of the Colonel's 
daughters, who had accompanied their father on the family's return voyage to Java. 
73 Lucassen to van den Bosch, 30 November 1839, as quoted in Leidelmeijer, Grootbedrijf, 
p. 158. Louis Francois-Xavier Crespel-Delisse (1789-1864) had first set up in business in 
Arras in 1814, and at the height of his career owned and operated six beet sugar factories in 
Picardie. See the entry under his name in http://www.encyclopedie.picardie.fr (accessed 15 
August 2014).
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Nonetheless, for whatever reason — and it may even have been affection rather than 
calculation — he married instead one of Holmberg's daughters. Anna Marciana 
Catherina Holmberg de Beckfelt had likewise accompanied her father, who was by 
then a widower of almost ten years' standing, when he, too, sailed back to the island in 
1841. Holmberg's eldest child, she had been born in the 'remote' town of Rembang 
on the island's Northeast Coast, where her father had currently been posted, in 1823.
We shall return to the Hoevenaar-Holmberg couple's story in a later chapter. 
The immediate impact of their marriage, however, was that Hubertus Hoevenaar was 
'lost' to Lucassen, something for which it looks as if Lucassen attempted to compensate 
by marrying one of his daughters to another Dutchman with claims to experience 
with steam-driven machinery. The individual concerned was one Gerardus Johannes 
Netscher (1822-1877), who had arrived in Surabaya in 1845 or thereabouts as an 
assistant to the Indies' Government's 'Chief Engineer for Steam-power'. He married 
into the Lucassen family two years later, and, as the husband of Mathilde Theodora 
Charlotte Lucassen (1828-1906), was for some years the de facto administrateur 
[general manager] of the Colonel's sugar factories. Subsequently, however, he fell 
foul of colonial officialdom in Tegal — and perhaps of his irascible father-in-law as 
well. For whatever reason, the arrangement at the Tegal factories did not work out, 
and the young man returned (presumably together with his wife) to a position with 
the Indies Government in their Surabaya dockyard.74 This was the point at which 
Alexander Lawson came on the scene. Moving in the opposite direction to Netscher, 
from dockyard to sugar factory, he became the Colonel's key technical man.
We do not know much about Lawson's years with the elder Lucassen and 
subsequently with Theodore RN and Donald Lucassen, the two sons who took over 
management of the business after their father's death in 1854. It was presumably on 
Lawson's advice that they bought the big new steam mill that was installed in 1859 to 
compliment the Derosne machinery set up in the boiling house some seventeen years 
earlier.75 Meanwhile, Theodore RN Lucassen had bought the Kemanglen factory from 
his father's joint heirs and, parting company with his stepbrother (who remained 
based in Java), had become an absentee owner. This opened the way for Lawson. In 
74 See NP, vol. 53, 1967, pp. 169-70; 'Stamboek NI Ambtenaren', NA, MK; B Gunawan 
& D Valenbreder, 'De Kwestie Netscher: De Verhouding Ambtenaar-Particulier op Java in de 
Periode 1845-1855', Working paper no. 2, Vakgroep Zuid en Zuidoost Azie, Anthropologisch-




1874, after the Scot had been there for a quarter of a century, he was appointed as 
the administrateur of the Kemanglen factory. Hence Lawson reached the pinnacle 
of any sugar man's career. It looks as if at the same time he also put his savings into 
the enterprise: as well as being the administrateur, he had a 25 per cent interest in 
Kemanglen as a part-lessee.76
By then, Lawson had established a family locally and may well have abandoned 
any plan — if he had ever had one — of returning to Scotland. Harriet Aitkins had 
born him six children at Kemanglen, and died shortly after the birth of the last. Two 
years later, in 1861, Lawson remarried a Java-born woman, Anna Maria Leroy, and 
had four more children with her. Little or nothing appears to have survived relating 
to their lives together. Presumably, as Kemanglen's administrateur and his wife, they 
had spent their final years together in the lordly mansion that the owners had built 
adjacent to the factory. One admiring contemporary who had enjoyed the Lucassens' 
hospitality there in the 1850s described it as an 'Indo-European palace'.77 There 
would have been servants aplenty, horses and carriage on call, and lavish hospitality 
— signifying, in short, a style of life, with its huge high-ceilinged rooms and vast 
verandah, that was at some considerable remove from anything that Lawson would 
have known back in Dundee half a century earlier.
There remained one thing from the Scottish connection, however, that Lawson 
would not have escaped. This was the commodity that had been the staple of his 
father's business in Dundee. Initially, the Java industry, in which Lawson spent the 
greater part of his life, packed most of its sugar into keranjang [baskets] made locally 
from the woven leaves of palms and other trees and plants. From around the mid-
century onward, however, the predominant mode of packing sugar began to change. 
Increasingly, it was packed in sacks manufactured from jute. Known universally as 
'gunny bags' — the term had a Sanskrit origin — they were at a later phase in the 
industry's history generally supplied from Bengal. Before that, however, there is a 
strong likelihood that they came from Dundee, prior to the supplanting of production 
there by the development of a huge jute industry in Calcutta and elsewhere in the 
subcontinent. In short, the very packaging of sugar — along with steam and steel — 
was part of the same global trajectory that had taken Lawson himself from one side 
of the world to the other.
76 NHMR, 4978.
77 SA Budding, Neêrlands-Oost-Indië: Reizen over Java, Madura, Makassar […]: Gedaan 
Gedurende het Tijdvak van 1852-1857, vol. 1, Rotterdam, Wijt, 1859, p. 148.
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In July 1877, midway through the sugar Campaign and perhaps exhausted 
by its demands on the factory's administrateur, Alexander Lawson died, at the age 
of fifty-eight, and was buried next to Harriet Aitkins in the little European cemetery 
at the nearby Adiwerna sugar factory.78 The history of his and Harriet's surviving 
offspring — and of his subsequent Java family — is yet to be uncovered. It is a 
reasonable assumption, however, that most of them married locally — as had Lawson 
himself in the case of his second wife — and became part of the Creole colonial 
society that typified 'Dutch' Java during the nineteenth and early twentieth century. 
That Creole character, moreover, extended into the industry in which he had spent 
the greater part of his life: global in one respect, it was Creole in another.
A Creole Prometheus
Prometheus's appearance on the Indies' frontier, as has already been suggested, had a 
distinctively Creole or hybrid dimension. The point is crucial to an understanding of 
the story of technology and technicians on the so-called colonial periphery of Java in 
the mid-nineteenth century. It is a mistake to conceive of that story exclusively in terms 
of unproblematic diffusion of technology from the West. As has been argued apropos 
of some older accounts of the subject, a common feature of many of these histories is 
that they present science and technology as a 'black box' — in effect, a hermetically 
sealed system of knowledge and its application which was simply transferred, holus-
bolus, from one location to another. Recently, historians have begun to open that box 
and have demonstrated, for example, ways in which engineers, technicians and users 
negotiate technological change: groups or individuals adapt technologies to their own 
needs, and use technologies in ways not originally intended, or choose not to use 
them at all.79
Indeed, one leading student of the subject has remarked, in relation to the global 
'dissemination' and 'transfer' of technology, that it is 'the complexity of the processes 
by which the ideas or inventions exchanged are introduced into the receiving society' 
78 'Alexander Lawson / echtgenoot van Anna Maria Le Roy / geb. te Dundee 1819 / overt 
18 Juli 1877. Sacred to the memory of / Harriet Aitkins / spouse of Alexander Lawson / who 
died September 1859 / aged 35 years.' See Bloys van Treslong Prins, Europeanen op Java, 
vol. 1, p. 1.
79 I am drawing gratefully here on the ongoing work of the University of Wageningen 
scholar, Harro Maat. See, for example, 'Agricultural Sciences in Colonial Indonesia', Historia 
Scientiarum, vol. 16, no. 3, 2007, pp. 244-63.
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which stands out; and that we need to pay close attention to 'the ways in which 
scientific knowledge and imported technologies are altered and innovated upon while 
being worked into new social and cultural contexts'.80 Likewise, it can be argued 
that 'a theory of Eurocentric diffusion … tends to reduce a rich historical record 
into simplistic binary oppositions: cores and peripheries, metropoles and colonies; 
oppressors and oppressed'.81
Accordingly, we need to think of the industrial project evolving around sugar 
production in nineteenth-century Java in terms of Creole technology and science — 
of a technology and science, that is to say, which was both metropolitan and colonial 
in its inspiration. Within this framework of understanding, technology — and its 
accompanying science in the sugar industry of Java in the mid-nineteenth century — 
has to be related not simply to the diffusion from the metropolis of technology and its 
attendant science but also to their evolution on the colonial frontier itself.
People as well as machines are central to an understanding of what took place, 
and the history of FJH Baijer, the 'Iron King' of Surabaya in the mid-nineteenth 
century, is a prime case in point.82 Nowhere else in mid-nineteenth-century Java 
was the connection between sugar, steam and iron quite so palpable as in the East 
Java metropolis. As one noted historian of the city has remarked, 'spearheading the 
industrial revolution in the Netherlands Indies was the sugar industry … [and] by 
the mid-1850s, two thirds of the mills in the districts around Surabaya operated 
with steam …'83 Baijer was the proprietor of a series of iron foundries and machine 
workshops in and around the city from the early 1840s through to his death there in 
1879. Born in the Low Countries around 1807, Baijer spent the whole of his adult 
life in the Indies, apart from a return visit to Holland in 1863-64. He had begun as 
an employee in the Indies Government's Surabaya dockyard and Constructie-Winkel 
[engineering workshop] and was described when he left it in 1841 as werktuigkundig 
80 Michael Adas, 'The Problem of Paradigms: Patterns of Scientific and Technological Transfer 
from 1880 to 1950', Journal of the Japan-Netherlands Institute, vol. 4, 1996, pp. 277-85.
81 Storey, p. 2.
82 For Baijer, See GH von Faber, Oud Soerabaia, Soerabaia, Gemeente Soerabaia, 1931, 
pp. 170-7.
83 See Howard W Dick, Surabaya: City of Work, Athens, Ohio, Ohio University Press, 
2002, pp. 253-9; Dick, 'Nineteenth Century Industrialisation: A Missed Opportunity?', in 
J Thomas Lindblad (ed.), New Challenges in the Modern Economic History of Indonesia, Leiden, 
Programme of Indonesian Studies, Leiden University, 1993, pp. 123-49.
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— the term which, as we have already seen, neatly embraced the possibility of 
'engineer', 'mechanic' and anybody else who had a recognised claim to skill and 
experiences in the manufacture and manipulation of machinery.
Baijer's best-known enterprises were De Phoenix and the appropriately much 
longer enduring De Volharding [The Perseverance], which continued as a major 
engineering works in Surabaya into the twentieth century. Baijer was not a solitary 
figure, however. Indeed, even by the date of Edwards's arrival there in 1846, Surabaya 
was already on the way to becoming, with its iron masters, foundries and engineering 
workshops, the key centre for servicing the emergent industrial project in Java sugar. 
There was, for example, the ex-London ironmaster, Charles Gill, who brought his 
family to Java in the 1840s and set up in the foundry business in Surabaya at about 
the same time as Baijer. His descendants were still to be found in the colony three-
quarters of a century later.84
Nonetheless, it was Baijer's enterprise that most neatly encapsulates key 
themes of the present argument. During the 1860s, his engineering yards, foundries 
and workshops attained a considerable reputation in the Indies — and beyond. In 
1866, for example, they were sought out by a visiting group of Japanese officials 
and businesspeople. Baijer probably thought more highly of an official inspection by 
Governor-General Pieter Mijer two years later.85 Nonetheless, Japanese interest was 
undoubtedly indicative of the extent to which Surabaya was — apparently — on the 
way to becoming a South-East Asian counterpart, in terms of industrial plants, of 
Calcutta, Shanghai and Hong Kong.
Without being isolated from the Netherlands, Baijer's several enterprises were 
nonetheless emphatically 'of the Indies' rather than mere transplants of metropolitan 
models. It was not simply the case, as the leading modern historian of the city has 
expressed it, that 'Surabaya had become an outpost of industrial Europe'.86 Rather, 
Surabaya had become the centre in the Indies of a Creole technology and science 
that drew its inspiration both from the metropolis and the colony itself: it was part-
European and part-Indies.
84 Information on the Gill family kindly supplied by Peter Christiaans from the files of the 
Centraal Bureau voor Genealogie, Den Haag.
85 Faber, Oud Soerabaia, p. 173.
86 Dick, Surabaya, p. 261.
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To be sure, the overwhelming bulk of the industrial equipment installed in 
Java's colonial sugar factories in the mid-century decades was imported from Western 
Europe, from manufacturers in the United Kingdom, France and the Netherlands. 
Toward the end of the period, some of it also began to be sourced in Germany. By the 
mid-nineteenth century, such manufacturers found a large market in 'the colonies'; 
and by its closing decades, one large enterprise in Scotland even had as its telegraphic 
address 'Colonial, Glasgow'.87 As we saw in an earlier chapter, steam-operated mills 
for grinding sugar cane were exported from the United Kingdom to the Caribbean 
from the late eighteenth century onward, and by the 1820s, developments in the 
boiling house had started to follow suit. In both the United Kingdom and continental 
Europe, factories and workshops began to specialise in fabricating virtually the 
entire 'package' of boiling house equipment, which was then broken down into its 
component parts and transported for re-erection in colonial locations.
Nonetheless, the development was altogether more ambiguous in character than 
it might initially appear. For example, although in the 1840s the London engineering 
firm of Robinson boasted that their new milling machinery was so configured as to 
need a minimum of on-site expertise to install or re-locate it, too much should not 
be read into statements of this kind. In fact, as the history of individuals such as 
Lawson makes clear, Java's mid-century sugar industry had a nucleus of technically 
highly skilled people, brought there to look after their considerable investments in 
machinery by an Indies bourgeoisie of sugar manufacturers, financiers and merchants 
(to whom we shall return subsequently). Indeed, Robinson's simultaneous assurance 
to their potential customers that their new mill 'may be erected and set to work 
by a local engineer, colonial mechanic, or intelligent manager' points in precisely that 
direction [emphasis added].88 In short, their machinery was not only adapted to the 
colonial frontier but also then adaptable on that frontier itself.
87 John McNiell & Co's advertisement promised '[s]ugar machinery including all requisites 
for sugar plantations and refineries'. See HC Prinsen Geerligs, Cane Sugar and its Manufacture, 
Altrincham (Manchester), Norman Rodger, 1909 [endpapers].
88 [HO & A Robinson], Description of Robinson's Steam Cane Mill, London, [no publisher 
stated], 1845, pp. 1-8. As the firm was at pains to make clear, their new steam mill was 'the 
production of engineers of practical experience in the sugar colonies and India … whereas the 
usual machinery, to do it justice, requires a first-rate British mechanical engineer to erect it 
properly, provided with erecting drawings, and in some machinery with special instructions 
from the maker'. The pamphlet carries the notice: 'Further particulars … on application to 
Messers H.O. and A. Robinson, Engineers, Mill Wall Iron Works and Engine Factory, Poplar, 
near London (where specimens may be seen), or at 12 Old Jewry-chambers, Cheapside, 
London'.
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A facility for adaptation was quickly developed there. Indeed, given the poor 
quality of the equipment emanating from Dutch yards around the mid-century 
(equipment from Belgium, the United Kingdom and France was a different matter), 
Creole technology and science had, of necessity, to evolve in order to deal with it. 
The machinery that was sent out from Holland at the end of the 1840s for the 
reconstruction of the Wonopringgo sugar factory on the north coast of Central Java, 
for example, was so bad that the factory's owners came to suspect the dealings of the 
brothers JE & LA Saportas, shady colonial adventurers and soi-disant 'experts', whom 
they had contracted to arrange its supply.89 To start with, there was no packing list 
with the crates of equipment, which made for endless difficulties when metres of 
otherwise anonymous-looking pipes and valves were concerned. Worse still, some of 
the apparatus, as supplied, was so bad that it had to be sent immediately to the Atelier 
Baijer at Surabaya to be reconstructed.90
Moreover, Baijer's enterprise was not the only one thus engaged. In 1853, for 
example, an entire sugar mill had been manufactured at the Government dockyard, 
and during the sugar Campaign, generally lasting from May through September, the 
yard was kept busy repairing machinery from the many sugar factories in the nearby 
Brantas delta and eastward along the coast in Pasuruan and adjacent Probolingo.91 
What is also obvious, however, is that sugar factories remote from the facilities of 
Surabaya and the Oosthoek (Java's Eastern Salient) quickly developed their own repair 
shops, with skilled personnel in attendance. When, in 1850, some of the newly 
installed equipment at Wonopringgo was damaged in operation, it could be sent for 
repair to the Djatibarang factory, westward along the coast in Tegal Residency, where 
a skilled European operative was employed. A Rotterdam newspaper clipping from 
the end of the decade records his widowed mother's grief at receiving news of his 
recent death in Java of 'my beloved eldest son … Franciscus Adrianus Bergmans … 
in life, Engineer [Ingenieur] at the sugar factories in Tegal'.92
89 For some of the difficulty attendant on the renovation, see e.g. Factorij to A'dam, 
26.8.1848/325 & 28.11.1848/338.
90 Factorij to A'dam, 28.11.1848/338.
91 KV, 1853, pp. 209-10. By 1857 (KV, 1858, p. 130), this connection with the sugar 
industry had been severed. The fabriek could only be used for 'private' work in exceptional 
circumstances.
92 Factorij to A'dam, 24.6.1850/24 & 27.7.1850/27. On Bergmans, see newspaper clipping 
in the files of the Centraal Bureau voor Genealogie, Den Haag.
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In terms of the size of their operations, the pace being set on the colonial 
'periphery' by the larger, more centralised 'ateliers' and dockyards in Java was 
largely in step with — or, perhaps, even in advance of — what was going on at 
the metropolitan 'centre'. Leastways, in respect to the number of workers on their 
books, mid-century engineering works in both Holland and Java appear to have been 
roughly comparable. The biggest of the Dutch shipbuilding and engineering works 
around the mid-century was Paul van Vlissingen's and Abraham Dudok van Heel's 
Koninklijke Fabriek voor Stoom-en-Andere Werktuigen [Royal Factory for Steam-
and-Other Machinery] on the Oostenburg in Amsterdam. The firm was said to have 
had around 1600 workers in its employ circa 1857, but five years later the workforce 
had dropped back to between 850 and 900.93 The NSM's Feijenoord dockyard in 
Rotterdam — where Lawson had been working prior to his departure for Java in 
1847 — appears to have been a significantly smaller enterprise: it was said that when 
its orders ran out in the following year, some 700 men were laid off.94
Meanwhile, across the world, in distant Surabaya, Baijer's workforce was (circa 
1860) reportedly around 750-strong, while the Government dockyard and foundry 
(circa 1853) employed 800 or more workers. Some of Surabaya's predominantly 
Javanese workers were designated as 'Coolies', but most were described as werklieden, 
implying that they were by no means in the category of unskilled labour.95 In the 
1860s, for example, in the case of Baijer's establishment, Jhr [Jonkheer] Mr WT 
Gevers Deynoot, a visiting dignitary from the Netherlands, made special mention 
of its Javanese workers as being both handig en gevat [adroit and clever].96 We do 
not know how Lawson experienced the great workshop and dockyard in Surabaya 
where he was in charge of assembling the Onrust and the Borneo. Nonetheless, it is 
reasonable to assume that he would rapidly have found himself being initiated into 
the ways of Creole technology. They were ways that were, no doubt, different from 
those of the NSM dockyard at Feijenoord which he had left four months earlier, but 
they were geared very effectively to local circumstances.
93 MG de Boer, Geschiedenis der Amsterdamsche Stoomvaart, Amsterdam, Scheltema & 
Holkema's Boekhandel, 1921, vol. 1, pp. 78-9.
94 De Boer, Roengen, p. 151.
95 Faber, Oud Soerabaia, p. 172; KV, 1853, pp. 209-10.
96 Jhr Mr WT Gevers Deynoot, Herinneringen eener Reis naar Nederlandsch Indië in 1862, 
The Hague, Nijhoff, 1864, p. 95.
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The skilled character of much of the workforce, one that included people 
designated as 'Chinese-Indonesians' as well as 'native' Javanese (allowance needs to 
be made for the problematic nature of ethnic identification of this kind), is easily lost 
from sight.97 Given the essentially colonial nature of the archive on which we have 
to rely, the Europeans, with their prior training in the industrial centres of North-
West Europe, stand out. Even so, they were obviously not alone. The case of the 
manufacture of sugar is better documented than that of the industrial establishments 
in Surabaya itself. Highly skilled Chinese-Indonesian sugar makers were a ubiquitous 
feature of the mid-century industry (and for long afterwards). Wearing an apparently 
characteristic kind of bowler hat, they are to be seen in one antique photograph of a 
major mid-century factory, taken around 1870. It shows a hierarchy of management 
— with the European administrateur and his colleagues at its apex — arranged on 
the steps at the front of the fabriek.98 Some twenty or more years earlier, in the mid-
1840s, it had been reported that most sugar factories were actually 'run' by Chinese-
Indonesians.99 A decade later, at the Wonopringgo factory, the newly installed 
administrateur, Thomas Edwards, employed skilled Chinese-Indonesians to oversee 
work in the boiling house (because he felt that Javanese workers were 'not reliable'). 
Indeed, it was an important part of his plan to bring the factory up to scratch.100
Nor was it only skilled Chinese who were involved. Visiting the steam-operated 
Boedoeran sugar factory in East Java in the early 1860s, the Singapore-born William 
Barrington d'Almeida (he was later to become a barrister in the United Kingdom) 
observed that 'the men employed to boil the juice are Chinese but the most important 
branches of the machinery are managed by Javanese'.101 WT Gevers Deynoot made 
similar observations about the sugar factories that he visited at around the same 
time.102 Likewise, it was reported in the mid-1840s that it was Javanese workmen 
97 A report on the Java industry in 1846 recorded that in the specific case of the Lucassen 
factories in Tegal (see above), the Derosne apparatus was operated by Javanese workers. See 
E & L Saportas, in Exh 24.4.1847/28.
98 See the photograph of the Tjipiring sugar factory in Semarang Residency, reproduced in 
Breton de Nijs, p. 61.
99 E & L Saportas, in Exh. 24.4.1847/28.
100 Factorij to A'dam, 26.4.1854/284.
101 WB d'Almeida, Life in Java: With Sketches of the Javanese, vol. 2, London, Hurst & 
Blackett, 1864, pp. 268-9.
102 Gevers Deynoot, Herinneringen, p. 128.
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who operated the French-made, Derosne apparatus installed at Theodore Lucassen's 
factories in Tegal Residency.103 Perhaps most interesting of all, the Koning Willem II 
factory near Surabaya, one of the biggest and most technologically advanced in the 
colony, employed during the 1860s a small number of Javanese workers designated as 
inlandsche assisten machinists [assistant-mechanics], who evidently worked alongside 
— at a quarter of the pay or less — the factory's sole European mechanist.104
In short, the inventory of steam-operated machinery in Java in the mid-
nineteenth century has to be understood in a dual context: not simply one of diffusion 
103 E & L Saportas, in Exh 24.4.1847/28.
104 Leidelmeijer, Grootbedrijf, p. 348: 'Bijlage E-II. Uitgaven aan personeel kosten bij 
suikerfabieken Sentanen Lor en Koning Willem II te Soerabaija'.
Figure 5: A sugar factory's hierarchy of management: Tjepiring, North-Central 
Java in the 1860s.
Source: Koninklijk Instituut voor Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde, Leiden, no. 503826
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from the metropolis but also of the evolution of Creole technology and science in the 
colony itself. For example, the story that in Java (as in other 'sugar colonies') it was 
commonplace around the mid-century for Vacuum Pans to be used for the final 
'boiling' of sugar into a near-solid state — they were said to be fitted with bolt-down 
hatches so that the sugar could then be dug out — is suggestive of a potent capacity 
for adaptation.105
The evolution, in this respect among others, of a distinctively hybrid, 
Creole form that was part-colonial, part-metropolitan in its inspiration, did not go 
unchallenged. Indeed, it was the subject of a hostile dialogue, running over several 
decades in the middle of the nineteenth century. As late as 1878, for example, a 
Netherlands-based writer was still able to deplore the 'backwardness' of the Java 
sugar industry. In this article (signed Delft, September 1878), the writer is quite 
explicit in his attack on Creole technology in sugar manufacturing in the colony: 
he recommended 'verbetering der fabricage door de toepassing der in Europa algemeen 
als goed erkende methodes van werken' ['improvement in manufacture through the 
application of well-recognised European modes of manufacture'; emphasis added].106
Polemic of this kind had a long pre-history in the strained relations between 
soi-disant metropolitan experts and the Creole manufacturers in the colony. In the 
1850s, for example, we find Thomas Edwards, the formidable administrateur of the 
Wonopringgo sugar factory (to whom we shall return in the following chapter), 
engaged in a defense of Creole science and practice — and taking up the cudgels 
105 See John Scoffern, The Manufacture of Sugar in the Colonies and at Home, London, 
Longman, Brown, Green and Longmans, 1849, p. 91. Scoffern himself, however, was highly 
critical of the use of new technology by colonial planters, particularly with regard to the way in 
which some of them operated their Vacuum Pans, citing stiff or overboiled sugar as a common 
occurrence. The practice of overboiling led to the complete separation of molasses and sugar. 
A direct result of this practice was the need for liquoring to improve its colour, which led to 
additional loss of product. Scoffern quotes a letter from a Dr Evans, (possibly EW Evans, the 
author of The Sugar-Planter's Manual: Being a Treatise on the Art of Obtaining Sugar from the 
Sugar-Cane, London, Longman, Brown, Green and Longmans, 1847), who wrote of Vacuum 
Pans in Java being fitted with large apertures through which the stiff boiled sugar was shoveled 
out, an occurrence that slowed production and added to the original cost of the Pan. The 
sugar at that stage should have been crystalline, still coated with molasses, damp and readily 
pumped out without manual assistance. I am indebted to Dr Andrew Ratledge for kindly 
communicating this information.
106 F van Heumen, 'Over de Fabricage van Suiker uit Suikerriet', Tijdschrijft voor Nederlandsch 
Indie (Nieuwe Reeks), vol. 7, no. 2, 1878, pp. 216-18.
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against one such expert from the University of Utrecht, who had been hired by the 
Dutch Colonial Office to investigate the Java industry. Edwards was evidently not 
somebody who tolerated fools lightly. Presented with a copy of Professor GJ Mulder's 
recommendations for improvements in sugar-manufacturing techniques in Java, he 
did not mince his words. 'I beg to say', he wrote to his employer's local representatives 
(who were clearly only too happy to pass on his comments to Amsterdam), 'with 
all deference to the great name and worldwide reputation of that gentleman … [his 
proposal was quite] the worst that has ever come under my notice'. He went on to 
suggest that, although its author 'may be the first chemist in the world … I take leave 
to say that he knows nothing whatever about Sugar mills'. The problem, from the 
colonial manufacturers' point of view, was that 'improvements' advocated by Mulder 
would undermine an economy of production predicated on the extensive use of cane-
trash in the boiler house. More intensive crushing left it virtually useless as fuel, and 
double crushing, as advocated by Mulder, notoriously fouled the mills with broken 
cane. If there was an economically feasible alternative to existing practices, Edwards 
had no doubt whatsoever that 'no recommendation will be needed to induce [the 
manufacturers] to obtain the best presses that can be had for money'.107
Edwards could be so scathing, moreover, because he was fully conversant with 
global developments in sugar manufacturing. His was emphatically not the reaction 
of the scientifically ill-informed and technologically retrograde. 'Of late years', he was 
able to inform his employers in 1861, 'many scientific and practical men have written 
on the manufacture of sugar from cane juice, [and] … I have a long list of extracts 
from different writers … now before me'.108 It comes as no surprise, therefore, to find 
that in the 1850s he was an early member, along with (locally) a couple of members of 
the Lucassen clan and the Resident of Pekalongan, of the newly formed Nederlandsch-
Indische Maatschappij van Nijverheid [Netherlands-Indies Industrial Society].109
107 Edwards to Factorij, 2.8.1856/1036, in Factorij to A'dam, 9.8.1856/480. The episode is 
discussed, in its broader context, in Leidelmeijer, Grootbedrijf, pp. 195-224.
108 Edwards to Factorij, 24.12.1860, in Factorij to A'dam, 2.1.1861/ 915.
109 For a list of the members, see 'Lijst van Leden', Tijdschrift voor Nijverheid, in NI, vol. 3, 
1856, Batavia, Lange en Co, pp. 105-12. President of the Society was SD Schiff, the Director 
of Cultivations — effectively the CEO of the Cultuurstelsel; and in line with the aspirations of 
Creole science and technology, the Society produced its own Batavia-printed journal. Similar 
aspirations had been evinced in Surabaya in 1851 in the formation of the 'East Java Division' 
of the metropolitan-based Koninglijk Instituut voor Ingeniers. See Almanak en Naamregister 
van Nederlandsch-Indië, Batavia, 1827-64, here 1857, p. 303.
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As these examples indicate, there was nothing remotely isolated about the 
evolution of technology and science in Java during the mid-century decades. Not 
only intellectually but physically, contact between Europe and the colonial frontier 
was central to it — and by the late 1840s this latter was a great deal easier and 
quicker than it had been previously. For those who could afford it, the distance in 
time between the colonial Indies and metropolitan Holland was significantly less, in 
the mid-century decades preceding the opening of the Suez Canal and direct steamer 
connections between Europe and Asia, than has often been supposed. Indeed, the 
single most important development (before the arrival of the aeroplane) in closing the 
time-gap between Europe and 'the East' had taken place some decades earlier, with 
the establishment during the 1840s of a regular Overland Mail passenger steamer 
route from Singapore to Marseilles or Southampton via the Red Sea and the Egyptian 
land-bridge. A journey that had previously taken three-and-a-half or four months via 
sail and the Cape was reduced to a little over five weeks.110
It was hence possible for Edwards — paid to do so by his employers — to make 
a swift trip to Europe in 1857-58 to order new equipment for Wonopringgo and to 
specify his requirements in person at the 'Millwall Iron Works & Engine Factory' 
of the well-known manufacturing firm of Robinson, on the eastern, Thames-side 
outskirts of London. This ensured that the new machinery would be ready in time for 
installation at Wonopringgo in the 'dead' period at the end of the 1858 Campaign. 
Departing for Europe in October 1857, thanks to the Overland Mail, Edwards could 
be securely back at Wonopringgo by early May 1858, in good time for the beginning 
of the manufacturing season for which his presence was indispensable.111 Baijer, the 
'Iron King' of Surabaya and Edwards's erstwhile employer (see above) was to make a 
similar journey with a similar purpose in 1864-65.112
The full significance of that ongoing interconnectedness, however, is only 
something that can be appreciated in the context of the way in which the industrial 
110 Femme Gastra, 'The Experience of Travelling to the Dutch East Indies by the Overland 
Route, 1844-1869', in Gordon Jackson & David M Williams (eds), pp. 120-37.
111 'Edwards leaves for Europe with this Mail', the NHM Batavia factorij informed Head 
Office early in October 1857, and asked them to put 5000 guilders at his disposal (Factory 
to A'dam, 10.10.1857/2105, NHMA). He began his return voyage at the end of February 
1858, in company with some of the machinery from Robinsons, and resumed management 
at Wonopringgo on 14 May 1858. See Factorij to A'dam, 25.3.1858/63; Factorij to A'dam, 
7.6.1858/650.
112 Faber, Oud Soerabaia, p. 173.
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project in sugar evolved in Java during the middle decades of the nineteenth century. 
It is to this that we can now turn.
63
3 The Industrial Sugar Factory: Wonopringgo, Thomas Edwards and the Nederlandsche Handel-
Maatschappij (NHM)
As late as the 1870s, a painter's representation of a sugar factory on the north coast 
of Central Java made conspicuous reference to its purportedly picturesque aspects.113 
The place appears to be located in wilderness; a few 'blacks', as they would have 
been referred to then (it might be a particularly remote part of the Caribbean), are 
scattered in desultory fashion in the foreground; and a 'pioneering' European cabin 
bravely flies the Dutch flag. Although a belching chimney forms part of the picture, 
it is possible to feel that it is only there out of a need somehow to add variety to a 
scene otherwise totally lacking in animation or purpose. In fact, however, it is the 
vital clue to what was actually being depicted: an industrial site in constant day-
and-night operation for a substantial part of the year, operating with a disciplined 
workforce of several hundred labourers, its grinding mills fed with rail-hauled cane 
and, within its walls and in day-and-night operation, an array of apparatus that was 
fully the match (by the time the painting was made) for most other leading sectors of 
the contemporary international sugar economy.
The rise of the industrial factory was central to all this. As has been widely 
observed, the arrival of steam operation and more specifically, though not exclusively, 
the steam engine, entailed the need for economies of scale to justify its use wherever 
it was installed. Technological advance necessitated larger units of production and the 
concentration of production in one place. It also raised issues of how to concentrate 
labour in a single location and how to subject labour to the degree of discipline which 
large units of production require if they are to operate smoothly — or indeed, operate 
113 See Figure 6 overleaf.
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at all.114 Unsurprisingly, these were all issues played out within the context of the 
industrial project in sugar which got underway in Java during the 1830s and 1840s 
and developed exponentially thereafter.
There is, of course, no single pace-setting model of what constitutes 
'industrialisation', and the immediate focus here is on technological innovation. This, 
far from constituting a clean and decisive break with the past, took place (at least until 
late in the nineteenth century) on a largely incremental basis that mixed the new 
with the old in a myriad of possible permutations. The revolution in the technology 
of sugar manufacture — and the word 'revolution' does seem appropriate, given the 
114 In the context of a wide literature on 'the factory', I have relied primarily here on the 
discussion relating to its development in metropolitan Holland in van Zanden & van Riel, 
pp. 227-35.
Figure 6: A deceptively tranquil scene: the Kemanglen sugar factory, North-
Central Java in the 1860s.
Source: Courtesy of the author
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almost total transformation of the production process that it eventually involved — 
was paradoxically at once rapid and delayed in the middle decades of the nineteenth 
century: brand new, state-of-the-art apparatus rubbed shoulders with much older and 
'obsolete' equipment, as was typical throughout the major sectors of the international 
sugar economy of the day. Something similar, as we shall see, might be said about the 
organisation of industrial labour in factory (and field): older forms of subordination 
existed alongside, and in tandem with, ways of recruitment and discipline which had 
a much more 'modern' appearance.
The Mid-century Progression of the Industrial Project
Just how far the industrial project in Java sugar had progressed in the decades between 
Alexander Lawson's arrival in the colony at the end of the 1840s and his death at the 
Kemanglen sugar factory in 1874 is evidenced by both the machines and the men 
who often came out with them. On present evidence, at least, we cannot be sure that 
Thomas Edwards, an Englishman who arrived in the colony early in the 1840s, came 
together with a consignment of sugar-making equipment. What is certain, however, 
is that he spent the rest of his life in its company. Indeed, his career in the colony 
spanned the third quarter of the nineteenth century, which saw sugar production in 
Java shift firmly and decisively into an industrial phase that crucially underpinned the 
colony's rise to international eminence as an exporter of cane sugar outclassed only 
by Cuba.
Artisan Sugar Manufacture in Java and Early Attempts to Industrialise 
Production
Before the 1820s, the manufacture of sugar in the Dutch colony largely approximated 
the 'Chinese' style found elsewhere in South-East Asia.115 The mills employed were 
simple constructions, generally made up of two upright wooden rollers that were set 
in motion by water-buffalo yoked to an overhead beam. The juice thus obtained was 
then boiled down into sugar in open pans, often little more than cauldrons set over 
direct heat. 
On a technological level, in the Batavia Ommelanden as elsewhere in the colony, 
with very few exceptions, the industry's manufacturing sector remained rudimentary, 
to an extent that led contemporary commentators to compare it unfavourably with the 
115 Leidelmeijer, Grootbedrijf, pp. 69-82.
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great sugar industries of the Caribbean. It suffered likewise from its location, which, 
although near to the terminus of the Chinese junk trade and VOC headquarters, 
made it heavily dependent on a supply of workers from elsewhere. A further factor 
of considerable importance was the policy of the VOC toward the sugar industry, 
which was both restrictionist and erratic.116 Moreover, it seems perfectly possible that 
by the late eighteenth century, the sugar industry in the Ommelanden was suffering 
from a severe ecological crisis.117 Unsurprisingly, perhaps, by the opening decades 
of the nineteenth century, the industry there had come to be widely regarded as 
moribund. Recent research, however, has suggested that this picture is somewhat 
overdrawn and that moves were indeed afoot late in the eighteenth century and early 
in the nineteenth to update the industry's production methods.118
116 Peter Boomgaard, Children of the Colonial State, Amsterdam, Free University Press, 1989, 
p. 30.
117 See Leonard Blusse, Strange Company: Chinese Settlers, Mestizo Women, and the Dutch in 
VOC Batavia, Dordrecht, Foris Publications, 1986, pp. 15-34.
118 Leidelmeijer, Grootbedrijf, pp. 95-112.
Figure 7: Artisan sugar production: a 'pre-industrial' mill operated by water-
buffalo.
Source: Courtesy of the author
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Nonetheless, attempts to modernise the industry, in the sense of catching up 
with Caribbean best practice, met with only limited success prior to 1830. The two 
largest such operations were both located in West Java, where proximity to the port 
of Batavia perhaps conferred some advantage, but where — as in the Ommelanden 
— a scarcity of locally available labour was a possibly fatal drawback. One of these 
pioneering ventures was on the Pamanoekan and Tjiassem estate (aka 'P&T') — a 
vast tract of land alienated by Lieutenant Governor Thomas Stamford Raffles during 
the British occupation of the island between 1811 and 1816, and still in the hands of 
some of his cronies and their associates during the decade that followed.
It was they who established an elaborate sugar manufactury on the estate, 
located at the 'up-country' settlement of Subang, on the edge of West Java's 
mountainous interior.119 From a colonial standpoint at least, Subang was a remote and 
somewhat isolated spot. Nonetheless, it was there, at the beginning of the 1830s, that 
the Vacuum Pan — the sine qua non, as we have seen, of the mid-century industrial 
project in sugar worldwide — may have made its first appearance in Java.120 Despite 
or perhaps because of all this, however, the P&T estate was by then virtually bankrupt, 
and developments there stalled for a decade or more. Elsewhere in West Java, during 
the course of the 1820s, the Batavia-based firm of Trail & Co bought a steam engine, 
almost certainly the first in Java to be used for that purpose, to run a large sugar-
making operation that they owned in the coastal lowlands near Bekasi, to the east of 
Batavia, where it complimented other up-to-date machinery similarly imported from 
manufacturers in the United Kingdom.121 Despite these early harbingers, however, it 
119 On Subang in the 1820s, see G Roger Knight, 'From Plantation to Padi Field: The 
Origins of the Nineteenth Century Transformation of Java's Sugar Industry', Modern Asian 
Studies, vol. 14, no. 2, 1980, pp. 177-204.
120 John Pitcairn (administrateur, P&T) to van den Bosch, 14.8.1830, NA, Collectie van 
den Bosch, 426: 'I am anxious to inform your excellency that a machine lately invented in 
England for boiling sugar by steam has been sent out to me, which will likely arrive in the 
course of this year. It possesses many advantages over the present mode of boiling sugar …' 
See also JE de Sturler [Secretaris Pekalongan] to van den Bosch, 2 September 1830, in regard 
to what he (mistakenly) designates as a 'Trek Fournius' ['Draft Furnace'] on the P&T estate. 
He says it ought to be copied by the Government's sugar contractors and that Mr Loudon, 
formerly Administrator of P&T, by then living in Pekalongan, 'verhaalde mij dat het van de 
nieuwste ondervinding is, en er een ingenier uit Engeland is gezonden geweest om het interigten' 
['told me that it was of the very latest invention and that an engineer had been sent out from 
England to install it']. See NA, Collectie van den Bosch, 216.
121 'AV Batavia', 1824, vol. 3, p. 23, NA, Collectie Schneither, 84. For Trail & Co's 
importation of Machinery (from the United Kingdom), see IB, 13.8.1827/8, MK, 2507; IB, 
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was only in the following decade, with the inauguration in 1830 of the Cultuurstelsel, 
that significant progress began to be made on the industrial project in sugar.
The Cultuurstelsel and the Industrial Project in Sugar
The Cultuurstelsel, or System of [State] Cultivations, represented an attempt by the 
Dutch colonial state to commandeer peasant land and labour for the purposes of 
export commodity production. The principal crops were envisaged as coffee, sugar 
and indigo-producing crops, though this list was not exhaustive. Discussion of the 
agrarian aspects of the Stelsel can wait until later in the book. From the immediate 
standpoint of the manufacture of sugar, however, the essential fact was that the Stelsel 
inaugurated a period of far-reaching technological modernisation in the Java industry.
The factories initially established under its aegis represented a marked advance 
on what had gone before, at least in those parts of Central and East Java where 
the Stelsel 's remodelling of the sugar industry was largely concentrated. Primarily, 
this meant that the new (or in some few cases, revamped) factories were equipped 
(for the most part) with iron, horizontally-set, triple-roller mills for the grinding of 
cane. Indeed, their installation became one of the key stipulations in the agreements 
entered into with the Indies Government by the 'Contractor' entrepreneurs — mostly 
Europeans with an admixture of Chinese-Indonesians (the latter were formally 
excluded from contracts late in the 1830s) — who were the industry's mainstay 
during the mid-century decades. As well as 'modern' mills, the Contractors' factories 
were likewise usually possessed of sets of equipment in the boiling house, a modified 
version of the 'Jamaica train', which marked an improvement in terms of efficiency 
on earlier 'Chinese' arrangements.
Nonetheless, all this was still at some remove from what was technically possible 
by the 1830s and 1840s. Indeed, with a few notable exceptions, developments in 
Java during this period were scarcely on par with the contemporary industries of the 
Indian subcontinent or Mauritius. Thereafter, however, in terms of the technology and 
science of sugar production, Java drew away decisively from its erstwhile counterparts.
The central developments of the sugar revolution of the nineteenth century, 
as has been argued, took place in the boiling house, as well as in the milling of cane 
itself. Initially, the Java industry was rather slow to take up the Vacuum Pan and 
24.5.1824/2, MK, 2476 & IB, 29.3.1823/4, MK, 2468.
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associated steam-operation in this key sector of production. When it finally did so, 
however, progress was substantial and rapid. Indeed, by the late 1850s steam-operated 
equipment of one kind or another was to be found in the boiling houses of more 
than half of the nearly 100 factories working on contract to the Indies Government, 
and in virtually all of them by 1870.122 In the case of the heavily 'sugared' adjoining 
Residencies of Pekalongan and Tegal on the north coast of Central Java, for example, 
the earliest Vacuum Pans were installed at the beginning of the 1840s, where they 
worked in conjunction with some of the most advanced (Derosne et Cail) equipment 
to be found anywhere in the world at that date. Even so, at that date these were 
pioneering ventures and, Java-wide, factories similarly equipped were in a tiny 
minority. Within the next decade and a half, however, Vacuum Pans became very 
much the norm. Indeed, by the late 1860s, only one of the factories in Pekalongan-
Tegal still operated solely with open pans in the old style.123
By then, Java had largely caught up with developments elsewhere in the 
international sugar economy, particularly those taking place in the New World. In 
this respect, the comparison between Java and Cuba is a particularly potent one. 
Destined to be Java's occidental counterpart for the remainder of the colonial era, 
the Caribbean island overtook Brazil in the mid-nineteenth century as the world's 
single largest producer-exporter of cane sugar. In part, at least, it did so because of 
innovation in the field of manufacturing technology which transformed Cuba into the 
most technologically advanced sugar industry in the New World. In addition to the 
122 Leidelmeijer (Grootbedrijf, p. 138) has established that nearly 60 per cent of the colony's 
ninety-six contract sugar factories (fifty-six in all) were equipped with Vacuum Pans circa 
1857. A degree of possible ambiguity exists as to the nature of the stoomtoestellen [steam 
equipment] installed at some few factories, in so far as the reference (in documentation 
relating to the industry collected by the well-known Umbgrove Commissie in the mid-
1850s) may be to steam-heated, but 'open', clarifying and evaporating pans (i.e. 'Wetzels', 
'Gadsdens' and the like) rather than to Vacuum Pans per se. See SU, Bijl D. Nonetheless, in 
the greater majority of cases referred to by Leidelmeijer (at least fifty of Java's total of ninety-
six 'Contract' sugar factories), the reference is clearly to Vacuum Pans, unambiguously defined 
by their luchtledige [reduced-pressure], 'closed' character. Moreover, in some cases where the 
Umbgrove documentation (itself using very varied terminology supplied by the officials of 
the sugar-producing Residencies) is apparently ambiguous re stoomtoestellen — as in the four 
Lucassen and Holmberg factories in Tegal — we know from other sources that these factories 
were indeed fitted with Vacuum Pans.
123 JVFB, vol. 24, 1848-49, pp. 76-7; 'Overzigt Tegal', NA, Collectie Umbgrove, pp. 1-5; 
JVFB, vol. 37, 1861-62, appendix; KV, 1867-68, p. 124.
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installation of steam-driven mills at the beginning of the 1860s, the Caribbean island 
was said to have perhaps as many as seventy-seven factories equipped with Vacuum 
Pans — and associated steam equipment in the boiling house. If this calculation is 
roughly correct, Java — with its fifty-six or so Vacuum Pans — was not so very far 
behind.
To be sure, the comparison can be overstated. It seems doubtful, for example, 
whether either of Java's most advanced sugar factories at the time — Wonopringgo 
on the north coast of Central Java and Koning Willem II in East Java — matched 
in technological finesse such mid-century Cuba factories as Acana, in Matanzas 
province.124 Even so, the Java sugar industry of the mid-nineteenth century evidently 
possessed factories which — by the very mixed standards of the day in respect to the 
machinery of manufacture — were broadly comparable with those of other similarly 
advanced sectors of the international sugar economy.
The Evolution of the Wonopringgo Sugar Factory
The Wonopringgo sugar factory was located in Pekalongan Residency, near the foot 
of the mountains that form the southern fringe of the coastal plain of Central Java. 
To its north, the level country of intensively cultivated, irrigated rice fields extends 
through the district of Pekajangan down to the outskirts of the town of Pekalongan 
itself, while almost immediately to the factory's south, in the district of Sawangan 
(Karanganyar), the land becomes undulating, leading to the foothills of the massif 
that separates the Pasisir from the interior of Central Java. Streams coming down 
from the mountains made Wonopringgo a particularly good location for a factory 
that, until quite late in the nineteenth century, depended heavily on water power for 
grinding its cane, while its proximity to the densely populated coastal plain ensured 
a ready supply of labour.
To designate the original installation there, built at the beginning of the 1830s, 
as a 'factory' would be to use something of a misnomer. Its early history, however, 
exerts a fascination not only because of what it was not, but because of the extent 
to which it complicates any narrative of the Cultuurstelsel predicated on notions of 
a 'command economy' that was imposed in a thoroughly businesslike and coherent 
124 I am grateful to Dr Curry-Machado for drawing my attention to the Acana mill, which 
was among the most advanced of its day.
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fashion. In this part of the colony, at least, nothing could be further from the truth. 
The story begins in 1830, at the very onset of the Cultuurstelsel and of the state's 
drive to expand sugar production, when the Dutch authorities in Pekalongan, no 
doubt panicked by the sheer force of the edicts coming from the gubernatorial 
palace at Buitenzorg, decided to order the planting of sugar cane in the Pekajangan 
district, to the south of Pekalongan town. (They probably hoped that the location 
was sufficiently removed from the indigo fields not to do any damage to what they 
reasonably suspected was the Residency's most promising commodity.) The area of 
land involved amounted to no more than 80 bau (about 55 hectares) — around a 
tenth of the amount of land being planted for the developed Wonopringgo factory 
some quarter of a century later — but the project caused endless trouble.
Figure 8: Mid-nineteenth-century industrialisation: there is no extant painting or 
photograph of the Wonopringgo sugar factory in the mid-century decades. This 
contemporary view of the Pangka factory further along the north coast of Central 
Java provides some indication of what Wonopringo must have been like.
Source: Koninklijk Instituut voor Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde, Leiden, no. 47D4
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In order to get the ripening cane processed into sugar, and in the absence 
of other takers, the Residency authorities contracted a local Chinese-Indonesian, 
identified as one Gou Kang Tjou in Dutch accounts, to buy the cane and build a 
mill. Since Gou appeared to have no money of his own, Pekalongan's leading Chinese 
merchant, Nonya [Mrs] Oei Taylo — in a deal she was later to regret — advanced the 
cash. Meanwhile, the Bupati of Pekalongan, together with an allegedly penniless Arab 
trader — who was probably called Sarif Schan, and who was an Islamic functionary 
attached to the Regent's Court — were likewise prevailed upon to stand surety for 
Gou, as was one of the Residency's Dutch controleurs or district officers.125
What Gou did with his money was to build a primitive processing plant in 
the long-established 'Chinese' manner. Officially inspected by the Dutch authorities 
in 1834, it was said to be already ruinous: a bamboo shed housed half a dozen small 
wooden roller-mills (in the local, 'Japara' style) for grinding the cane, and a building 
that served simultaneously as a boiling house and living quarters was equipped with 
a set of six iron cauldrons. The resultant sugar, so badly made that most of it had 
liquified, was stored in a tumbledown warehouse on the site, and the entire enterprise 
was valued at the derisory sum of between 800 and 1000 guilders. Recriminations over 
Gou's venture helped foul relations between the Bupati, Oei Taylo and the Residency 
for at least the next decade: the venture exposed the Bupati to the claims against Gou, 
and he found himself being sued for 15 000 guilders by Nonya Taylo. Since his salary 
from the Dutch amounted to no more than 12 000 guilders a year, this was obviously 
a very serious matter for the already heavily indebted Bupati. Indeed, it was serious 
enough for him to bring it up with Governor-General ad interim JC Baud when the 
latter visited the Residency in 1834.
As if this was not enough, a plan was also hatched, further bedeviling Gou's 
venture. The plan was to transfer the whole operation southwards to a new site, in 
Karanganyer, where a well-connected European Contractor was installing himself.126 
125 For the information in this and the following paragraphs, see L Vitalis, 'Rapport 
Pekalongan 1834', pp. 35-6, NA, Collectie Baud, 460; 'Rapport omtrent de suikermolen te 
Wonopringgo', in L Vitalis to Directeur Cultuurs, 10.3.1834/25, ANRI, Archief Cultuurs, 
no. 333, Exh. 13.3.1834/761; 'Brieven aankomende van de Directeur van Cultuurs 1832', 
AD, Pekalongan, no. 80; Cultuurverslag Pekalongan, 1834, pp. 1-14, ANRI, Arsip Cultuurs, 
1624; IB, 25.5.1833/3, MK, 2847; IB, 5.7.1834/3, MK, 2852; IB, 3.10.1834/7, MK, 2853; 
IB 24.12.1834/10, MK, 2853.
126 See AV, Pekalongan, 1831 & 1832 [unpaginated] & Directeur Cultuurs to Resident 
Pekalongan, 13.3.1832/390 together with enclosed letter De Sturler to Governor-General, 
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This individual, the Scots-born Alexander Loudon, was a favorite of the all-powerful 
Governor-General, Johannes van den Bosch — and had as his business partner a 
retired army officer, JG de Sturler, whose niece was the Governor-General's wife.127
Loudon himself subsequently moved to richer pastures in neighbouring 
Semarang Residency. The Karanganyer speculation, succinctly described by one 
Dutch official as being located on a site anything but suitable for a sugar factory, 
was abandoned, and the centre of operations moved back to Wonopringgo, where 
European Contractors were installed to manage things. The new concessionaires were 
the offspring of an earlier Governor-General, the formidable HW Daendals, but they 
appeared to have inherited little of their father's drive or acumen.128 Around 1839, they 
erected a new factory on the Wonopringgo site, but the operation quickly changed 
hands, and by 1841 it was owned by the Semarang-based commodity trading firm 
of Tissot & Co129, in conjunction with their Batavia associates, Lagnier & Co. The 
several successive Contractors who now ran the operation proved scarcely more adept 
than Gou, except in so far as they had managed to get some money from the Indies 
7.3.1832 (extract) and AD, Pekalongan, nos. 1-3 & 80. Loudon had petitioned the Batavia 
Government against the granting of a contract to Gou, arguing that it would jeopardise 
his supplies of cane and be the 'ruin' of his own Karanganyar venture, for which he had 
already bought 'expensive English iron machinery'. Accordingly, the Director of Cultivations 
(the 'CEO' of the Stelsel) refused to ratify Gou's contract and journeyed to Pekalongan to 
decide if cane should go to Gou or Loudon. The Resident remarked that 'from the above, it 
can be sufficiently seen, how unfair it would be, to ruin the Chinese contractor in order to 
accommodate someone [i.e. Loudon] who is already well-provided for'. He observed that 
'Wonopringgo' Cane would have to be carted 4-5 palen (7.5 kilometres) to Loudon's mill 
at Karanganyar. As of 1832, ratification of Gou's contract remained postponed: 'Messers 
Loudon and De Sturler, so I understand, have prevented ratification so far by their repeated 
petitions, since these gentlemen are convinced that they have a claim to the cane which was 
originally planted for the Wonopringgo mill'.
127 Westendorp Boerma, Briefwisseling, vol. 2, p. 260.
128 The brothers CJ and AD Daendals took over Loudon's contract at Karanganyar 
(IB, 12.12.1838/10, MK, 2589). They already held a concession to manufacture sugar in 
neighbouring Semarang Residency. As former Contractors, they were being sued by the 
Indies Government in 1843 for non-delivery of sugar. See Extract IB, 13.2.1843/11 in AD, 
Pekalongan, no. 100.
129 The head of the firm, the Marseilles-born Jean Marie Tissot, had arrived in Java in 1810. 
He was for some time active as a coffee planter in the Principalities. By the late 1820s, however, 
he had gravitated to Semarang, where he set up in business in some form of association with 




Government130 to finance the building of an 'industrial' factory on the site, with two 
triple iron-roller mills for grinding the cane and something rather more elaborate 
than Gou's cauldrons for boiling the juice down into sugar. Even so, the operation 
was badly undercapitalised and lacked some vital equipment. Most importantly, it 
was dependent on a single water-wheel, which had insufficient power to run both 
mills simultaneously, with the result that the grinding season was unduly prolonged 
and much of the cane had dried out before it could be crushed. In any event, the mills 
were in very poor condition. Nor were matters helped, it was reported, by the fact 
that the Contractors had insufficient funds to buy the firewood needed for boiling the 
sugar, and hence had to rely entirely on burning cane-trash.131
The situation changed decisively in the mid-1840s. Both Tissot and Lagnier 
were heavily involved in the sale of Dutch cotton goods on consignment from the 
Nederlandsche Handel-Maatschappij (Netherlands Trading Society) or NHM132; and 
with the collapse of their business ventures in 1843, their assets, such as they were, 
including the Wonopringgo factory, passed into the hands of the Batavia branch-
office or factorij of the NHM.133 Unable to find a buyer at what they regarded as 
a realistic price, they then set about converting the run-down sugar works into a 
modern factory.
The new Netherlands-based owners were the biggest Western business-house 
operating in the colony in the mid-nineteenth century and both the commercial agent 
of the Indies Government and (until 1850) its bankers. As such, the NHM enjoyed 
what seemed, at times, the status of a quasi-governmental enterprise. By virtue of 
their political connections, as well as the large amount of capital at their disposal — 
nominally 34.5 million guilders, subscribed by mostly Dutch stockholders134 — and 
130 At the close of 1844, the outstanding loan from the Indies treasury amounted to 
30 000 guilders. See 'Lijst … Kultuurondernemingen … Ultimo December 1844', in 
Exh. 1.2.1847/22.
131 For the state of Wonopringgo at the time that it came into the NHM's hands in 1844, 
see 'Nota betreffende de Fabriek Wono Pringo door den Heer CA Granpré Molière', NFB, 
31.12.1844/669.
132 WFM Mansvelt, Geschiedenis van de Nederlandsche Handel-Maatschappij, vol. 2, Haarlem, 
[1924-1926], pp. 19, 39.
133 NFB, 4.6.1843/614 & 29.8.1844/655; Mansvelt, vol. 2, pp. 18-19 & 39-40.
134 When the NHM was established in 1824, the Dutch King, Willem I, was the largest 
single shareholder (Mansvelt, vol. 2, p. 226). For an authoritative recent overview of the 
company's history, see Ton de Graaf, Voor Handel en Maatschappij: Geschiedenis van de 
Nederlandsche Handel-Maatschappij, 1824-1964, Amsterdam, Boom, 2012.
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by virtue, also, of the wide scope of their business, they played a dominant role in the 
commercial life of the Indies (and a major role in the Netherlands itself ). During the 
mid-century decades, they developed extensive interests in the Java sugar industry. 
Indeed, around 1860 nearly one-fifth of the colony's major sugar factories, most of 
them in the north coast Residencies of Central Java, had contracts of some sort with 
the NHM for the sale of that part of their output which they were not committed 
to deliver to the Government — which also sold its sugar through the agency of 
the NHM.135 Wonopringgo itself, however, was the first, and for almost a quarter 
of a century, the sole directly-owned speculation in sugar manufacture in which the 
NHM were involved. Accordingly, the firm's Batavia factorij lavished a good deal of 
attention on it (not least in the form of monthly letters to Amsterdam cataloguing 
developments there, something for which the historian can be duly grateful!). The 
firm ended up converting it into a 'model' factory on parallel lines to the cotton mills 
that the NHM had already established in the Netherlands.
They began on the right footing in 1847 by re-negotiating the contract for 
Wonopringgo (for a further twenty years) on a basis that obliged the firm to deliver 
to the Government only as much sugar as was needed to cover the state's expenses 
incurred in organising the cultivation of the cane (primarily so-called crop payments 
to peasant cane growers). This was provided under the standard arrangement 
prevailing under the Cultuurstelsel. The remainder of the factory's output remained at 
the 'free disposal' of the manufacturer.136 This was a favourable (though not unique) 
arrangement, which meant that as sugar prices experienced renewed buoyancy toward 
the end of the 1840s, the NHM could hope to profit from increased production at 
Wonopringgo to a greater degree than the majority of factories in Java circa, whose 
contracts stipulated that the greater part or the whole of their output had to be 
consigned to the Government at a preordained price. Having thus settled the matter 
of 'free disposal' and gone on to order several ship-loads of new equipment, the 
factorij then set about finding somebody to manage the enterprise efficiently. In 1852, 
they found him.
135 See Chapter 5 below.




'Even Though an Englishman …': Thomas Edwards (1814-1864)
Since the NHM had been founded in the mid-1820s with a view to wresting the 
commerce of Java from the (potential) control of the British, the appointment by its 
Batavia branch of an individual by the name of Thomas Edwards as Wonopringgo's 
administrateur [general manager] may have been seen as a provocation by Head 
Office, and clearly needed to be justified. 'Even though an Englishman', as the 
factorij readily conceded in reporting on matters to Amsterdam, Edwards stood head 
and shoulders above the many other applicants for the position, which had been 
advertised in June 1852 in the colony's sole — and Government-run — newspaper, 
the Javasche Courant.137
He was one of the industry's first 'professionals', in so far as his job was a salaried 
one (and the NHM rejected subsequent attempts on his part to lease the factory from 
them). As such, he received 500 guilders a month (the same base salary as an Assistant 
Resident in Government service) together with an annual bonus linked to the factory's 
output, free accommodation at Wonopringgo and 'all that which is normally provided 
free of charge to the Administrator of a sugar factory'.138 The essential point about 
Edwards, however, was not only that he was already an experienced sugar factory 
manager, who had been administrateur of two other such enterprises in Java during 
the preceding half-decade, but also that he had considerable experience with steam-
operated machinery. This was crucial, since by this date Wonopringgo had become a 
large and well-equipped enterprise, in whose manufacturing process steam played a 
crucial role.
The extent of this advance is partly obscured by the relatively late arrival in 
the industry, at least in appreciable numbers, of steam-driven mills for grinding cane. 
Indeed, shortly after the mid-century there were said to be only ten steam engines 
operating sugar mills in the whole of Java, with four more in the offing.139 This meant 
that only around 10 per cent of the big Java factories operating around 1860 had 
steam mills: in Cuba, almost exactly contemporaneously, the figure was around 
137 NFB, 10.7.1852/67.
138 NFB, 10.7.1852/67.
139 KV, 1863, Bijl W, Nota betrekkelijk de werking van stoommachinerien op de suikerfabrieken 
voor het in beweging brengen van de molen [Note concerning the operation of steam machinery 
in sugar factories with reference to how the mills are powered].
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70 per cent.140 At Wonopringgo itself during the mid-century decades, motive power 
for grinding of the factory's cane continued to come from two big water-wheels (a 
second water-wheel was brought to Wonopringgo from Loudon's now abandoned 
and part-demolished factory at Karanganyer) rather than a steam engine.141 Even 
so (and as will be argued subsequently), there was nothing necessarily retrograde 
about the continued adherence to water power in the Java sugar industry in the mid-
nineteenth century: for the factories, water was a 'free' and plentiful resource, at least 
in the case of those situated, as was Wonopringgo, near abundant supplies from the 
nearby mountains. The essential point, moreover, was that throughout mid-century 
Java, water-power was harnessed in association with a great deal of technologically 
advanced machinery.
Wonopringgo was a prime case in point. Following their assumption of 
ownership at the factory in 1844, the NHM came up with substantial amounts of 
money to re-equip it in a manner befitting what was by far and away the colony's 
richest and most powerful business enterprise.142 First, two new mills for grinding the 
cane were installed in 1845: exploiting its commercial contacts in the Indies, the firm 
was able to have one of them (made by the Dutch firm of Van Vlissingen) shipped 
from the Surabaya warehouse of their agency there. These in turn were replaced at the 
end of the following decade by up-to-the-minute milling equipment, imported from 
the London engineering firm of Robinson, whose yard Edwards had visited in person 
to order machinery to his precise specifications during a six-month visit to the United 
Kingdom in 1857-58. (The equipment was still there — and still operational — 
early in the twentieth century.) This was similar machinery to that which Robinson 
was exporting contemporaneously to Cuba.143 Though still predominantly water-
140 Tann, 'Steam and Sugar', p. 72.
141 Edwards's description is summarised as follows: the north mill wheel was 30 foot across 
(diameter) and 7 foot 10 inches wide, and the south wheel was 20 foot by 3 foot 7 inches. See 
enclosure in Factorij to A'dam, 25.2.1853/192.
142 For the information in this and the following paragraphs, see 'Nota betreffende de 
Fabriek Wono Pringo door den Heer CA Granpré Molière', in NFB, 31.12.1844/669; 
Factorij to A'dam, 1.8.1845/233; Factorij to A'dam, 17.9.1845/236; Factorij to A'dam, 
29.11.1847/305; JC Teengs [Report on Wonopringgo], Batavia, 27.6.1850, in Factorij to 
A'dam, 24.7.1850/29; Factorij to A'dam, 25.9.1854/316; Edwards to Factorij, 9.9.1854/826, 
in Factorij to A'dam, 11.10.1854/320; JVFB, vol. 35, 1859-1860, p. 255; Heijning to De 
Directie der Vereeniging van Suikerfabrieken te Passoeroean, 20.12.1863, in Factorij to 
A'dam, 25.1.1864/1225; Mansvelt, vol. 2, pp. 363-6.
143 Curry-Machado, Cuban Sugar, p. 47.
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powered, Wonopringgo was also possessed by this date of an auxiliary steam engine, 
for those occasions during the 'dry season' when there was insufficient water to fully 
operate the mill. The heart of the 'new' Wonopringgo, however, was located in the 
boiling house where the cane-juice was cleansed, concentrated into tjing [thick juice] 
and subsequently transformed into sugar. When the firm had taken over the factory 
in 1844, the 'boiling house' was just that: an array of some fifty-two iron cauldrons 
(in Dutch, ketels) and a magazijn or warehouse with room for 7000 pots. The semi-
liquid sugar was left to set in these pots and (sometimes) 'clayed', meaning that the 
pots were sealed with wet clay, the water from which percolated through the setting 
mass, taking impurities with it and leaving several layers of fine white sugar in its 
wake.
Here, the changes wrought by the NHM were nothing short of revolutionary: 
a set of four Vacuum Pans — the NHM evidently did nothing by halves — was 
installed there circa 1850, after a massive and prolonged effort. It took a month to 
drag them (presumably using labour commandeered from the local population) the 
sixteen kilometres from the wharf at Pekalongan to the factory site at Wonopringgo. It 
took considerably longer than that to get them operating properly, something which 
caused both considerable dissent among the factory's European personnel and the 
premature departure of the 'engineer' in charge of the assembly of the new apparatus. 
Even so, it was all worth it, since (as explained earlier) the Vacuum Pans made it 
possible to complete the penultimate stages of manufacture in a way that ensured 
both more and better sugar and a far greater efficiency of operation. Wonopringgo 
was thereby launched on a trajectory that made it one of the most productive and 
profitable sugar factories in Java in the mid-nineteenth century. Given the ample 
provision of Vacuum Pans, moreover, it also seems to have proved possible — on 
one occasion at least — to use them for reducing the cane-juice to a tjing as well 
as for boiling that syrup to near-setting point. As Thomas Edwards was to remark 
subsequently to his employers: '[T]he system of evaporation in vacuo is much superior. 
The work is brought together, the superintendence is much easier … [emphasis in 
original]'.144
The trouble was, however, that this made very heavy demands on the boilers, 
meaning that fuel was required at a prohibitive cost. Hence, the reduction to tjing 
144 For this and the material in the following paragraph, see Factorij to A'dam, 
11.10.1854/320, appendix; Edwards to Factorij, 9.9.1854/826.
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appears to have continued to take place (for the most part) at Wonopringgo in the 
mid-nineteenth century in similar open platte batterijen [steam-heated batteries] to 
those found in most contemporary factories in Java. What singled out Wonopringgo 
was the extensive use of bone charcoal in the manufacturing process. Prior to being 
pumped into the Vacuum Pans, the cane-juice was twice treated with bone charcoal 
during the cleansing (using Taylor filters) and concentration process.
Meanwhile, the new apparatus in the boiling house was complemented by 
the installation of a Centrifuge that spun the nearly 'finished' sugar into crystalline 
form. Initially installed (in 1854) so that some of Wonopringgo's output could be 
marketed direct and without the need for further refining (Australia was the intended 
destination)145, a whole bank of Centrifuges would subsequently become a ubiquitous 
feature of the production line. In the 1860s, however, the sole Centrifuge operated 
alongside older systems for draining the sugar of molasses in gemetselde steenen bakken 
[specially constructed brick troughs], which supplanted or supplemented the more 
conventional clay pots. A small pottery, a plant for manufacturing bone charcoal, 
a saw-mill, an iron foundry and a rudimentary fitters' workshop completed the 
mid-century inventory of Wonopringgo: an industrial complex located, somewhat 
incongruously — as pioneering factories worldwide tended to be — in the midst of 
farm-land and forest. With no more than a touch of hyperbole, Edwards remarked to 
his employers after almost a decade in their service that Wonopringgo was
[o]ne of the most complete [factories] in Java — nothing has ever been refused 
by you which I have thought might conduce to an improved manufacture, and 
although other administrators may have shown more ability, not one, I dare 
to affirm, has been more animated by a more constant and earnest desire for 
improvement than myself.146
From Whitchurch to Java: A Transnational Trajectory
Edwards's predecessor at Wonopringgo had been somebody with minimal experience 
of steam and steel. He was a former warehouse keeper and prior to that captain of a 
sailing ship.147 The new appointee was a man of a very different stamp. His career was 
145 Factorij to A'dam, 25.9.1854/316.
146 Edwards to Factorij, 24.12.1860, in Factorij to A'dam, 2.1.1861/ 915.
147 J Stokhekker, administrateur of Wonopringgo, 1844-51. Before becoming a pakhuismeester 
[warehouse-keeper] for the NHM in 1840-41, he was gezagvoeder [commander] of the 
Schooner Calypso. See JVFB, vol. 16, 1840/41, p. 3.
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akin to that of Alexander Lawson, Hubertus Hoevenaar and the other werktuigkundig 
individuals whose vital connection to the sugar industry is discussed at various points 
in the present account. That is to say, he was part of that transnational 'diaspora' of 
skilled individuals, initially at least with qualifications that were experiental rather 
than formal, who roamed the booming sectors of the global industrialising economy 
during the middle decades of the nineteenth century and who formed part of a 
'network of knowledge' that was international in character.
Thomas Edwards himself had been born in the Shropshire town of Whitchurch, 
in the Welsh borders of England, in fairly good agricultural country which produced 
many cattle — and much leather. His father was by trade a leather worker — a currier 
who treated and softened the hides after they left the tannery — as his own father 
had been before him. Curriers were in decline, however, and as a youth Edwards 
gravitated (along with many of those working in the leather industry) toward the 
rapidly industrialising areas of south Lancashire, some eighty or so kilometres to the 
north. By the 1830s, the districts lying between Manchester and Liverpool — where 
his uncle, Robert Broadhurst Hill, was a substantial man of business — had become 
the cradle of industrial development in the United Kingdom. It was no accident that 
the world's first passenger railway had opened there in 1831, and the area was home 
to a number of major foundries and engineering works, and to the collieries that 
supplied them with fuel. Edwards had experience in both.
He was first employed at the Haydock colliery, south-east of Liverpool, at 
that time the largest coal mine in south Lancashire. At Haydock, as we know from 
a few surviving fragments of letters and diaries kept by his younger brother Robert, 
Thomas Edwards learned technical drawing, and experienced going down the pit 
itself. Down there, he was teased by the women workers — 'the queerest concerns 
you ever saw', Tom told his brother — who laboured along with men on the coalface 
or in the tunnels. Moving on from the colliery, he worked for a time, presumably 
again as a 'gentleman apprentice', at the nearby Vulcan Foundry.148 Vulcan, then at 
the beginning of an illustrious history of mechanical engineering which lasted until 
148 'June 19th, 1833 — Tom left W'Church for Haydock and then went to Vulcan Town 
by the following month.' Extract from Robert Hill Edwards's First Journal (in possession of 
Elaine Nobbs, Charlottetown, PEI, and kindly transcribed for me by Mr Don Jardine, a direct 
descendant of Robert Hill Edwards, Tom Edwards's younger brother). Shortly after his arrival 
in Java, in the late months of 1842, Tom was already being spoken of as a werktuigkundige — a 
person expert with machines. See IB, 13.9.1842/1, MK, 2637.
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late in the twentieth century, was owned and run by a son of George Stephenson 
(of 'Rocket' fame) and by Charles Tayleur, the Liverpool-based scion of a wealthy 
Shropshire family.149 Tayleur's links to the Unitarian Dissenter congregations of his 
home county, to which the young Thomas Edwards also belonged (his late father had 
been a respected Unitarian preacher as well as being a leather worker)150, may well 
explain his apprenticeship at the foundry.151
By the mid-1830s Vulcan was manufacturing steam locomotives and engines 
on an increasingly significant scale. It was a sizeable and important establishment, and 
obviously attracted some clever and ambitious young men. One of Thomas Edwards's 
contemporaries among the apprentices there, Daniel Gooch, was to become a famous 
engineer with the Great Western Railway in the United Kingdom, and subsequently 
its company chairman. Edwards left no account of his experience at Vulcan, but 
Gooch did. His diary enables us to reconstruct a picture of young Edwards trudging 
from his lodging at a farm in a nearby village, down a rough, unmade lane to where 
the not quite complete factory lay — still a green field-site but with the new Newton-
le-Willows railway station, midway between Liverpool and Manchester, only a short 
distance away.152
149 For information on the Vulcan Foundry in the 1830s and 1840s, see 'The Story of Vulcan 
Works from 1830 to 2002', prepared by Malcolm Siberry for MAN B & W Diesel Ltd, 
Ruston, UK, posted at http://www.enginemuseum.org/bbv.html (accessed 15 August 2014).
150 See the obituary notice (by the town's Unitarian Minister, the Rev. John Philp) in the 
Unitarian publication, The Monthly Repository of Theology and General Literature, vol. 20, 
1825, p. 181.
151 The family of Charles Tayleur (1775-1854) owned an estate near Market Drayton in the 
north of the county and possibly a town house in Shrewsbury [information from http://www.
enginemuseum.org/sor.html (accessed 15 August 2014)]. Their number may have included 
some very prominent Unitarian Dissenters. In the late eighteenth century, William Tayleur 
of Shrewsbury (where Unitarianism was very strong among the 'better sort', who had two 
chapels in the town), an Oxford Fellow and London Barrister, was a noted Unitarian. See John 
Seed, 'Gentlemen Dissenters: The Social and Political Meanings of Rational Dissent in the 
1770s and 1780s', The Historical Journal, vol. 28, no. 2, June, 1985, pp. 299-325.
152 Gooch began his distinguished career at the Vulcan Foundry as an apprentice in January 
1834. He recorded in his diaries: 'On the 28th January 1834, I left home to go and work at 
the Vulcan Foundry, near Warrington in Lancashire, under Mr. Robert Stephenson. He and 
Mr. Tayleur of Liverpool had just built their works ~ indeed they were not quite finished ~ 
when I went there. The works were constructed chiefly for building locomotives. When I 
arrived at the Newton Junction late in the evening, I found Mr. Charles Tayleur, the Manager 
of the Vulcan Works, in the waiting room. I had a letter from Mr. Stephenson for him, and 
presented it with my great awe to him, as the arbitrator of my future. He, however, spoke 
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There is no surviving record of any of Vulcan's machinery having being sent 
to Java at this time, but Edwards, at least, made the journey. Why there and not 
to Cuba, where so many young engineering 'exiles' found their way around that 
time? Possibly the issue of slavery ruled this choice out. Brought up — as we have 
just seen — in the Dissenter communities of north-west England, and hence into 
an abolitionist tradition, Edwards may possibly have ruled out Cuba — with its 
thousands upon thousands of black African slaves incarcerated in factory barracks 
— on those grounds if no other. However that may be, Edwards arrived at the age of 
twenty-seven in Batavia in August 1842 on board a ship, the Warlock, which had left 
Liverpool in April of that year.153 Most probably, he did so at the behest of his first 
employer in Java, Thomas Benjamin Hofland, though again we cannot be quite sure 
of exactly what happened and what the connection was.
Leastways, Hofland was the person who supported Edwards's application to 
the colonial authorities, a few weeks after his landing there, for permission to remain 
in Java.154 One of the colony's richest men, together with his brother Peter, TB 
Hofland had recently bought the P&T estate in West Java from the British interests 
who had owned it for the previous twenty years, and he was also the proprietor of 
several sugar factories in East Java's Oosthoek districts. The Hoflands were both Asian-
born and had arrived in Java from the Indian subcontinent during the course of the 
1820s.155 Together with their Amsterdam-born partner Johann Erich Banck, and in 
cahoots with Chinese-Indonesian business interests in Surabaya, they made a great 
deal of money in the Oosthoek in the following decade supplying sugar on contract to 
the Indies Government.156
in a kind, friendly way to me, and this did much to reassure me … The works were situated 
about a mile from the Moss; down a wretched dirty lane with ruts a foot deep. I had to be in 
the works not later than ten minutes past six in the morning, and a dreadful walk it was in 
the dark when I first went there' [from www.enginemuseum.org/sor.html (accessed 15 August 
2014)].
153 Javasche Courant, 13 August 1842.
154 IB, 13.9.1842/1, MK, 2637.
155 On the Hoflands, see Bosma and Raben, pp. 126-8.
156 The NHM's Batavia factorij advanced the Hoflands more than 1 million guilders to buy 
Pamanoekan and Tjiassem, on the security of its output of sugar and coffee. See Factorij to 
A'dam, 5.9.1840/1527 & 29.11.1841/1819. As to the brothers' financial relation to the East 
Java Chinese, it was reported by the factorij in the early 1850s 'that the Chinaman Kwee Yang 
83
Sugar, Steam and Steel
It was not there, however, but at P&T that Edwards found his first job in Java. 
In taking over the estate, the Hoflands, it has to be assumed, aimed to follow up their 
success in the sugar industry of East Java with something similar at P&T. Within a 
few years they had built a second factory elsewhere on the property, in addition to 
the Subang operation that they had inherited from their British predecessors.157 TB 
Hofland's application to the Indies Government for permission to prolong Edwards's 
stay on the estate made explicit reference to the fact that the sugar works were of 'such 
a character that a capable machinist needed to be continually employed there'.158
Indeed, to Edwards's expert eye the problems were evidently more far-reaching 
than that. Within a very few months, he was accompanying some of the equipment 
from Subang for repair at a machine workshop in Pasuruan in East Java, operated 
by a pair of British 'migrants', WJF Dudman and Thomas Reed Stavers.159 Newly 
established in the booming sugar districts of Java's Oosthoek, such a workshop's 
existence was a further indication of the advancing frontier of the industrial 
manufacture of sugar in the colony in the middle decades of the nineteenth century 
— and of the transnational character of the technicians who supported it. Dudman 
and Stavers's venture was described by the Dutch Resident as being of 'great utility' 
to the area's sugar factories, and in 1842 its owners were lent the considerable sum 
of 12 000 guilders by the Indies Government to buy and ship from Europe 'a large 
iron smelting furnace and the equipment belonging to it'. Like Edwards himself, its 
proprietors were highly mobile and possessed of the kind of skills that gave them a 
chance of a better life in the colony than would have been the case 'at home'. Early in 
the century, Dudman & Co had been shipbuilders at Deptford in the lower reaches 
Ho, died on July 7 (possibly in 1851) and that the Hoflands had considerable sums [groote 
sommen] on loan from him'. See 'Aantekeningen uit de Correspondentie Factorij', NHMA, 
7999, file 588.
157 In 1842, the factorij remarked on the 'substantial improvements recently effected' at 
Pamanoekan & Tjiassem, without, however, going into any detail. See Factorij to A'dam, 
8.1.1842/1858. For a description of the sugar-making equipment at P&T in the 1840s, see 
Assistant Res. Krawang, 'Verslag omtrent den Toestand der Verkoopte en den Verhuurde 
Landen in der Afd. Krawang', 16 March 1850, AD, Krawang, no. 9.
158 IB, 11.2.1843/4, MK, 2642.
159 For the information in this and the following paragraphs, see IB, 1.7.1843/23, MK, 
2647; IB, 15.8.1840/20, MK, 2609; IB, 29.6.1841/5, MK, 2619; and the files on the 
Dudman brothers in the Centraal Bureau voor Genealogie, Den Haag (kindly supplied by 
Peter Christiaans). On Stavers, see Chapter 5, below.
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of the Thames to the east of London, and it is fairly certain that the 'Java' Dudmans 
came from the same family.160
Stavers had been born in Deptford on the Thames Estuary in 1798 and died in 
the United Kingdom in 1867. Much of the later part of his life, however, was spent 
in Java, where he was described as a 'master shipwright and seaman' at the time of 
being given permission to settle in the colony in 1840.161 He was not, however, the 
only member of his family to have settled on Java as the place to make his fortune. A 
brother, William 'Jack' Stavers — whom we shall meet again later — had found his 
way to the island some two decades earlier. Around the mid-century, William Stavers 
was the Government Contractor for the Koning Willem II sugar factory — one of 
the best equipped of its day — in East Java's Surabaya Residency. A nephew, Francis 
Dawson Stavers (1823-1864), also appears to have had a stake in the same operation.
Like Thomas Reed Stavers, WJF Dudman (1816-1868) likewise had kin living 
in Java. Following the termination of his connection with the workshop in East Java, 
he became partner in the Government sugar contract in the Rembang Residency 
on the north coast of Central Java. His brother, Robert Dudman, meanwhile, had 
enjoyed a career that had striking parallels with that of Thomas Edwards. In the 
early 1840s, he, too, was engaged in repairing sugar-making machinery in Java, in 
this instance on estates belonging to to the Dezentje family in the Vorstenlanden 
[Principalities] of Central Java. It was there that several score of European planters, 
with the recently deceased patriarch of the Dezentje family very prominent among 
them, had established themselves on 'estates' leased from the nobility of the princely 
Courts during the 1810s and 1820s. Like Edwards, Robert Dudman went on to 
become administrateur of a sugar factory — before dying in Surabaya in 1855.
On his journey to the sugar belt of the Oosthoek, Thomas Edwards may well 
have seen enough to convince him that his future lay there rather than in West Java, 
where there were few factories and where it appears that the Hoflands had drawn back 
from any plans to install up-to-date steam equipment.162 For whatever reason, by 1846, 
160 See C Northcote Parkinson, Trade in the Eastern Seas, 1793-1813, London, Cass & Co, 
1966 [1937], pp. 121, 128.
161 See IB, 15.8.1840/20, NA, MK, 2609.
162 For a description of the sugar-making equipment at P&T in the 1840s, see Assistant 
Res. Krawang, 'Verslag omtrent den Toestand der Verkoopte en den Verhuurde Landen in … 
Krawang', 16 March 1850, AD, Krawang, no. 9. It would appear from these reports that there 
were no Vacuum Pans operating on the estate in around 1850.
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within three years after his arriving there, Edwards and the Hoflands parted company. 
Meanwhile, he had found the domestic partner who remained with him for the rest 
of his life. Ann Baird had been born at Subang in 1826. She was almost certainly the 
daughter of Robert Webster Baird, the superintendent of the 'sugar works' there, and 
a local woman whose identity is presently unknown. In the normal way of things in 
the Indies colonial communities of Java in the nineteenth (and twentieth) century, 
Baird might well have 'recognised' his daughter, thereby conferring European status 
on her. However, Robert Baird died in the same year as she was born, and quite 
possibly before she was born.163 As a result, Ann Baird remained 'un-recognised' and 
hence an inlander or native. (This was a 'mistake' that Edwards took pains to avoid 
with respect to his own children with Ann Baird.) Brought up, as we must presume, 
among her dead father's British colleagues — one or two of whom were still there in 
the early 1840s — she most likely met Edwards at Subang. What is certain is that she 
subsequently lived with him in East Java and later still at Wonopringgo.
Departing from P&T, Edwards first took himself to Surabaya, where Frans 
Jacob Hubert Baijer first employed him.164 Later to be hailed as the city's 'Iron 
King', Baijer was at that time the proprietor of a recently established iron works 
and repair shop, the 'Phoenix' Fabriek voor Stoomwerktuigen [the Factory for Steam 
Machinery].165 From there Edwards moved directly into the sugar industry of East 
Java which Baijer's enterprise had been created to service. It was presumably no 
coincidence that both the sugar factories at which Edwards subsequently worked 
(Padjarakan and Tjipiring) were in the process of installing — or had just installed 
— steam-operated machinery.166 Accordingly, when the NHM factorij decided to 
employ him as their administrateur at Wonopringgo in 1852 they had obtained the 
services of one of the most experienced steam engineers in the colony.
Unsurprisingly, the NHM thought very highly of Edwards, whom they 
correctly saw as the cap-stone of their venture at Wonopringgo. Indeed, they thought 
well enough of him, and of his capacities as a man well-versed in the ways of steam 
163 See the notice of his death in Bataviasche Courant, 23 February 1826.
164 IB, 2.11.1846/22, MK, 2688.
165 IB, 2.11.1846/22, MK, 2688.
166 See 'Opgave wegens de op Java werkende suikerfabrieken, Juni 1848', in NHMA, 9207. 
These brief details of Edwards's career in the Indies prior to this appointment at Wonopringgo 
come from his application (in 1857) for naturalisation as a Dutch citizen in NA, Archief 
Ministerie van Justitie, 2.09.01, dossier 4862.
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and steel, to pay for a return voyage to Europe in 1857-58 on the expensive Overland 
Mail route so that he might order more machinery for Wonopringgo — and visit his 
family. It also appears that he took this opportunity of taking his and Ann Baird's 
two young daughters to join his mother, sister and brother-in-law in Edinburgh. He 
did so in the knowledge that they would receive the kind of education there that they 
could never hope to experience in remote Wonopringgo. The two young 'scholars … 
born in Java' are recorded in the Edinburgh Census early in the following decade.167
Presumably, their father anticipated that the family would soon be reunited. 
Leastways, in 1862, despite considerable inducements to remain, he left the 
employment of the NHM, apparently with a view to returning to the United 
Kingdom. Instead, he lingered in Java and in 1864 took up employment with the 
Batavia firm of Maclaine Watson. Together with their close affiliates in Semarang 
and Surabaya, Maclaine Watson were at this time second only to the NHM's factorij 
in terms of the extent of their sugar interests. Edwards became the administrateur at 
their Gempol sugar factory, some 150 kilometres to the west of Wonopringgo, in 
Cirebon Residency.
What had happened to make him abandon his apparent plan to repatriate? 
Had he lost the money he would have saved from his salary and bonuses during 
his ten years at Wonopringgo? The year 1862, in which he took his long-projected 
departure from Wonopringgo, was a bad one for agricultural speculations in Java, 
and many firms and individuals had their fingers badly burnt. It seems possible 
that Edwards, having invested his money locally, might have been among them.168 
The most likely candidate for identification as the agent of Edwards's ruin was the 
entrepreneur and sugar-factory owner, Johannes Herderschee. His death in May 1862 
(discussed in a subsequent chapter) exposed huge debts to 'private individuals' and 
brought about the collapse of the substantial Batavia firm of Van Ommeren, Reub & 
Co (see Chapter 5, below). Herderschee's Simbang sugar factory in Pekalongan was 
quite near to Wonopringgo, and it is highly likely that he and Edwards would have 
known each other well.
167 I am grateful for this information to the research of Mrs Jill Hawkins, who has established 
that the two girls ('scholars' and 'born in Java') were living in the early 1860s in Edinburgh's 
'New Town' with the Torrop family. (Edwards's widowed mother also lived with them.)
168 On the crisis of 1862, see L de Bree, Gedenkboek van de Javasche Bank, vol. 2, Wetevreden, 
Kolff, 1928, pp. 47-62.
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In any event, Edwards's tenure at the Gempol factory was a short one. It seems 
likely that he had used his trip to Europe in 1857-58 not only to lodge his children 
with his relatives but also to get advice about his health. His father had died at the age 
of thirty-five and his brother, Robert Hill Edwards, was grievously sick in Canada, 
where he had taken himself and his family to farm early in the 1840s. It is hard not 
to suspect that the chemical processes used in treating leather in the Edwards's family 
workshop back in Whitchurch all those years earlier had taken a terrible toll. Be that 
as it may, Thomas Edwards died near his new workplace, in the hillside village of 
Agalinga, a few kilometres from the Cirebon town of Madjalengka, on 13 November 
1865. The sugar Campaign at Gempol would have ended for the year, and it was 
where he and Ann Baird had presumably gone to escape the heat of the plains. He 
was scarcely fifty years old. In what was, in effect, a posthumous tribute to what he 
had achieved at Wonopringgo in the decade he was there, the Resident of Pekalongan 
eulogised Wonopringgo two years after his death as
without doubt one of the best looking [schoonste] and fit-for-purpose factories 
built on Java. No expense has been spared to apply everything that science 
found worthy to increase and improve the quality of output.169
Industrial Production and Productivity at Mid-century Wonopringgo
Edwards had remained at Wonopringgo for a full ten years. Under his management, 
the factory had flourished and become a profitable enterprise for both the owners and 
for Edwards himself. It had been transformed from a run-down, poorly performing 
factory into a large and well-equipped enterprise, with a commensurately extensive 
area of plantation. Back at the very beginning of sugar making there, early in the 
1830s, Gou's pair of simple 'Chinese'-style wooden mills had had supplies of cane 
from some 80 bau (55 hectares) of 'plantation'. The industrial set-up for grinding 
cane and boiling down the juice at Wonopringgo created by the NHM was matched 
with an area under cane 10 times greater than that: something in excess of 800 bau 
(550 hectares) was planted in the vicinity every year.
In terms of output, moreover, Wonopinggo under NHM control was — or 
became — a convincing demonstration of the economies of scale associated with the 
rise of the industrial factory and of the productive potentials of steam and steel in one 
169 Resident Pekalongan to Director Binnenlands Bestur, 20.2.1867/674. Exh. 11.4.1868/91.
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combination or another. One estimate was that 'Chinese'-style mills of the kind used 
by Gou produced at best around 2 piculs (around 125 kilograms) of sugar per day170, 
whereas in the 1820s, Trail & Co's pioneering steam-driven mill in West Java (see 
above) was reckoned to be capable of a daily output of 30 piculs per day.171 Used in 
combination with the steam-grinding of cane, or independently of it (as was widely 
the case in Java in the mid-nineteenth century, for reasons already explained), the 
steam-operated Vacuum Pan offered further improvements in the quality as well as 
the quantity of the product.
The NHM's Wonopringgo was not only a much larger enterprise than its 
predecessors, but also a much more productive one in terms of the quantities of 
sugar manufactured from a given area of cane. It is impossible (given the fragmentary 
sources available) to know how much sugar Gou Kang Tjou had actually produced 
at his (abortive) sugar works from his 80 bau of cane in the early 1830s: it may 
have been as little as 100 piculs or around 6300 kilograms, but the figure seems 
improbably low.172 Altogether more satisfactory data relate to the state of affairs at 
Wonopringgo in the mid-1840s. In 1844, immediately prior to the NHM take-over, 
the output of the semi-industrialised factory was in the region of 14 000 piculs or 
880 MT, obtained from some 700 bau (490 hectares) of cane. The visiting NHM 
executive who reported on this considered that the resultant sugar yield of 20 piculs 
per bau was a fairly respectable one, given the state of affairs there and the fact that 
only 600 bau of the planted cane had actually been harvested.173
Thereafter, however, things really took off. If the figure of 20 piculs per bau was 
thought quite reasonable in the 1840s, by the early 1860s something approaching or 
exceeding 50 piculs per bau was the norm at Wonopringgo. Indeed, in 1865 the figure 
reached an exceptional 58 piculs. Some of this increased productivity, of course, had 
to do with improved cultivation and the resultant higher yields of cane (though this 
improvement is unquantifiable on existing data). Even so, there can be little doubt 
170 Hooyman, 'Tegenwoordigen Staat', pp. 203-5.
171 'AV Batavia', 1824, vol. 3, p. 23, NA, Collectie Schneither, 84.
172 Inspector of Cultivations Louis Vitalis found only about 70 piculs of 'good' sugar there 
in 1834, adding that a third of the stock had reverted to syrup. See 'Rapport omtrent de 
suikermolen te Wonopringgo', in Vitalis to Directeur Cultuurs, 10.3.1834/25, ANRI, Archief 
Cultuurs, no. 333, Exh. 13.3.1834/761.
173 'Nota betreffende de Fabriek Wono Pringo door den Heer C.A. Granpré Molière', 
23.12.1844, in NFB, 31.12.1844.
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that the evolution over time of the industrial project within the factory walls was 
primarily responsible. Far better equipped than the other two Government contract 
sugar factories operating in Pekalongan in the 1860s, Wonopringgo produced 
signicantly more sugar per hectare than other factories in the locality, such as nearby 
Sragie, and Kalimatie.174
The Factory and its Workforce
By the 1850s, Wonopringgo's many refinements included apparatus for producing 
gas so that the whole factory could be lit at night in relative safety, since continuous, 
twenty-four-hour operation was the sine qua non of an efficiently run Campaign. 
The military connotation of this term — used for the manufacturing season (which 
generally ran, as previously mentioned, from May to October, during the 'dry' 
monsoon when conditions underfoot allowed for the movement and ripening of cane) 
— was not inappropriate. There had to be a certain degree of precision and discipline 
if the schedule for harvesting and crushing was not to go badly awry, resulting in 
significant loss of sucrose content in the cane. As was the case globally, the rise of the 
industrial factory in Java was therefore intimately associated with the recruitment and 
disciplining of labour. Edwards spoke of Wonopringgo's need for 'three hundred men 
at 6 o'clock every morning' in and around the factory compound throughout the 
Campaign. In so doing, moreover, he laid specific emphasis on the particular needs of 
industrial production, for: 'I need scarcely say that in a sugar fabriek the work of the 
day cannot be put off till the morrow — everything must be done at the right time 
or the whole fabrication will soon come to a deadlock'. It was a situation in which, as 
he remarked, 'order and regularity' was of the essence.175
In the absence of the factory siren that was becoming common in the industrial 
enterprises with which Edwards himself would have been familiar in the United 
Kingdom, workers were perhaps summoned by gongs or drums (direct evidence is 
lacking) from surrounding villages specifically assigned to labour service at the factory. 
Unlike the turn-out in south Lancashire where Edwards had originally based himself, 
174 Between 1863 and 1869 Wonopringgo averaged some 53 piculs per bau (ppb), nearby 
Sragie averaged 35-62 ppb and the more distant Kalimatie about 43 ppb. See GG to MK, 
8.2.1872/193/3, Exh. 20.11.1872/27.
175 The information on labour at Wonopringgo in the mid-nineteenth century in this and 
the following two paragraphs is drawn from Edwards to Factorij NHM Batavia, 11.12.1858 
& 15.12.1858, in NFB, 18.12.1858/430.
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however, wages played only a minor part in labour recruitment for Wonopringgo in 
the mid-nineteenth century. Instead, the Government officials — both Dutch and 
Javanese — who were responsible for supplying workers to the factory relied on the 
corvée obligations imposed on the peasantry by the state.
As we shall see subsequently, the Dutch had inherited from the pre-colonial 
regime in Central Java a peasant labour service regime of formidable proportions. 
During the middle decades of the nineteenth century (albeit in circumstances that 
were to transform it), this regime was harnessed to the requirements of the commodity 
production of sugar, in the factory itself as well as in the field. Edwards's correspondence 
with his employers at Batavia (at a time when a local dispute appeared to imperil his 
supply of commandeered labour) makes it clear that 'Government Coolies', as they 
were called, were the mainstay of the factory's workforce. Whether he might have 
preferred 'free workers' to forced labour was immaterial for, as he informed the NHM,
in the surrounding districts there is not a single peasant who is not subject to 
the orders of half a dozen different functionaries — that may not be written 
in the statute book — but is written in the book facts. Not one of the dwellers 
in the desas [villages] who has a household and a status, has the free disposal 
of his own time, and he cannot sell that to me which he himself is unable to 
dispose of.
To be sure, as elsewhere, Wonopringgo's commandeered workforce was accorded a 
daily dole by the factory, amounting to between fifteen and twenty doits [a copper 
coin notionally worth one-hundredth of a guilder] in the mid-century decades. As 
one leading Dutch economic historian has neatly observed, however, corvée under 
the Cultuurstelsel constituted a 'form of labour that was no less coerced for being 
remunerated by the payment of coins'.176 Even so, although wages were hardly the 
key, the factory workforce that evolved over the mid-century decades was not a 
homogeneous one.
Along with the 'Government Coolies', who generally performed menial tasks, 
factories in the mid-nineteenth century like Wonopringgo also started to assemble 
a semi-permanent nucleus of mandoors [skilled operatives and foremen] who were 
employed to work with the machinery and to supervise the 'casual' workforce. 
176 Jan Luiten van Zanden, 'Linking Two Debates: Money Supply, Wage Labour and 
Economic Development in Java in the Nineteenth Century', p. 170, in Jan Lucassen (ed.), 
Wages and Currency: Global Comparisons from Antiquity to the Twentieth Century, Bern, Peter 
Lang, 2007, pp. 169-92.
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Relatively few in numbers, these skilled workers were still a vital dimension to the 
industrial project.177 Moreover, at some big factories — though not at Wonopringgo 
in the mid-century— manufacturers began to arrange to settle some part of 
the workforce in and around the factory compound, where they lived with their 
families.178 These workers' quarters, housing a variety of skilled operatives as well 
as labourers, were to become a feature of the Java industry after the commandeered 
labour associated with the Cultuurstelsel began to be phased out during the third 
quarter of the nineteenth century. Their embryonic existence in some parts of the 
colony in around 1850, however, serves to underscore the distinctly heterogeneous 
nature of the industrial factory's workforce even when the Stelsel was at the peak of 
its operation.
It is to the way that land — as well as labour — was harnessed to the sugar 
industry in general throughout lowland Java during the middle decades of the 
nineteenth century, and to how this was articulated with the relations of production 
which had existed on the island before van den Bosch and his associates got to work 
there in the 1830s, that we can now turn.
177 RE Elson, Village Java under the Cultivation System, Sydney, Allen & Unwin, 1994, pp. 
209-10.
178 Elson (Village Java, p. 212) cites the case of the very big and well-equipped Koning 
Willem II factory in East Java, 'where a large portion of the workers lived in three large factory 
compounds (named "London", "Paris" and "Singapore")'.

Part II
The 'Peasant' Economy, the Money 
Trail and the Bourgeoisie
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4 Sugar without Slaves:The Agrarian Basis for the Industrial Project 
Sugar is associated — perhaps indelibly — with plantations and slaves. Java, as things 
developed during the middle decades of the nineteenth century, had neither: or, at 
least, not in any way that related to the production of sugar. The 'sugar plantation' as 
conceived in the heavily Caribbean-centric literature did not exist there (or was found 
only on the margins of the industry). Neither did slavery, nor the indentured forms 
of labour that (in part) supplanted it in the New World and elsewhere. Ostensibly 
at least, commodity sugar production, as it developed on Java, belonged instead to 
a general, long-established, 'Asian' pattern, in which cane was raised by a 'peasant' 
workforce, utilising existing farm-land in conjunction with other crops.
As we shall see, a generalisation as broad as this runs the risk of seriously 
misrepresenting the agrarian basis of production that evolved in Java through the 
mid-century decades. Nonetheless, it does serve to highlight the major disparity 
between how the industry's raw material was produced and the classic situation 
of contemporaneous New World sugar manufacture. In the Dutch colony, the 
sugar industry expanded rapidly between the 1830s and 1880s, primarily but not 
exclusively under the aegis of the Cultuurstelsel or System of [State] Cultivations, 
which was inaugurated at the beginning of the period by Governor-General Johannes 
van den Bosch and his lieutenants. In contrast to the barrack slavery of transported 
Africans and the dominant monoculture of contemporary Cuba — Java's Caribbean 
antipode — Java sugar's expansion was predicated on raw material produced by local, 
peasant labour from cane fields that were created by the temporary amalgamation 
of scores of often minute irrigated rice fields or sawah. The sawah amalgamated in 
this way, however, remained within the domain of peasant agriculture and reverted 
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to 'peasant' cropping once the cane 
had been harvested — whereupon a 
fresh set of fields was prepared for the 
planting of the next season's sugar 
harvest. This was the famous system 
of wisselbouw or crop rotation which 
singled out Java's sugar industry 
from virtually all its major global 
counterparts.
Production of the industry's 
raw material did indeed take on 
some plantation-like characteristics, 
particularly after the Cultuurstelsel 
began to be phased out from about 
1870 onwards. Over the course of 
time, cane ceased to be a 'peasant' 
crop in any meaningful sense of 
that word and came under the 
direct and close supervision of 
industry personnel. Even so, cane's 
continued location within the cycle 
of 'peasant' agriculture became and remained the defining characteristic of the Java 
industry. In this context, it is hardly possible to do more than skirt around (rather than 
address directly) the question of whether the 'peasantry' of mid-twentieth-century 
anthropology/sociology is a particularly useful concept to apply to the bevolking 
[i.e. the 'common people'] of the mid-nineteenth century. Colonial language-usage 
rarely if ever used the term boer or any other possible Dutch synonym for 'peasant', 
so, for better or for worse, we appear to be stuck with the term 'peasantry', however 
much the term might need to be qualified.
From Plantation to Padi-field
Well in advance of the inauguration of the Stelsel in 1830, the prime focus of commodity 
sugar production in Java had shifted from West Java, where it had been plantation-
based, into the island's north-central and eastern districts, where sugar manufacture 
was based largely on the cultivation of cane in peasant rice fields. However tentatively, 
Figure 9: The founder of the 
Cultuurstelsel: Governor-General 
Johannes van den Bosch.
Source: Koninklijk Instituut voor Taal-, Land- 
en Volkenkunde, Leiden, no. 47A9
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this shift was in evidence at various points along Java's Northeast Coast from at least 
the late eighteenth century onward, as was a context of state (i.e. VOC) intervention 
to promote it, something that likewise proved to be the way of the future.179 From 
1830 onward, however (as we shall see shortly), intervention of this kind took place 
in an unprecedented scale in the form of the Cultuurstelsel — as a result of which all 
vestiges of plantation-style production in the sense widely current in relation to sugar 
in the New World were swept away.
In consequence, and in further contrast to the situation in the Caribbean and 
elsewhere in the New World, sugar in Java was very far from being a monoculture, 
carried on (largely) in the absence of other significant cultivations. Indeed, the case 
was quite the contrary. Throughout the lowlands of the island's central and eastern 
districts, and in increasing quantities from 1830 onwards, cane was raised alongside 
other State Cultivations, notably crops for the dyestuff indigo, and — crucially — 
alongside main-crop 'peasant' rice and a variety of peasant-grown secondary crops 
or palawija, which ranged from sweet corn through to beans and onions. In short, 
the Java sugar complex was embedded within a very extensive multi-crop agrarian 
economy and located, however uneasily, within an elaborate annual cycle of peasant 
agriculture.
Eventually this degree of 'embedded-ness' became, or threatened to become, 
the industry's Achilles' heel. Predominantly, however, Java sugar's ability to exploit 
the land and labour of a densely settled peasantry was the key source of Java sugar's 
international comparative advantage. Even so, crucial questions remain about the 
dynamics of that exploitation: about how it was achieved and how it may have 
evolved over time. Categorically, in respect to agrarian matters, the Stelsel represented 
something altogether more far-reaching than 'business as usual'. As one leading 
modern scholar in the field has argued, 'the received view' that the Cultuurstelsel 
represented little more than 'the simple employment of existing methods of authority 
… is in need of some important clarification and qualification'.180 As will be argued, 
the development of sugar as a State Cultivation in the middle decades of the nineteenth 
century, in tandem with the fiscal policies of the increasingly formidable colonial 
state, resulted in a situation in which the old ways of exploiting rural resources were 
melded with new ones.
179 Knight, 'From Plantation to Padi-field', pp. 177-204.
180 Elson, Village Java, pp. 183-4.
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The key to this melding was the fact that rural Java on the eve of the 
Cultuurstelsel was far from being a simple, subsistence economy or one in which 
'peasants' constituted a homogeneous social and economic formation. Indeed, rural 
resources of land and labour had long been organised for the commodity production 
of a variety of crops (sugar cane among them). In turn, this production was enmeshed 
in an elaborate regime of labour service which dated from the pre-colonial era but had 
in large measure survived subsequent Dutch colonial advance. One of its hallmarks 
was a rural working population organised quite specifically, it would seem, to provide 
both produce and labour to the state through the intermediary of the local elites 
of Javanese officials and headmen. Integral to this organisation, moreover, was a 
division of the rural workforce into categories of people who were differentiated (at 
least so it seemed to outsiders) in terms of the degree of their access to land, their 
'preparedness' to offer themselves for labour service and other such considerations. 
It was on foundations such as these that the exploitation of land and labour evolved 
under the aegis of the Cultuurstelsel during the course of the mid-century decades.
Java Before the Cultuurstelsel: A 'Picnic' at Sea with Commissioner 
Nederburgh in 1798
A little scene enacted on the north coast of Central Java at the end of the eighteenth 
century, recorded in the published account of Commissioner SC Nederburgh's 
journey there in 1798181, is highly instructive. Nederburgh's journey took place at a 
time when the Dutch Republic, temporary successor of the ancien regime in Holland 
and the Indies, was attempting to assert its control over the Indonesian possessions 
of the VOC, the monopoly trading company which had represented the power in 
'the East' for the Netherlands for the previous two centuries, but which was now in 
bankruptcy. As the Republic's chief emissary, Mr Nederburgh — the title signified 
his status as a lawyer — was notionally the most powerful person in the colony: an 
individual who, in words of one recent authority, 'showed himself to be a man of a 
monstrous and delicate ego, whose desire for power knew no bounds'.182 He would 
181 [Nederburgh, SC], Journal der Reize van Mr SC Nederburgh, Gewezen Commissaris 
Generaal over Nederlands India, Langs Java's Noordoostkust, in 1798, Amsterdam, W Holtrop, 
1804, p. 3.
182 Nederburgh had arrived in Java in 1793 as head of three Commissioners-General and 
'became the supremo in Java until his return in 1799'. See Van Niel, Java's Northeast Coast, 
p. 53.
99
Sugar, Steam and Steel
have travelled in some style, accompanied by a sizeable entourage, and he would have 
been received with high ceremony.
The journey would nonetheless have been a relatively slow one. The building 
of the great Post Road, a highway suited to European conveyances — with crucial 
assistance from teams of very Javanese water-buffalo on its more tortuous stretches — 
was still a decade away. Commissioner Nederburgh's progress through his realm took 
place, therefore, largely on-board ship. As such, it became the occasion for a repast 
at sea — a picnic on the water — which spoke eloquently of both colonial power 
and commodity production in Java in the late eighteenth century and of the legacy 
bequeathed by the colony's old order to the VOC's (eventual) successors in the mid-
nineteenth century.
The Old Order: A Colonial Realm and Acquisition of Commodities
Sailing eastwards, the 500 kilometres from Batavia to Semarang — the main centre 
of Dutch power in Central Java and the seat of the powerful Governor of Java's 
Northeast Coast — Commissioner Nederburgh's vessel dropped anchor off the town 
of Pekalongan, a hundred kilometres or so west of his destination.183 After heralding 
him with a nineteen-gun salute from the shore (at least, so they assured Nederburgh, 
who had been too far off to hear it), the chief local dignitaries hastened out to greet 
him in praauws laden with refreshments. Pekalongan was destined to become part of 
one of Java's key zones of industrialised sugar production during the course of the 
nineteenth century. In Nederburgh's day, however, sugar was still of minor importance 
there. Above all, rice — husked and unhusked padi grown by the area's peasantry 
— constituted the chief claim to the attention of the VOC and the people with 
whom the company dealt in its quest for commodities. Nevertheless, the relations 
of production that underpinned this quest, in Pekalongan itself and elsewhere in the 
Java lowlands by the end of the eighteenth century, remained a powerful influence on 
the progress of commodity production there in the century that followed — and on 
the production of sugar in particular.
The only individual specifically named in Nederburgh's account of the day he 
spent moored off the north coast of Central Java was the German-born 'Dutchman' 
Frederik Jacob Rothenbühler. Rothenbühler, who had arrived in Java three decades 
earlier when he was still in his teens, was about forty years old and the Dutch Resident 
183 See Journal Nederburgh, p. 3.
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or — in his VOC guise — Onderkoopman (Subordinate Merchant) at Pekalongan. As 
such, he was the key figure in the colonial power structure in this part of provincial 
Java. By the time of Nederburgh's voyage, the Resident would have abandoned living 
in the increasingly dilapidated old Dutch fort, the Beschermer or Protector184 with its 
stone walls and four bastions, built in the 1740s when the VOC had first made its 
appearance there. Like his counterparts elsewhere on Java's north coast (following 
local usage, the Dutch usually referred to these districts stretching eastwards from 
Cirebon as the Pasisir), he would have moved into altogether more congenial and 
airier accommodation in the nearby Residentie, the office-cum-residence of the 
chief official which lay at the physical centre of colonial power in the administrative 
divisions or Residencies of Java in the nineteenth century. What kind of man lived 
in the Pekalongan Residentie at the end of the eighteenth century is something that 
ultimately can only be guessed at. One later verdict on Rothenbühler — and one 
preserving a distinct flavour of a certain kind of late colonial sentiment — comes 
from F de Haan, the indefatigable Government archivist extra-ordinaire in Batavia 
from the early 1900s until the 1930s. De Haan, who was presumably fully familiar 
with the surviving written record, opined that the Resident was 'a very clever man but 
something of a bore with an exaggeratedly high opinion of the Native'.185
Rothenbühler was among that group of representatives of Dutch influence 
— VOC employees — who had begun to establish a presence on Java's north coast 
and in the island's Eastern Salient [the Oosthoek] from the middle of the eighteenth 
century onward. That presence was initially very much an armed one, but quickly 
settled down into something altogether more 'civil', dominated on the Dutch side 
by Company men who drew their incomes from commissions, trade on their own 
account and — in many cases — from whatever they could glean in the form of 
bribes and the like from the people with whom they dealt. In this latter respect, 
according to one modern authority, Rothenbühler 'was regarded as an honest and 
devoted servant of the company', which was a good deal more than could be said of 
many of his contemporaries.
In the decades that followed, institutionalisation proceeded inexorably, albeit 
at a slow and somewhat erratic pace, and the successors of Rothenbühler and his 
184 P Bleeker, 'Fragmenten eener Reis over Java', Tijdschrift voor Nederlandsch-Indië, vol. 2, 
1849, pp. 262-70, here pp. 266-7.
185 F de Haan, 'Personalia der Periode van het Engelsch Bestuur over Java', Bijdragen tot de 
Taal-, Land-en Volkenkunde, vol. 92, 1935, pp. 477-681, here p. 634.
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ilk were gradually formed into a powerful bureaucracy of salaried officials, which 
became and remained one of the distinguishing hallmarks of the Dutch colonial state 
in the Indies.186 Rothenbühler himself served under successive post-VOC regimes, 
including the regime established under the occupation of Java by the British between 
1811 and 1816. Only with the colony's restoration to the Dutch did he finally retire, 
though not to the Europe that he had left in his youth. Instead, he settled himself 
near Surabaya, the 'capital' of East Java, as head of a household that boasted more 
than a hundred domestic slaves — among them, presumably, given the prevailing 
mores, a fair number of concubines and musicians as well as household servants.187 
Retirement evidently agreed with him: he lived there for another twenty years before 
dying, full of years, at the age of seventy-eight.
On that April day in 1798, however, Rothenbühler was not alone in sailing 
out to present his respects to Commissioner Nederburgh. With him on the flotilla of 
Indonesian craft were his three Javanese Bupati subordinates. Designated as Regenten 
or 'Regents' by the Dutch, they were there to represent the Priyayi elite at whose apex 
they stood. The most senior of them was Raden Adipati Jayaningrat, then thirty-two 
years of age. He had been the Bupati of Pekalongan since 1789, when he had been 
appointed by the Dutch to succeed his murdered father.188
Under the suzerainty of Mataram, the dominant Javanese state that the Dutch 
had encountered on their arrival on the island at the end of the sixteenth century, 
the Priyayi were both state functionaries ('courtiers') and local power-holders. 
They retained much of these complex loyalties well into the nineteenth century. In 
186 See HW van den Doel, De Stille Macht: De Europese Binnenlands Bestuur op Java en 
Madoera, 1808-1942, Amsterdam, Bert Bakker, 1994; and C Fasseur, De Indologen: 
Ambtenaren voor de Oost, 1825-1950, Amsterdam, Bert Bakker, 1993.
187 Frederik Jacob Rothenbühler was born in Zweibrücken circa 1758, arrived in Java in 
1771 and died in Surabaya on 21 April 1836. In 1809, he became Gezaghebber [Commander] 
of the Oosthoek, and by 1811 had become Raad Extraord. van Indie Supernumerair. In 
1812, he was appointed, along with J Knops and PH van Lawick van Pabst, and under the 
direction of Colonel Colin Mackenzie, to what became known as the Mackenzie Land Tenure 
Commission, with a broad brief to inquire into reform of the existing Government system 
in Java. See Van Niel, Northeast Coast, pp. 26-7, 242; and Ketjen, E, 'Levensbericht van FJ 
Rothenbuhler', Verhandelingen Bataviaasch Genootschap van Kunsten en Wetenschappen, vol. 41, 
1881, pp. 71-3. For the lifestyle of high officials of the era, inter alia their seraglios, and for 
developments in the administration in general, see Boomgaard, Children of the Colonial State, 
pp. 14-15.
188 Van Niel, Northeast Coast, p. 83.
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Pekalongan, for example, it was reported as late as the 1860s that the Bupati (as 
well as 'the common people') still perceived the Javanese Courts of Central Java as 
the centre of their world.189 Bupati and lesser Priyayi officials constituted a 'native' 
administrative corps, known as the Pangreh Praja, which was a critical element in the 
reconstruction of the sugar industry in the mid-nineteenth century. As such, they 
were subject to Dutch pressure but also needed to be accommodated if colonial ends 
were indeed to be achieved.190
Along with the three Bupati, however, were two other individuals, neither 
Dutch nor Javanese, but of Chinese descent. Their presence on board the flotilla 
was a further indication, should one need it, of the complex nature of local power, 
189 'Solo is immer de Negari van het land' ['Solo remains the centre of their realm'], PV, 
Pekalongan, 1857 [unpaginated], AD, Pekalongan, no. 5.
190 The classic accounts are: Heather Sutherland, 'The Priyayi', Indonesia, vol. 19, 1975, 
pp. 57-79; Sutherland, The Making of a Bureaucratic Elite, Singapore, Heinemann, 1979; 
Onghokham, 'The Residency of Madiun: Priyayi and Peasant in the Nineteenth Century', 
PhD Diss, Yale, 1975; James Rush, Opium to Java: Revenue Farming and Chinese Enterprise 
in Colonial Indonesia 1860-1910, Ithaca, NY, Cornell University Press, 1990. The origins 
of the relationship between Dutch colonisers and Javanese and Chinese-Indonesian elites 
dated in this part of Java from the middle of the eighteenth century, when the whole of the 
island's northern Pasisir came under the suzerainty of the VOC. From the mid-eighteenth 
century onward, exploiting its new position of political power along the length of the Pasisir 
and utilising what were presumably existing Chinese commercial networks and connections 
with Javanese power-holders, the company began to demand rice and other commodities — 
including sugar — from the Bupati over whom it was now suzerain. For discussion of the 
dominant political economy of Java in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries with 
reference to specific regions, see e.g. Mason C Hoadley, Towards a Feudal Mode of Production: 
West Java 1680-1800, Singapore, Institute of Southeast Asian studies, 1994, pp. 3ff.; Luc 
Nagtegaal, Riding the Dutch Tiger: The Dutch East India Company and the Northeast Coast 
of Java 1680-1743, Leiden, KITLV Press, 1996; Gerrit Knaap, 'Maritime Trade in Small-
Town Java around 1775', in Peter Boomgaard, Dick Kooiman & Henk Schulte Nordholt 
(eds), Linking Destinies: Trade, Towns and Kin in Asian History, Leiden, KITLV Press, 2008, 
pp. 81-98; Van Niel, Northeast Coast; Kwee Hui Kian, The Political Economy of Java's Northeast 
Coast c. 1740-1800: Elite Synergy, Leiden & Boston, Brill, 2006; PBR Carey, 'Waiting for 
the "Just King": The Agrarian World of South-Central Java from Giyanti (1755) to the Java 
war (1825)', Modern Asian Studies, vol. 20, no. 1, 1986, pp. 59-137; Boomgaard, Children 
of the Colonial State, pp. 11-31; Merle C Ricklefs, 'Some Statistical Evidence on Javanese 
Social, Economic and Demographic History in the Later Seventeenth and Eighteenth 
Centuries', Modern Asian Studies, vol. 20, no. 1, 1986, pp. 1-32; Ricklefs, War, Culture and 
Economy in Java, 1677-1726, Sydney, Allen & Unwin, 1993; Ricklefs, Jogjakarta under Sultan 
Mangkubumi, 1749-1792: A History of the Division of Java, London, Oxford University Press, 
1974.
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influence, wealth and ethnicity in the decades prior to the introduction of the 
Cultuurstelsel. In Pekalongan as in other parts of the Pasisir, the locally born Chinese-
Indonesians were often termed peranakan, or 'sons of the soil'. Like many of their 
Dutch contemporaries, such people tended to be markedly acculturated to their 
Javanese milieu. In some cases, they had been settled on the island for generations, 
though — again like their Dutch counterparts — without necessarily losing ties to 
their homeland.191
Too much should not be made of the 'ethnic' distinctions implied in this 
terminology. The notionally tripartite division of colonial society into 'Europeans', 
'Chinese' and 'Natives' was still some way off in the future. In the particular case 
of Pekalongan, for example, something of the awkwardness of trying to portray the 
situation within a latter-day ethnic terminology emerges from the fact that the area's 
'Javanese' Bupati had Chinese forbears. Regent Jayaningrat of Pekalongan himself 
was quite unambiguously of part-Chinese descent, and early in the nineteenth 
century he was reckoned to derive two-thirds of his total income from the leasing of 
villages to Chinese-Indonesian interests, in an arrangement that had probably held 
good for some time prior to that. As one Dutch scholar has observed, 'these groups 
[Dutch, Javanese and Chinese] were not separate from one another, whether socially, 
politically or economically; in many respects they were indeed locked into mutual 
interdependency'.192
One of the two Chinese-Indonesian men accompanying Rothenbühler was 
the so-called Captain China of the town of Pekalongan itself. He was the person, 
that is to say, who was appointed by the Dutch to head the substantial community of 
Chinese-Indonesians who were settled there. Late in the eighteenth century, among 
the towns of the Pasisir, Pekalongan was reckoned to be second only to Semarang 
— the north-coast metropolis that gave access to the rich interior of Central Java 
191 See the succinct discussion in Rush, Opium, pp. 90-2. Several sources from the early 
nineteenth century reserve the term peranakan to describe locally settled Chinese who had 
converted to Islam. See e.g. Residency Report Semarang 1823 (Domis), pp. 288-9, NA, 
Collectie Schneither, 91, and 'Knops' Description 1814', Mackenzie Collection (Private), 
79, p. 270, India Office Library, London. See also Mason C Hoadley, 'Javanese, Peranakan 
& Chinese Elites in Cirebon: Changing Ethnic Boundaries', Journal of Asian Studies, vol. 47, 
no. 3, 1988, pp. 503-17, here pp. 505-8; PBR Carey, 'Changing Javanese Perceptions of the 
Chinese Communities in Central Java', Indonesia, vol. 37, 1984, pp. 1-47, here pp. 3-16; Van 
Niel, Northeast Coast, pp. 101-20.
192 Nagtegaal, Dutch Tiger, p. 5.
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— in terms of the size of its Chinese community. By the 1820s, the town's Chinese 
quarter had a population of well over 1000 men, women and children. It was located 
across the river from the Javanese Regent's Court or dalem, the main mosque and the 
market, and comprised
a row of dwelling houses, amounting to perhaps fifty to sixty. To the north and 
south it is defended by wooden palisades … [T]he houses are joined one to 
another, with high stories; towards the west is the Kap-pit-tans residence, to the 
right of which is a garden, which may be about one acre in extent, beautifully 
shaded with trees …193
The 'Kap-pit-an' himself, however, was not the most important of the two Chinese-
Indonesians aboard the boats that sailed out to greet Nederburgh. A person of 
altogether greater consequence was the leaseholder of the district of Ulujami, 
to the west of the town of Pekalongan itself. Leased from the VOC, Ulujami was 
at that time a rich, rice-producing area, described in the 1780s as 'the granary of 
Semarang'.194 Run by Chinese-Indonesians, its workforce largely comprised Javanese 
peasants: around 1803, there were estimated to be about 8000 of them living there, 
not counting their children.195
193 Ong Tae Hae, The Chinaman Abroad: An Account of the Malayan Archipelago, Particularly 
Java, translated by WH Medhurst, London, John Snow, 1850, pp. 11-12. According to 
'Statistiek Pekalongan 1821', B/2, there were 668 men, 658 women and 928 children, 
approximately half of whom (664 adults, 406 children) lived in the Chinese kampong at 
Pekalongan itself (NA, Collectie Schneither, 90). Some twenty-five years later, the Chinese 
population there amounted to 1900 souls, out of a total urban population roughly estimated 
at 15 000: see Bleeker, 'Reis', pp. 266-7.
194 On Ulujami, see Peter Boomgaard, 'A Bird's Eye View of the Economic and Social 
Development of the District of Comal, 1750-1940', in Hiroyoshi Kano, Frans Hüsken & 
Djoko Suryo (eds), Beneath the Smoke of the Sugar Mill, Yogyakarta, AKATIGA/Gadjah Mada 
University Press, 2001, pp. 9-37, here pp. 9-21; Ong, Chinaman Abroad, p. 13; Van Niel, 
Northeast Coast, pp. 108-9. The district of Ulujami (along with adjacent areas) was leased by 
the VOC to the Chinese Captain at Semarang, Tan Tok, and administered by his nephew 
Tan Tjienko ('… the same is no further subordinate to the Resident than only with respect to 
the shipping of produce, wherefore this post is one of the most agreeable that can be wished 
for …'). See 'Rothenbuhler Report 1798', p. 64, Mackenzie Collection (Private), no. 7, 
India Office Library, London. The leasing of Ulujami to Chinese-Indonesian interests, which 
apparently dated from the outset of the VOC regime on the Northeast Coast in the 1740s, 
persisted until 1813 (John Bastin, Raffles' Ideas on the Landrent System in Java, The Hague, 
Nijhoff, 1954, pp. 164-6).
195 'Memorie van den Resident Willem Beekman … 25 Augustus 1803' [unpaginated], in 
AD, Pekalongan, no. 48.
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In European accounts, the leaseholder was called Tan Yok or Tan Tok.196 He 
had presumably travelled from Semarang for the occasion, for he was the 'Captain 
China' there and member of one of the city's leading business families. His nephew, 
Tan Tjienko, actually managed the Ulujami estate. The 'Captain China's' descendants 
maintained links with Pekalongan and the neighbouring Residency of Tegal for 
much of the nineteenth century. The family's interests there (as we shall see) were 
accommodated in the colonial schemes for expanding the sugar industry in this part 
of the Pasisir, which began to come into play after 1830. Indeed, the Tan dynasty was 
one of Semarang's foremost mercantile clans in the nineteenth century: in common 
with the Han family of Surabaya the Tans were, as one recent researcher has observed,
keen exploiters of the tax farming industry of the Pasisir. Assuredly, the 
Semarang and Surabaya Chinese captains were the foremost merchants of 
the key commodity of Central and East Java, rice, as well as sugar, salt and 
other products, shipping large quantities to Melaka, Johor, Siak and beyond 
… The Towkays [i.e. big Chinese business men] collaborated closely with 
Company personnel in administrative, business and other matters … [T]he 
Towkays certainly played their cards right. Company administrators on the 
Pasisir needed an economic partner who had local expertise, sufficient resources 
to cater for their needs, and was cooperative … The keyword here is mutual 
benefit …197
Commodity Production: Cotton, Indigo, Sugar and Rice
All those aboard the little flotilla, that is to say, were involved in the exploitation of 
commodity production in the region. By the late eighteenth century, production of 
this kind embraced the manufacture of the dyestuff indigo and of sugar as well as the 
production of cotton thread. Nonetheless, by far the greatest commodity produced 
196 Van Niel, Northeast Coast, p. 109.
197 Kwee Hui Kian, 'Cultural Strategies, Economic Dominance: The Lineage of the Tan 
Bing in Nineteenth Century Semarang', in Boomgaard et al., Linking Destinies, pp. 197-218; 
Kwee, The Political Economy of Java's Northeast Coast, c. 1740-1800, pp. 164-71. Kwee 
notes, for example, that Tan Tiang Tjhing (1770-1833) had closer relations with the Dutch 
authorities in Semarang, and the VOC's Governor of the Northeast Coast, based at Semarang, 
defended the leasing of Ulujami to the Tans against queries from the Netherlands. (He was 
presumably in receipt of kick-backs for approving the deal.) The Tan family had various links 
to the sugar industry in this part of Java in the mid-nineteenth century. They extended into 
the Batang area to the east of Pekalongan town, and the Captain China of Semarang owned a 
sugar mill there as early as 1764. See Boomgaard, 'District of Comal', pp. 17-18.
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and traded along the length and breadth of the Pasisir in the late eighteenth century 
and at the beginning of the nineteenth was rice.198 Notionally at least, the bulk of 
production of all kinds reached the Dutch through the agency of the Bupati, in the 
form of contractually agreed 'Contingents' and 'Forced Deliveries'. In this respect, 
as in many others, conditions in the lowland localities of East and Central Java were 
so various as to make it sensible to speak not of one Java but of many. Nonetheless, 
we can make several broad generalisations. One is that the prevailing rural political 
economy fused elements of what is sometimes referred to as 'subsistence peasant 
cultivation' with wide-spread production of commodities for both local and distant 
markets. A second such generalisation is that the day-to-day business of accessing 
agricultural production was — and remained — heavily dependent on mutually 
advantageous understandings between the emergent colonial state and various 
powerful local interests.
These latter included, obviously enough, the Bupati and the Chinese-
Indonesian traders and entrepreneurs with whom they were often closely associated. 
By the 1820s, however — a decade prior to the inauguration of the Cultuurstelsel and 
all that it implied for the evolution of commodities and the relations of production 
which underpinned their supply — they had been joined by others. Colonial 
resources had begun to remark upon the presence of Arabs — most likely locally 
acculturated or recently arrived members of the Hadhrami 'diaspora'199 — as well 
as the even more recent arrival of a number of privately-operating European and 
Armenian traders dealing in commodities of one sort or another. In Semarang in 
1825, for example, when the outbreak of the Dipanagara uprising ('the Java War') 
threatened the security of the town, the small contingent of merchant citizens who 
rode out against 'the rebels' (in many cases to their deaths) included individuals from 
both the latter ethnic groups.200 In short, on the eve of the Cultuurstelsel, a diverse 
198 See e.g. Van Niel, Northeast Coast, pp. 121ff.
199 William G Clarence-Smith, 'The Rise and Fall of Hadhrami Shipping in the Indian 
Ocean, c. 1750-c. 1940', in David Parkin & Ruth Barnes (eds), Ships and the Development 
of Maritime Technology in the Indian Ocean, London, Routledge Curzon, 2002, pp. 227-58; 
Frank Broeze, 'The Merchant Fleet of Java, 1820-1850', Archipel, vol. 18, 1979, pp. 251-69.
200 PBR Carey, The Power of Prophecy: Prince Dipanagara and the End of the Old Order in 
Java, 1785-1855, Leiden, KITLV Press, 2008, pp. 613-14; Joseph Bremner to [?], Semarang, 
4.9.1825, enclosure in J McLachlan [to Hugh MacMaster], London, 16.2.1826; Gillian 
Maclaine to Marjorie Maclaine, 8.10.1825 [copy], MacMaster MSS (in Private Possession, 
UK).
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group of people controlled, or sought to control, commodity production through a 
variety of means.
Within this framework, a mass of fairly heterogeneous petty farming households 
carried on direct production, together with their attendant and (sometimes) dependent 
labourers — people whose significance will be discussed in some detail in the pages 
that follow. In standard terminology, they were 'peasants'. Some of their notionally 
surplus output may have been marketed directly. It is safe to assume, however, that 
the bulk of it was expropriated through imposts on crops authorised by the state 
and carried out through the agency of Priyayi power-holders.201 At the same time, 
'surplus' labour was likewise expropriated through the medium of corvée.
Indeed, labour service of one kind or another lay at the heart of all these 
arrangements. Just how central it was is indicated by the fact that the standard 
measurement of rural resources in lowland Java in the late eighteenth century 
was the cacah, a unit probably best described as combining land per se with the 
amount of labour service (and hence people) that it would provide.202 In 1798, 
when Rothenbühler set about enumerating the resources of the Residency under his 
charge, he recorded the assets of Pekalongan's Bupati in terms of the number of 
cacah that they possessed.203 In some of its dimensions at least, it may be argued 
that 'pre-colonial' Java (which the Dutch were increasingly infiltrating from the mid-
eighteenth century onward) was possessed of a labour service regime whose only real 
parallel in the region was in distant Siam. Attempts by colonial regimes in the early 
nineteenth century to replace these arrangements with a direct tax on the cultivators 
201 Arrangements through which Chinese-Indonesians obtained control over the Bupati's 
rights over the produce and manpower of the countryside, common enough everywhere on 
the north coast at the end of the eighteenth century, were particularly extensive in Pekalongan 
Residency. In 1808, for example, the Regent of Pekalongan was reckoned to derive two-
thirds of his total income from the leasing of villages to Chinese interests. See 'Bijl. [no. 6] 
Behoorende tot de Memorie van den Paccalongangsche Resident JA Middelkoop', 1808, AD, 
Pekalongan, no. 48.
202 Rothenbuhler, for instance, '… was aware that the word cacah means number, and that 
the complete expression would be cacah karya, or the amount of land necessary for the upkeep 
of one household capable of providing the ruler with one corvée labourer. The same cacah 
karya was also a unit of taxation, because, if no corvée was required, this unit should yield a 
specified amount of tax'. See Boomgaard, Children of the Colonial State, appendix 1: 'What is 
a cacah', p. 207.




— the so-called Landrente — had only limited success in many areas204, due in part at 
least to the resilience of an altogether older political economy. Indeed, in many areas 
of Java, members of Priyayi elite arranged to pay the Landrente (notionally) levied on 
'their' villagers in return for harvest levies. In some districts, at least, they did so in 
association with local Chinese traders, who thereby gained access to commodities at 
favourable rates.
In short, on the eve of the introduction of the Cultuurstelsel, a long-standing 
system of imposts and levies — in kind and, above all, in labour — was still firmly 
in place in rural Java, and formed the basis for commodity production everywhere 
on the island with the exception of the Ommelanden around the colonial capital of 
Batavia. In one key dimension, the system was sanctioned by long usage and brute 
force, and 'legitimated' at a functional level by the cultivator's quest for security in 
a landscape in which settlement was still widely interspersed by forest and waste. 
The system was presumably also based on intricate, elaborate and time-honoured 
accommodations which permeated the entire rural political economy, and on the 
arrangements for general commodity production which were based on it.
Sugar as a 'State Cultivation' from 1830 till about 1880
Much has been written about the Cultuurstelsel and about the role sugar played in 
it. Perspectives have been rich and varied, many of them reflecting a fascination with 
its impact, both short- and long-term, on the socio-economy of rural Java.205 From 
204 WR Hugenholtz, 'Landrentbelasting op Java, 1812-1920', Proefschrift, Universitiet 
Leiden, 2008; WR Hugenholtz, 'The Land Rent Question and its Solution, 1850-1920', in 
Robert Cribb (ed.), The Late Colonial State in Indonesia: Political and Economic Foundations of 
the Netherlands Indies 1880-1842, Leiden, KITLV Press, 1994, pp. 139-72.
205 For a succinct introduction to the history of the era, see Vincent JH Houben, 'Java in 
the Nineteenth Century: Consolidation of a Territorial State', in Howard Dick et al., The 
Emergence of a National Economy: An Economic History of Indonesia, 1800-2000, Sydney, Asian 
Studies Association of Australia in association with Allen & Unwin, 2002, pp. 56-81. The 
account in the following pages draws extensively on, and is greatly indebted to, a number of 
accounts written over the last few decades, beginning with C Fasseur, Kultuurstelsel en Koloniale 
Baten, Leiden, Universitaire Pers, 1975 (translated and edited by RE Elson & Ary Kraal as 
The Politics of Colonial Exploitation, Ithaca NY, Southeast Asia Program, Cornell University, 
1992); RE Elson, Javanese Peasants and the Colonial Sugar Industry: Impact and Change in 
an East Java Residency, 1830-1940, Singapore, Oxford University Press, 1984; Elson, Village 
Java; Lukman Soetrisno, 'The Sugar Industry and Rural Development: The Impact of Cane 
Cultivation for Export on Rural Java, 1830-1934', PhD Diss, Cornell University, 1980; MR 
Fernando, 'Peasants and Plantation: The Social Impact of the European Plantation Economy 
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the standpoint of the present argument, however, the crucial facts have to do with 
its role in making possible the industrial project. Developments post-1830 did not 
initiate the rise of sugar as a significant commodity in Java, but sugar did vastly 
expand its grip on the island. Indeed, during the decades that followed, sugar cane 
became the hegemonic — though, as we shall see, far from exclusive — crop in huge 
tracts of the lowlands of the island's eastern and central districts. It also became a 
major agricultural staple in those areas of the interior of Central Java — the so-
called Vorstenlanden or Principalities of Yogyakarta and Surakarta — which existed 
outside the direct operation of the Cultuurstelsel itself.206 Important as was the mid-
century development of sugar production in the Vorstenlanden, however, it was in 
the so-called Government Lands (i.e. the directly ruled parts of the island) that the 
industrial project in sugar reached its highest stage of development. It did so under 
the aegis of that Cultuurstelsel that had been inaugurated in 1830 and was to last (as 
far as the raising of sugar cane itself was concerned) until its phased dismantlement 
during the 1870s and 1880s.
The way in which sugar production was organised within the framework of the 
Cultuurstelsel was essentially dualistic. The production of raw material took place on 
the basis of the commandeering by the state of Javanese peasant land and labour. At 
the same time, the state granted concessions to Government Contractors (all of whom 
were Dutch, Indies-Dutch or Chinese-Indonesians), whose business it was to ensure 
that peasant-raised cane was processed into commercial-grade sugar. In tandem, 
these two developments constituted the heart of the Cultuurstelsel. Compulsory 
peasant cultivation of cane took place under the supervision of Dutch and Javanese 
government officials and 'village' headmen. When ripe and ready for harvest, the 
in Cirebon Residency from the Cultivation System to the End of the First Decade of the 
Twentieth Century', PhD diss, Monash University, Melbourne, 1982; Djoko Suryo, 'Social 
and Economic Life in Rural Semarang under Colonial Rule in the later Nineteenth Century', 
PhD Diss, Monash University, Melbourne, 1982; Robert Van Niel, Java under the Cultivation 
System, Leiden, KITLV Press, 1992; Frans van Baardewijk, The Cultivation System: Java 1834-
1880, vol. 14 of Peter Boomgaard (ed.), Changing Economy in Indonesia, Amsterdam, Royal 
Tropical Institute (KIT), 1993.
206 On the industry in the Vorstenlanden, see Bosma & Raben, pp. 121ff.; Bosma, 'Sugar 
and Dynasty in Yogyakarta', in Ulbe Bosma, Juan A Guisti-Cordero & G Roger Knight 
(eds), Sugarlandia Revisited, New York & Oxford, Berghahn Books, 2007, pp. 73-94 and 
— especially for its masterly account of the broader context of developments in the mid-
nineteenth century in South-Central Java — see Vincent JH Houben, Kraton and Kumpeni, 
Surakarta and Yogyakarta, 1830-1870, Leiden, KITLV Press, 1994.
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contracting manufacturers arranged for it to be cut and then carted to their mills, 
using a mixture of servile and notionally 'free' workers (see below).
In short, the Cultuurstelsel provided the Contractors with both an assured 
supply of raw material and much of the workforce necessary to process sugar in what 
remained, despite increasing amounts of new industrial-style equipment, a heavily 
labour-intensive industry. It did so, moreover, in a context in which each of the 100 or 
so 'contract' factories set up under the Stelsel was assigned a so-called beschikkingskring 
or, more simply put, a kring — a term that translates rather awkwardly as 'circle 
of disposal or exploitation'.207 It was from fields within the kring that the factories 
contracted to the Indies Government obtained their raw material and drew much of 
their labour. Albeit in a thoroughly contingent fashion, this created a flexible basis for 
the production of its raw material, which set the Java industry apart from virtually all 
its major counterparts in the international sugar economy. As we shall see in a later 
chapter, it had profound consequences for the industry's continuity and ability to 
expand.
The Imperatives of Raising Cane
Famously, cane sugar worldwide required heavy inputs of labour into both plantation 
and manufacturing sectors if profitable levels of output were to be achieved and 
maintained. In nineteenth-century Java, these requirements were greater than 
almost anywhere else in the international economy of cane sugar. This was because 
its industry, virtually unique among major contemporary producers, eschewed the 
practice of ratooning, whereby cane was grown year after year from the stumps of 
the previous crop. Instead, in the case of Java, cane was generally planted anew each 
season, as was dictated by the system of crop rotation or wisselbouw which, as we have 
already seen, became the dominant mode of cane cultivation once the Cultuurstelsel 
had got underway.
Crop rotation, in turn, reflected both socio-economic and agricultural 
imperatives. It appears to have evolved in part as a way of minimising the disruption 
caused to 'village Java' by the rapid expansion post-1830 of sugar production, in so 
far as cane could be 'fitted in' to the existing agricultural cycle. Crop rotation also had 
other advantages. It allowed the rapid expansion of production through the planting 
207 See e.g. Elson, Javanese Peasants, pp. 35-46; and Fasseur, Colonial Exploitation, p. 34.
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of cane on existing farm-land and — as contemporaries could not have failed to be 
aware — had the potential for producing the consistently high yields of cane for 
which Java became internationally renowned. Ratooning, while saving on labour, did 
so at a cost. In the agricultural conditions of the mid-nineteenth century, it invariably 
led to a steady and appreciable fall-off in yields after the first crop. Rotation and 
annual replanting suffered from no such disadvantage. Instead, they held out the 
promise of cane that was always 'first crop' and commensurately high-yielding.
Under the aegis of the Stelsel, the typical mid-nineteenth-century schedule of 
work in sugar began with the harvesting of sawah rice around April and May of each 
year. The land assigned to sugar was then repeatedly ploughed, using water-buffalo 
and wooden ploughs.208 Contemporaneous with this process of opening up, drying 
out and 'sweetening' the soil [uitzuuring], there also took place the construction of 
access roads and — most important of all — an elaborate grid of ditches, designed 
as much to lead water off the standing cane as to irrigate it while in the early stages 
of growth. Cane was then planted in furrows using rooted cuttings taken from the 
tops of the previous year's planting of now ripened cane. Once planted — and 
planting was usually completed by September — the young cane needed to be 
kept free of weeds, banked-up, irrigated and sometimes fertilised, though this was 
rare in the mid-century. It was also necessary to construct, and keep in good order, 
stout bamboo fences around each plantation complex, which might otherwise suffer 
significant damage from the inroads of wild boar. After several months of growth, this 
demanding schedule of maintenance eased up considerably, since the semi-mature 
cane created sufficient shade to inhibit weed growth and, during the west-monsoon, 
was more likely to suffer from wet feet than from any shortage of water. Even so, 
adverse climatic conditions at any time during the twelve- to fifteen-month growing 
season could cause major upheavals in the 'normal' work process. Serious flooding, 
for example, could wash out the cane and necessitate replanting, while high winds 
might flatten large tracts of well-established plantation and require extensive work to 
stand the crop up again.
208 See e.g. JJ Tichelaar, 'De Exploitatie eener Suikerfabriek, Zestig Jaar Geleden', ASNI, 
vol. 33, no. 2, 1925, pp. 248ff.; G Roger Knight, 'The Peasantry and the Cultivation of Cane 
in Nineteenth Century Java', in A Booth, WJ O'Malley & A Weidemann (eds), Indonesian 
Economic History in the Dutch Colonial Era, New Haven, Yale University Southeast Asian 
Series, 1990, pp. 49-66.
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When a sufficient area of the plantation was ripe enough for harvest, the 
Campaign began, usually some time in May of the year subsequent to planting. By 
then, the onset of the east-monsoon would generally have begun to create sufficiently 
dry conditions underfoot. Workers could then go into the plantation to hack 
down the cane with knives, tie it up in bundles and stack the bundles on carts to 
be hauled to the factory by the ubiquitous water-buffalo. Only at a very few mid-
century factories was haulage partially mechanised through the installation of an iron 
tramway along which wagons were pulled by draft-animals between plantation and 
mill. Arrangements like this began in the 1860s and became more common as the 
century progressed. Once the cane had arrived at the factory — speed was of the 
essence, since the sucrose content of the cane deteriorated rapidly once it was cut — it 
was offloaded by hand and passed into the mills.
Most of the work inside the mid-century factory, and the compound that 
surrounded it, was of an entirely unmechanised nature, and highly labour-intensive. 
The manufacturing process itself required a great deal of manual labour, as did the 
removal of the expressed cane [ampas] from the mills themselves and its drying for 
subsequent use as fuel in the boiler house. In fact, the factory's furnaces consumed 
fuel far in excess of their stock of ampas, and had to rely on a great deal of cutting 
and carting of timber, at (presumably) an ever-increasing distance from the factory 
itself. Once the sugar had been manufactured and dried, it had to be packed and 
transported — usually by cart, less commonly by water — to wharves and warehouses 
on the coast, from where it could be shipped to a major port for export overseas.
Sugar and Servility: Provisioning the Industry with Labour209
In an important sense, the mid-century Java industry was every bit as dependent on 
servile labour as were its contemporaries in Cuba and Brazil, where slavery remained 
the norm until the 1880s. Nonetheless, the differences between Java and the major 
New World producers again far outweighed the similarities. Labour in Cuba (in 
particular) in the mid-nineteenth century evolved strongly in the direction of the 
barrack slavery of black African workers, who were shipped across the Atlantic in 
209 For a general introduction, see G Roger Knight, 'Sugar and Servility: Themes of Forced 
Labor, Resistance and Accommodation in Mid-Nineteenth Century Java', in Edward Alpers, 
Gwyn Campbell & Michael Salman (eds), Resisting Bondage in Indian Ocean, Africa and Asia, 
London & New York, Routledge, 2006, pp. 69-81.
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ever-growing numbers during the mid-century decades.210 In Java, forced labour in 
sugar developed in quite different ways and from a profoundly different foundation.
The prime, initial reason for this difference was quite straightforward. Work in 
the island's mid-century sugar fields and factories represented in some key dimensions 
a servility imposed on a settled local population of farmers and labourers — peasants, 
in short — who had long been incorporated (as we have seen) into a highly developed 
regime of labour service to the state and its local intermediaries. Within this overall 
context, however, servility took complex forms. In terms of access to land, Java's 
peasantry was markedly differentiated internally. Some peasants held more land than 
others, while some peasants held no land at all and were dependent for access on a 
variety of forms of share-cropping, tenantry and the like. In turn, this historically 
skewed access to resources was a vital factor in the commandeering of labour. The 
hegemonic positioning of the sugar industry within the larger framework of the 
agrarian society was contingent, that is to say, not only on the determination of state 
power-holders to support it, but also on the particular social and economic formation 
of rural Java.
A Heterogeneous Workforce: Corvée Labour, 'Government Coolies' and 
'Free' Workers
As was also the case in the mid-century New World, Cuba included, the extensive 
workforce harnessed to the many-faceted demands of the contemporary Java sugar 
industry took on a multiplicity of forms.211 Indeed, the Java workforce was probably 
even more heterogeneous than its Caribbean counterpart. The architects of the 
Cultuurstelsel had decreed that compulsory labour service, performed as corvée in 
the guise of Cultuurdienst, or Cultivation Service (a rather nice feudal invention 
on the part of Dutch officials), constituted the invariable basis for the cultivation 
of cane itself. Nonetheless, the other sectors of sugar production were serviced in a 
thoroughly heterogeneous fashion. Cutting and carting of cane at most factories was 
done by workers recruited (notionally at least) by the Sugar Contractors themselves, 
without recourse to corvée; and (as we saw in an earlier chapter) different and differing 
210 See e.g. Laird W Bergad, Cuban Rural Society in the Nineteenth Century: The Social and 
Economic History of Monoculture in Matanzas, Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 
1990, pp. 190-203, 228-39.
211 E.g. Bergad, Cuban Rural Society, pp. 245-62.
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arrangements prevailed for the work performed in the factories in which the cane was 
processed into sugar. 
To be sure, in this latter sector of production, some workers were indeed assigned 
to the industry on the putative basis of their labour obligations to the state (aka 
corvée) and its local Priyayi officials. Such workers were designated as 'Government 
Coolies'. To a degree that varied considerably over time and place, however, the 
contracting manufacturers who owned and ran the factories were also supposed to 
recruit people designated — this time in non-feudal Dutch — as vrijwilligers, literally 
'volunteers' and hence 'free labourers'. Sometimes these workers were also referred 
to as 'Free Coolies'. The term 'Coolie' was already on its way to becoming a general 
designation for 'native' workers rather than a relatively specific term for those who 
manually shifted heavy things.
Moreover, virtually all categories of labour were in receipt of some form of 
monetary payment. In the case of cane growers, this took the form of so-called crop 
pay or plantloon (see below), while in the case of virtually all other industry workers 
it took the form of a wage or dole, at levels often determined by the state. Embedded 
within the factories, moreover, was a core of skilled or semi-skilled workers and artisans 
who were generally in receipt of cash advances for their work for the entire milling 
season, and hence subject to some form of indenture, albeit of an 'informal' kind. 
There was no state-enforced penal sanction applicable to them (as was subsequently 
the case, however, with indentured workers elsewhere in the Netherland Indies).
Skewed Access to Rural Resources and the Basis of the Industry's Labour 
Supply
In stark contrast to later stereotypes of an island singularly packed with people, the 
agricultural environment of Java in the early and mid-nineteenth century was one 
in which settlement was still rather widely scattered in a countryside relatively well 
covered in woodland that provided a home to 'bandits', wild boar — and tigers.212 
The demography of nineteenth-century Java is an art not a science.213 Probably, then 
as now, most of Java's population was concentrated in the interior of Central and East 
212 The point is singularly well-made (and elaborated) in Elson, Village Java, pp. 1-13.
213 For perhaps the sanest survey of the demography, see Boomgaard, Children of the Colonial 
State, pp. 139-98.
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Java. Nonetheless, there is good reason to suppose that along both the north coast 
of Central Java and in the Oosthoek east of Surabaya, there existed in the 1830s and 
1840s pockets of dense settlement in which intensive wet-rice [sawah] agriculture 
had long been practised. Post-1830, it was into these pockets that the revived sugar 
industry attempted to nestle. To this extent, it is indeed true that the Cultuurstelsel 
era was not established — as were many of its global counterparts — on an agrarian 
frontier in which cultivation was limited and population sparse. Even so, labour was 
far from super-abundant in Java in the mid-century decades, and only became so late 
in the century or in the early years of the twentieth.
Under these circumstances, the key to forced labour in Java in the mid-
nineteenth century was not to be found primarily in the sheer weight of numbers in the 
countryside. Rather, it was located in the skewed access to resources that characterised 
peasant society. In turn, this skewed access facilitated the growth of a kind of rural 
proletariat, in however 'disguised' a form.214 Contrary to a once fashionable scenario 
that posited the industry's exploitation of a substantially homogeneous peasantry, the 
subordination of labour to the requirements of the large-scale production of cane was 
predicated on an existing and growing differentiation among Java's rural population 
into complex varieties of 'haves' and 'have-nots'.
The crucial dimension of this skewed access was the presence in the countryside 
of locally highly variable numbers of landless (or functionally landless) and dependent 
households. Such households appear already to have existed in locally varying 
numbers in the 1830s and 1840s and were markedly on the increase thereafter. 
214 See the key observation of Brass and Bernstein (in a more general setting) concerning 
'… the extent to which smallholding linked to colonial plantations was internally differentiated 
in socio-economic terms: that is, on the one hand, the better-off peasants, composed of 
proprietors and/or tenants whose main income derived from the sale of the product of labour 
rather than labour power itself, and on the other those "peasants", the majority of whose 
incomes came from the sale of labour power and not its product, and who were as a result never 
anything other than labourers with temporary/conditional access to land rather than peasants who 
sold their labour power. In other words, the extent to which repeasantisation was not so much a 
unilinear, once-for-all transition as a multiple and continuous process of transformation, that 
itself hid an accompanying and underlying trend toward proletarianisation/deproletarianisation 
[emphasis added]'. See Tom Brass and Henry Bernstein, 'Introduction: Proletarianisation and 
Deproletarianisation on the Colonial Plantation', in E Valentine Daniel, Henry Bernstein & 
Tom Brass (eds), Plantations, Peasants and Proletarians in Colonial Asia, London, Frank Cass, 
1992, pp.1-40, here p. 15.
116
G Roger Knight
Generally designated as menumpang, they were family units who lived in or adjacent 
to the compounds of landholders. As such, they were distinguishable from budjang, 
generally portrayed as male workers who were not yet married, and from itinerants.215 
From at least the 1850s onward, a propensity was commented upon in the colonial 
record for those landholders on whom corvée was imposed to send their dependent, 
client labourers as substitutes. By the 1850s and 1860s there were wide-spread reports 
that the landholding or (as they were referred to in some accounts) sikep strata of the 
peasantry avoided labour service, either in part or in its entirety, and dispatched their 
menumpang to the cane fields and factories in their stead.216
The implications of this for our understanding of forced labour in Java in the 
mid-nineteenth century are far-reaching. In the context of labour mobilisation in 
general, brutal disciplining of village heads charged with responsibility for the turn-
out of labour was one recourse, and at certain times and places no doubt critical. All the 
same, this was only part of the story. Coercion of the workforce was only possible in a 
sustained and systematic way because of a political economy in the countryside which 
left increasing numbers of rural workers dependent for their survival on something 
other than their own means of subsistence. Cane's hegemony in the agricultural cycle 
played some part in underpinning this feature of peasant society, in so far as cane's 
claim to land and irrigation water may well have helped push some marginal elements 
among the landed peasantry into the (functionally) landless category.217 So, too, did 
the growing pressure of population on land, as a result of what seems generally agreed 
to have been increasing numbers in the mid-century countryside. Equally important, 
however, and closely related to these two factors, was the historical existence in the 
countryside of groups of workers with (at best) only marginal access to land. In the 
case of at least some of the work required by the sugar industry, the state's ability 
215 For a brief guide to definitions (e.g. 'The entire group of landless families is normally 
indicated with the name (me)numpang'), see Boomgaard, Children of the Colonial State, 
pp. 59-67.
216 For the situation as it had developed, e.g. in the Pekalongan area by the 1860s, see G 
Roger Knight, 'Peasant Labour and Capitalist Production in Late Colonial Indonesia: The 
Campaign at a North Java Sugar Factory 1840-1870', Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, 
vol. 19, no. 2, 1988, pp. 245-65, here p. 256; Knight, 'The Peasantry and the Cultivation of 
Cane', passim.
217 See e.g. G Roger Knight, '"The People's Own Cultivations": Rice and Second Crops 
in Pekalongan Residency, North Java, 1800-1870', Review of Malay and Indonesian Affairs, 
vol. 19, no. 2, 1985, pp. 1-38.
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effectively to enforce labour on its behalf was fairly clearly conditional on the degree 
of their presence.218
Indeed, it looks as if the locally varying ratio between landed and landless was 
indeed a key factor — possibly even the key factor — in the effective implementation 
of a system of servile labour in the sugar industry. Along the sugared north coast 
of Central Java, in particular, there were contrasts in the effectiveness of the 
Cultuurstelsel in promoting the expansion of the sugar industry which point to some 
such explanation. There was a revealing difference, for example, between the situation 
in the adjoining (and later amalgamated) Residencies of Tegal and Pekalongan. In 
this area of Central Java, sugar had been a very small-scale industry in the pre-1830 
period, but a dozen or more sugar factories were subsequently established there under 
the aegis of the Cultuurstelsel — with very mixed results.
In Tegal Residency, and particularly in the districts immediately to the south 
of the city of Tegal itself, sugar had taken firm hold by the 1840s. For their owners, 
five of the six factories that operated there (Adiwerna, Djatibarang, Doekoewringin, 
Kemanglen and Pagongan) were profitable concerns. Further to the east, however, in 
Pekalongan Residency (and also in the eastern districts of Tegal itself ), the situation 
of the three factories established there in the mid-nineteenth century (Wonopringgo, 
Sragie and Kalimatie) was rather different. Of these, Wonopringgo alone, in the quite 
exceptional circumstances outlined in the previous chapter, started to show a profit 
in the 1850s, whereas it was only in the following decade, that, taken as a whole, the 
sugar industry there began to flourish in terms of production and productivity.
Of course, there were many reasons for this. These reasons related to the 
over-exploitation of the area's agricultural resources and repeated clashes between 
the Residency, leading Priyayi and Chinese-Indonesian interests over a period of two 
decades or more. There may also have been significant ecological factors militating 
against the expansion of the industry. Nonetheless, one of the key differences between 
parts of Tegal and the Pekalongan Residency related to labour. In the former Residency, 
218 One highly respected authority apparently reads the prevalence of menumpang quite 
differently, viz. as a way of escaping the full burden of the demands for labour service (Elson, 
Village Java, p. 384, fn. 491). The point is well-taken, but little explanation is provided for 
how some sections of the rural working population were able to take this option, while the 
provenance of the information — an unnamed Dutch official's pronouncement on this score, 




there appear to have been rather more working households available to the industry 
in the beschikkingkringen [formal zones of exploitation] which were assigned to each 
of the factories than in the latter. Altogether more striking, however, was the contrast 
between Tegal and Pekalongan in terms of the availability not simply of labour itself 
but of (functionally) landless labourers who were potentially 'available' to the industry. 
Data from the 1850s, collected in some detail by colonial officials, is crucial here. It 
suggests that menumpang and the like were present in much greater numbers in some 
locations along the sugared north coast than in others.219 In particular, it appears that 
in the prime sugar areas of Tegal over 40 per cent of the peasant households were 
landless menumpang, as opposed to a figure of around 18 per cent in the sugar areas 
of Pekalongan.220
These figures are certainly not unproblematic. Nonetheless, they point (at the 
very least) to the importance of differential access to resources within the peasantry 
in explaining the varying rates at which the sugar industry managed to establish a 
hold on agrarian resources as a whole. Where the number of dependent households 
was insufficient to create an adequate pool of menumpang and other landless workers, 
the ability of the state and its local agents, both Dutch and Javanese, to foster the 
industry's growth through the sufficient allocation of labour was correspondingly 
impaired.
In short, what ultimately made forced labour feasible was the extent of well-
established and expanding asymmetrical relations of production within the peasantry 
219 The point was noted by Dekker (W Dekker, 'Tussen Zelfvoorziening en Commerciele 
Landbouw', Docteraalscriptie, Vrije Universitiet, Amsterdam, 1978, pp. 56-7) more than a 
quarter of a century ago, but without any substantial discussion of its implications.
220 Landed and Landless Households in the Sugar Kring of Tegal and Pekalongan around 1856:
Source: 'Cultuurverslag 1851', for the area of the factory kring (Exh. 15.4.1853/12) and for the 
landed/landless elements in the population, see the data from the 'Umbgrove Monographies' 
(cited extensively in Elson, Village Java, passim). For the Tegal and Pekalongan sugar factories 
see NA, Collectie Umbgrove. The relevant sections of each 'Monographie' are 'III Bevolking 
binnen den kring der Onderneming/Vervolg B/Inheemsche bevolking/3/Verdeeling'.
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of the lowlands of Central and Eastern Java. Any other conclusion rests far too 
heavily on the supposed coercive abilities of a colonial state that was, in fact, far 
from enjoying untrammelled power over the disposal of rural resources. The mid-
century Indies regime simply did not have the sinew to sustain the requirements of 
a modern 'command economy': it was as yet only a 'half-formed bureaucracy' (the 
phrase is Heather Sutherland's) that was obliged, faute de mieux, to mix coercion with 
accommodation of the Javanese elites, above and within the 'village', with whom it 
had perforce to deal. As one leading student of colonialism has remarked (in a non-
specific context):
the colonial state existed in relation to different modes of production, each 
animated by people distinct from each other, distinctions that were crucial if 
clear order were to be preserved and if capital were to exploit the labour power 
it found in the colonies. Such labour power was not simply there for the taking; 
rather, the state had to hitch itself to the interests of indigenous elites in order 
to gain access to the labour power that imperial capital needed. Each colonial 
state had to manage a particularly complex set of contradictions, if that state 
were to promote the interests of 'its' economic actors in a competitive world 
economy …221
Coercion and Accommodation
In this context, the apparently persuasive argument of one highly respected Java 
specialist that 'terror and brute force were the cement of the nineteenth century 
colonial order' needs to be treated with some caution.222 In fact, the state had, of 
necessity, to tread a fine line in terms of authority between the strong arm and the 
blind eye as far as the exercise of power was concerned.223 A great deal also depended 
on the experience and character of the state's officials. In Pekalongan Residency in 
the early 1860s, for example, the Resident noted wryly that the handful of European 
Controleurs [District Officers] were too young and green 'to penetrate the cunning 
221 Frederick Cooper, Colonialism in Question: Theory, Knowledge, History, Berkeley, 
University of California Press, 2005, p. 51.
222 PBR Carey, 'Review of J van Goor, Kooplieden, Predikanten en Bestuurders Overzee: 
Beeldvorming en Plaatsbepaling in een Andere Wereld ', Itinerario, vol. 8, no. 1, 1984, p. 162.
223 See e.g. G Roger Knight, 'The Blind Eye and the Strong Arm: The Colonial Archive and 
the Imbrication of Knowledge and Power in Mid-Nineteenth Century Java', Asian Journal of 
Social Science, vol. 33, no. 3, 2005, pp. 544-68.
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of the native chiefs'.224 Moreover, the hierarchy of Priyayi officials, on whom the 
Dutch had perforce to rely for the execution of their orders, had a command over 
the wong cilik, or common people, which was itself circumscribed by a variety of 
factors. Despite a propensity, particularly in the high offices of state in Batavia, to 
assume otherwise, the fact was that Javanese officials could not 'deliver' regardless of 
local circumstances. In short, there was nothing uniform about the extent to which 
the Cultuurstelsel was able to provide a solid agrarian underpinning for the expansion 
of sugar production which took place in the colony after 1830: on the contrary, 
outcomes varied considerably over both time and place.
The expansion of sugar manufacture throughout the island's eastern and 
central districts was indeed considerable. By 1850, some 30 000 hectares of peasant 
farm-land were being brought annually under cane for the factories working under 
Government contract.225 The new industry's development was nonetheless a very 
uneven process. In the Oosthoek, sugar production of the kind prescribed by the 
architects of the Cultuurstelsel quickly took a firm hold during the course of the 1830s. 
High-ranking Priyayi did well from the Cultuurprocenten [Cultivation bonuses] with 
which the Indies Government sought to sweeten the labour both of its own officials 
and the Javanese power-holders through whom they worked. Peasant resistance (if 
that was indeed the proper word) certainly occurred, but it was minimised. Seasonal 
labour could be easily obtained from the nearby island of Madura, where the peasants 
themselves had always been more fertile than their fields. Moreover, a nucleus of 
manufacturers was already in place there by the late 1820s and — probably most 
significant of all — the extensive Chinese-Indonesian business networks of Surabaya 
and points east were evidently persuaded of the advantages to be gained from the new 
enthusiasm of the Indies Government for supplies of sugar.226 For a couple of decades 
or more, Surabaya and the Oosthoek were the Stelsel's star-performers.
Elsewhere, however, things went much less smoothly. In some parts of the 
Pasisir — notably the Pekalongan area already discussed — sugar was slow to take off. 
Not least, this was because other Cultuurstelsel commodities, above all the production 
of the organic dyestuff indigo, stood in the way, and played havoc with the kinds of 
accommodation on which the Stelsel depended. The problem was that state officials — 
224 AV, Pekalongan, 1863 [unpaginated], AD, Pekalongan, no. 6.
225 Creutzberg, Export Crops, Table 7, p. 71.
226 The indispensible account of developments in the mid-century Oosthoek is Elson, Javanese 
Peasants, passim.
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at the centre of, and sometimes in, the Residency itself — appear to have entertained 
grossly unrealistic expectations about the agricultural potential of Pekalongan. It was 
something about which the then Resident, CFE Praetorius (and subsequently Director 
of Cultivations), cautioned the Batavia authorities in a defensive letter written to the 
Governor-General in August 1835:
[In Pekalongan] up to now, circumstances operate against rather than for the 
Stelsel … People consider Pekalongan suitable, yes perhaps even the most 
suitable of the coastal Residencies for all sorts of crops, rice not excluded. 
Neither the one nor the other notion seems to me well grounded.227 
It was not until the 1860s, three decades after the inauguration of the Stelsel, 
that sugar began to flourish in Pekalongan Residency. There were several explanations, 
some of them aired at the time. High-ranking Priyayi and their Chinese-Indonesian 
associates — their interests hurt in this part of Java by developments that appeared 
to promise them little in return — proved 'recalcitrant' and found themselves at 
loggerheads with successive Residents, of whom there was a quite exceptionally large 
turnover in the mid-century decades.228 One of them characterised Pekalongan's 
leading Chinese merchant, Nonya Oei Tay Lo (in one of the several Dutch versions 
of her name), as 'stubborn and grasping' in the extreme, qualities of which the Dutch 
were themselves fine judges.229 This was a problem, because she appears to have 
dominated the commercial-financial world of Pekalongan Residency in the 1830s 
and perhaps in the following decade as well. Nonya Oei Tay Lo was reputed to control 
the trade in rice, both there and elsewhere in the Pasisir west of Semarang, and was 
the major creditor of both the Residency's leading Priyayi, the Bupati of Pekalongan 
and his counterpart further east in Batang, who was said to be 'in her lead strings'. 
She also owned at least two ships.230 Crucially, moreover, her family held the Indies 
227 Resident Praetorius to GG 28.8.1835/946, ANRI, Asip Cultuurs, no. 46.
228 For the Residents, see 'Stamboeken Indische Ambtenaren', MK. During the mid-century 
decades, Tegal had nine Residents and great continuity of office, notably Pieter van der Poel 
(1824-33), DA Varkevisser (1836-46) and JA Vriesman (1846-57). Pekalongan had some 
fourteen Residents, only one of whom, FH Doornik (1837-43), lasted any length of time; the 
rest stayed no more than two or three years, with the exception of GJP van der Poel (1852-57) 
— but he was seriously ill in the last two or so years of his tenure. Astonishingly, one Resident 
came back (or was sent back) for more: MH Halewijn (1828-31 and 1844-46) — though he 
was said to have enjoyed a particularly close and friendly relationship with the Bupati family 
of Batang.
229 Vitalis, 'Report Pekalongan … 1834', pp. 35-6, NA, Collectie Baud, 460.
230 Vitalis, 'Report Pekalongan … 1834', pp. 35-6, NA, Collectie Baud, 460; S van Deventer, 
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Government's opium farm for the area — the management of which would have 
underpinned their stranglehold on local trade as well as the lucrative business of 
selling the drug itself.231 Matters seem to have come to a head in Pekalongan late in 
the 1840s, when the two incumbent Bupati were replaced by more malleable but 
perhaps less effective successors.232 What happened to Nonya Oei Tay Lo is not clear.
Even so, it is worth stressing that histories of contest occurred as incidents in 
a system that worked towards, and generally achieved, a degree of accommodation 
between the parties concerned — Residents, Bupati, Chinese business people — which 
was fundamental to the rise of sugar in the mid-century decades. In Pekalongan itself, 
the NHM's Wonopringgo sugar factory, managed in the 1850s by the formidable 
Thomas Edwards (whom we met in the preceding chapter), was a case in point: 
'accommodation' was manifest in a degree of understanding between the factory's 
management and the local Priyayi, led in this case by the Javanese District Head or 
Wedana. Before Edwards arrived at Wonopringgo in 1852, it had already been noted 
that the 'native chiefs' were regular visitors to the factory — and were accompanied 
on occasion by their wives and children, suggestive of a social as well as a purely 
functional dimension to the relationship.233 Subsequently, the factory made 'loans' 
to the Wedana — though not without drawing so stony a response from company 
headquarters in Amsterdam that no further mention of the loans appeared in the 
correspondence.234
It was indicative of the continuing relationship of accommodation between the 
Wonopringgo factory and the local Javanese power-holders, moreover, that Edwards 
Bijdragen tot de Kennis van het Landelijk Stelsel op Java, Zaltbommel, Joh. Noman & Zoon, 
vol. 2, 1865-1866, pp. 704-5; AV, Pekalongan, 1831, Bijl. F, AD, Pekalongon, no. 2 shows 
Oeij Tailo as owning two ships, one of 97 tonnes and the other of 150 tonnes; 'Aantekeningen 
… Reise GG ad interim [JC Baud] Mei-Augustus 1834' [unpaginated], NA, Collectie Baud, 
462; AV, Pekalongan, 1834 [unpaginated], NA, Collectie Baud, 391 shows that virtually all 
the Government farms of markets [pasar] and stalls [warong] are held by either Oei Tay Lo or 
Oei Ponggoan.
231 The Opium farmer was identified in 1847 as 'Oeij Tankoie', and he was fined 4000 
guilders for his overtreding der pachtvoorwaarden. See 'Civeel Teregtzetting Landraad 
Pekalongan, 16.3.1847', in AD, Pekalongan, no. 58.
232 For instance, the 'PV, Pekalongan, 1858', p. 11, in AD, Pekalongan, no.1/5 noted that 
the Bupati of Pekalongan at that time had spent a long time in Sumanep, was in effect a 
stranger to the Regency and (not surprisingly, perhaps) showed 'little energy'.
233 Rapport JC Teengs, 27.6.1850, in Factorij to A'dam, 24.7.1850/ 29.
234 Factorij to A'dam, 24.10.1857/597 & 7.5.1859/737.
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greeted the transfer in 1861 of a 'well-disposed' District Head — a 'cultivated 
[beschaafd] fellow', it was said — with great dismay in his reports to his employers. 
Dismay rapidly turned to relief, however, when it transpired that his successor came 
from the same family as the previous District Head and that 'he seems to be as sound 
and just as energetic a man as his predecessor'.235 
By definition, accommodation was a two-way process. Edwards was well aware 
of this. A case in point related to his requisition of 'Government Coolies', the corvée 
labourers who formed the backbone of the workforce employed in and around the 
factory itself during the sugar Campaign, supplied through the intermediary of the 
Wedana. Edwards knew and accepted that a percentage of them would be retained 
by the Wedana for the Wedana's own use. Edwards was likewise fully aware that if he 
made too heavy demands, for example, for the carting of firewood to the factory, it 
would be met by a reduction of co-operation from the District Head in relation to 
other facets of Wonopringgo's operations: 'Every favour of this sort given is an excuse 
for bad plantation', he remarked to his employers, because he would be informed 
that '… the cane planters are busy cutting wood and therefore cannot attend to the 
plantation …'236 Most revealing of all, it looks as if Edwards was forced to back off 
when he tried to get the Wedana to interfere in person in a dispute with some cane-
carters hired by the factory. Instead, he appears to have had to follow the Wedana's 
advice that to do so would be quite contrary to the usages of the carefully organised 
hierarchy of provincial Java. '[I]t's no use in me talking directly with ordinary people', 
Edwards was apparently told. '[Instead] I'll tell one of my lurahs [village heads] to talk 
to the people.'237 
In short, as these particular examples from one sector of the expanding industry 
suggest, the provision of labour to the sugar industry was subject to a variety of 
constraints. Commandeering by the state was far from a straightforward exercise, and 
235 Factorij to A'dam, 16.3.1861/940 & 2.5.1861/951.
236 [Extract] Edwards to Factorij, 4.2.1854/742, in Factorij to A'dam, 25.2.1854/271.
237 The [faulty] 'malay' text as reproduced by the NHM's Batavia factorij in a letter about 
the incident forwarded to company headquarters in Amsterdam reads: 'Saya rasa voor tjoemah 
bestjara sama orang ketjil. Saya poenia orang ketjil nanti loeroeh saya poenje parinta sadja'. I 
am indebted to Professor Anton Lucas of The Flinders University of South Australia for the 
suggested reconstruction of the text to read (translated in the text, above): 'Saya rasa percuma 
bicara sama orang kecil, saya punya orang kecil nanti lurah saya punya [akan] perintah saja 




accommodation as well as coercion was the order of the day. So, too, as we have seen, 
was the permeation of systems of servile labour with cash payment and an increasing 
variety of different labour forms based on inducement as well as constraint. Devices 
for provisioning the industry with labour, moreover, were only one aspect, albeit a 
very important one, of the dynamics of the sugar industry's attempts to dominate 
rural Java. Equally critical was a degree of reconstruction of the peasantry as a whole.
Sugar and the Making of a Colonial Peasantry
There has been a tendency in the existing literature to envisage the rise of sugar in Java 
in the mid-nineteenth century primarily in terms of the adaptation for new purposes 
of old arrangements for exploiting the island's agrarian resources. In tandem, Java has 
often been viewed as a relatively unproblematic — albeit somewhat singular — case 
of 'sugar-with-peasants'. Neither position, however, seems quite right, and the present 
argument — hardly novel but well worth reiterating — is that existing arrangements 
for securing commodity production in rural Java formed only one of the bases for the 
huge expansion of the sugar industry which took place in the middle decades of the 
nineteenth century.
Sugar and peasants, in fact, did not simply find each other in Java in the mid-
nineteenth century. In a crucial, though asymmetrical sense, they made each other, 
to an extent that seriously undermines any lingering suggestion that the industry 
expanded from the 1830s onward simply, or predominantly, by exploiting relations of 
production in the countryside which it left essentially undisturbed. In fact, a variety 
of factors were involved, prime among these the forging of an internally differentiated 
colonial peasantry out of what was previously a somewhat more amorphous mass 
of rural cultivators and labourers. Although the organisation of large-scale sugar 
production did indeed take on a form heavily influenced by the existing rural political 
economy of rural Java, it also evolved in ways with a pronounced dynamic of their 
own. In short, the 'symbiosis' of peasantry and sugar production needs to be unpicked 
with some care.
The essential argument here is that some (but by no means all) elements of 
the rural working population of Java in the mid-nineteenth century became more 
'peasant-like' than had earlier been the case. In consequence, these workers were more 
easily subordinated to some (at least) of the requirements of the industrial project in 
sugar. In this context 'peasant-like' refers, above all, to what one participant in a now 
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global debate has described as 'the creation out of a series of much more varied and 
flexible social formations of a more homogeneous society of petty arable producers 
working predominantly with family labour'.238 
This concept of 'peasantisation' (the jargon is ultimately unavoidable) contrasts, 
of course, with any notion that there is something immutable, even primordial, about 
peasantry. Instead, it asserts that specific forms of peasantry emerged in tandem 
with capitalist expansion, commodity production and settled agriculture. Inter alia, 
colonial peasantries came into existence 'when the state set out to fix people in their 
locations so that they might be taxed and controlled better'.239 In the case of Java, the 
Dutch sociologist Jan Breman has strongly argued that by the mid-century a series 
of developments can be seen at work, which had the effect of tightening the bond 
between sections of the cultivators and the land. Such developments made them more 
readily taxable and — in the circumstances of the State Cultivations organised by by 
the Indies Government in the mid-nineteenth century — 'corvée-able' by the state 
and its agents.240
In consequence, colonial Java is an excellent example of the way in which 
peasantry was not a trans-historical phenomenon but one formed and re-formed over 
time in particular and varying social and economic constellations. Peasantry was less 
a 'pre-capitalist survival' than a corollary and part-creation of capitalist modernity 
and of the colonialisms within which capitalism was encompassed. 'Capitalism is 
a system only obscured by the phenomena it produces', the sociologist Henry 
238 CA Bayly, 'Creating a Colonial Peasantry: India and Java c. 1820-1880', in Mushirul 
Hasan et al., India and Indonesia from the 1830s to 1914: The Heyday of Colonial Rule, Leiden, 
Brill, 1987, pp. 93-106, here p. 93. For an expansion of Bayly's views, see the section on 'The 
Consolidation of the Indian Peasantry', in Bayly, Indian Society and the Making of the British 
Empire, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1988, pp. 138-45.
239 DA Washbrook, 'Progress and Problems: South Asian Economic and Social History 
c. 1720-1860', Modern Asian Studies, vol. 22, no. 1, 1988, pp. 57-96, here pp. 80-1. In 
addition to the work on South Asia cited above, the avowedly eclectic approach to the issue 
of peasantisation adopted here owes something to the seminal writings of Frederick Cooper, 
e.g. 'Peasants, Capitalists and Historians: A Review Article', Journal of Southern African 
Studies, vol. 7, no. 2, 1981, pp. 284-314; and Jack Lewis, 'The Rise and Fall of the South 
African Peasantry: A Critique and Reassessment', Journal of Southern African Studies, vol. 11, 
no. 1, 1984, pp. 1-24.
240 Jan Breman, Control of Land and Labour in Colonial Java, Dordrecht, Foris Publications, 
1983, pp. 17-18; Breman, 'Village Java and the Early Colonial State', Journal of Peasant 
Studies, vol. 9, no. 4, 1982, pp. 189-240.
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Bernstein has argued, and '… some of the phenomena of capitalism resemble those 
of pre-capitalist formations … which is the basis of (mistaken) articulationist notion 
of the "persistence" or "conservation" of pre-capitalist social relations and forms'.241 
Obfuscated as its development might be by a preference among colonial officials for 
a quasi-feudal terminology (for example, Herendienst, Cultuurdienst), a specifically 
colonial peasantry was in the process of formation. This peasantry served — in 
however contingent, contested and imperfect a fashion — the purposes of capitalist 
commodity production in general and the industrial project in sugar in particular.
To be sure, there are important counter-arguments here. Discussion of the 
subject has certainly advanced some considerable way since Clifford Geertz's 
celebrated hypothesis in the mid-twentieth century about the 'Agricultural Involution' 
of late colonial Java. The relevant aspects of Geertz's multi-faceted hypothesis were 
articulationist avant le lettre, in so far as they postulated that the industry represented 
an amalgam of Western capitalist enterprise with Eastern pre-capitalist land and labour 
embodied in a largely homogeneous, classless peasant society.242 More recent research 
(much of it in archives) has begged to differ.243 It has drawn attention to the extent 
of landlessness and wage labour, the emergence of entrepreneurial groups among 
the peasantry, and to the consolidation of peasant elites of substantial landholders. 
Nonetheless, otherwise divergent accounts remain largely at one in maintaining that 
the cultivators' long-standing status as peasants was certainly impacted upon but not 
undermined in the mid-century decades by the requirements of the expanding sugar 
industry. Explicitly or otherwise, these accounts seem to assert the long-standing 
existence of peasantry and its essential mid-century continuity.244
241 H Bernstein, 'Capitalism and Petty Bourgeois Production: Class Divisions and Divisions 
of Labour', Journal of Peasant Studies, vol. 15, no. 2, 1988, pp. 258-71, here p. 261.
242 E.g. Clifford Geertz, Agricultural Involution: The Process of Ecological Change in Indonesia, 
Berkeley & Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1963, pp. 97-8.
243 See in particular Ben White, '"Agricultural Involution" and its Critics: Twenty Years after', 
Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars, vol. 15, 1983, pp. 18-31; RE Elson, 'The Cultivation 
System and "Agricultural Involution"', Working Paper no. 14, Centre of Southeast Asian 
Studies, Monash University, Melbourne; Elson, 'Clifford Geertz, 1926-2006: Meaning, 
Method and Indonesian Economic History', Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies, vol. 43, 
no. 2, 2007, pp. 251-63.
244 Robert Van Niel, for example, despite his great sensitivity to mid-century change and 
development, was clearly loath to abandon the idea that a key factor in the consolidation of 
the sugar industry was that it changed relatively little as far as the peasantry was concerned. 
In phrases reminiscent of Geertz, he contended that 'local arrangements eventually made by 
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Even so, the idea that sectors of Java's rural working population ended the 
nineteenth century a good deal more 'peasant-like' than they had entered it is a 
persuasive one. An ostensibly crucial factor in this evolution was the imposition of a 
state land tax, the so-called Landrente.245 Initiated in 1813 but evolving in piecemeal 
fashion for much of the century, it had major long-term implications for the structured 
evolution of rural society. It had the potential for creating a situation in which peasant 
households had to supplement their income with 'off-farm' labour in order to meet 
the increasingly monetary character of the state's fiscal demands. In 1830, however, 
when the Cultuurstelsel was introduced, the Landrente was still in a rudimentary stage 
of its implementation, a quasi-monetary tax that for many cultivators still amounted 
to little more than a 'traditional' delivery of part of their harvest. In short, the 
Landrente's role in mid-century peasantisation may be somewhat overdrawn. The 
system of crop-payment or plantloon, instituted under the auspices of the Stelsel itself, 
on the other hand, had an altogether more immediate and significant impact.
In many parts of the lowlands of Central and East Java, Cultuurstelsel 
production was characterised in its early years by what colonial contemporaries styled 
'en masse' recruitment of the rural workforce in the general vicinity of the sugar 
factories. Workers were marshalled into large gangs and marched off the sugar fields 
under the supervision of local Chinese-Indonesian mandur [foremen] and sometimes 
made to work there for days at a time. This proved ineffective, however, and by 
the mid-century, virtually everywhere in the colony's sugar districts, the basis for 
cane cultivation had become the individual cultivator household. Workers were thus 
ordered in increasingly regulated villages [desa], and under the control of the village 
headmen or lurah, which proved a much more satisfactory formula for working the 
fields, distributing 'incentives' and sheeting home responsibility for failure.246
Whether the desa organisation was fundamentally a colonial creation or more 
properly viewed as a mid-century consolidation of an entity with a long prior history 
the peasants [prevented] … the collapse of Javanese housekeeping arrangements … [T]hese 
adjustments and others made the System bearable [emphasis added]'. See Robert Van Niel, 
'The Effect of Export Cultivations in Nineteenth Century Java', Modern Asian Studies, vol. 15, 
no. 1, 1981, pp. 25-58, here pp. 44-5.
245 The authoritative discussions are in Hugenholtz, 'Landrent'; and Hugenholtz, 'Landrente 
Belasting'.




need not detain us here.247 Either way, it formed a crucial stage in the 'peasantisation' 
of agrarian Java. Cultivators became increasing bound to the soil, not only through 
their settlement in villages, but also through the system of plantloon devised quite 
specifically to anchor work in the sugar fields in the peasant household. One leading 
authority on the subject has a wonderfully revealing quotation from the Resident of 
Kediri (East Java) in 1833 about the need to incorporate hitherto itinerant elements 
into the resident working population: 'we can only expect useful work from them 
once they are settled and cultivating'.248
Plantloon hence became a vital feature of the colony's sugar districts where 
— by the mid-century — it was being paid on a routine basis to individual heads of 
farming households in return for their work in the cane fields. At one stroke, it both 
'recompensed' them for their household's labour and consolidated whatever bonds 
already existed between the household and the tilling of the soil. Since the agent of 
payment was the lurah, crop-payment further served to underscore his control over 
the village unit. These developments took place, moreover, within the context of an 
increasingly 'agrarian' discourse on the part of the state's bureaucracy.
This discourse, framed in terms of a categorisation of rural life, amounted (in 
Shahid Amin's pregnant phrase) to a 'cataloguing of the countryside' which made 
it — notionally at least — amenable to uniformity and record keeping.249 Over time, 
at least, this 'cataloguing' had a clear potential to impact on the character of peasant 
society itself. None of this, of course, is to ignore the agency of Javanese peasants and 
Priyayi elites in forging the mid-century basis on which the sugar industry was able 
to establish itself. Developments depended heavily not only on coercion but on the 
apparent perception among certain strata of the peasantry that what was happening 
served their own interests as well as those of state and industry.
Nonetheless, the consolidation of a colonial peasantry that took place in Java in 
the middle decades of the nineteenth century under the auspices of the Cultuurstelsel 
was a multi-faceted process. More was involved than the tying of cultivators to the 
soil and their organisation into lurah-dominated villages. A concomitant facet was 
the increasing economic differentiation among the peasantry. Some elements of the 
247 See, notably, Breman, 'Village on Java', passim cf. Elson, Village Java, pp. 29-35.
248 Elson, Village Java, p. 296.
249 Shahid Amin, 'Cataloguing the Countryside: Agricultural Glossaries from Colonial 
India', History and Anthropology, vol. 8, nos. 1-4, 1994, pp. 35-53.
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peasantry benefited more than others from the cultivation of cane and the commercial 
opportunities — the hire of ploughing teams and other beasts of burden, for example 
— which the expansion of the industry brought in its wake. Others were pushed 
toward the margins of subsistence by the same process. This was a development 
possibly accelerated (the point remains controversial) by the deleterious impact of 
long-term cane cultivation on the agricultural cycles in which it was embedded. 
Whatever its causes, this was the very antithesis of the 'homogenisation' of the rural 
population in socio-economic terms which the Cultuurstelsel was once widely held to 
have promoted.
Skewed access to resources in the lowlands of rural Java had long meant that 
some peasant households had far greater access to land, credit, water, tools, seeds and 
cattle than others. Developments in the middle decades of the nineteenth century, 
however, accentuated this situation markedly: there were ever more individuals and 
households for whom labour (rather than land) provided the essentials for subsistence. 
In consequence, a potentially 'industrial' workforce was in the making, which the 
sugar industry was able to exploit — in both field and factory — on an essentially 
seasonal basis. It is immaterial whether such workers were indeed 'proletarians': the 
essential point was that they could be treated as such, and taken on and laid off 
at will. However designated, they were an important constituent in the creation of 
industrial production.
Conclusion: Peasantry and the Industrial Project
The arrangements devised under the auspices of the Cultuurstelsel for raising cane 
through the utilisation of 'peasant' resources moved Java from the fringes toward the 
front rank of the international sugar economy. Most world-class cane sugar industries 
emerged or expanded during the course of the nineteenth century through the 
creation of Caribbean-style plantations utilising either slaves or indentured labour. 
In Java, however, under the direction of the Indies state and under the aegis of the 
Cultuurstelsel, the agrarian base of the industry evolved on quite different lines. In 
place of plantations as such, there took place a large-scale commandeering of peasant 
land and labour, in tandem with a system of concessions for processing cane into 
sugar granted to several score of formally designated contracting manufacturers. At 
the same time, the appropriation of village land and labour for expanded commodity 
production created what was, in effect, a specifically colonial peasantry of landholding 
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farmers (themselves increasingly differentiated into 'big' peasants and a mass of petty 
cultivators) and functionally landless workers.
None of this sits easily, of course, with an increasingly threadbare scenario that 
posits the industry's exploitation of a persisting, largely homogeneous 'peasantry'. 
Instead, it underlines the extent to which the subordination of land and labour to the 
requirements of the large-scale production of sugar cane was predicated on a growing 
differentiation among Java's rural population.
The Industrial Project's Escape from the Constrictions of Peasant 
Production
These several developments highlighted not only the difference between Java and the 
leading sugar industries of the New World but also the differences between Java and 
other parts of contemporary Asia. The agrarian contexts in which cane had been grown 
in Java early in the nineteenth century — as in other, contemporary pre-industrial 
centres of sugar production in places as far apart as the Indian subcontinent, Formosa 
and southern China — were fairly diverse. In the Ommelanden around Batavia, as we 
have seen, a quasi-plantation form of production evolved during the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries. Further east, however, production was organised predominantly 
on the basis of cultivation of cane by 'peasant' farmers as part of a broader, multi-crop 
agricultural regime. In tandem with merchant capital provided by Dutch colonial 
and Chinese-Indonesian interests, the growers were often closely associated with 
the rudimentary milling of cane and the production of sugar, more or less in situ. 
Units of production were small and decentralised. The arrangement offered a way 
of producing crude sugar which combined minimal capital outlay and maximum 
flexibility in response to market fluctuations.
As elsewhere in nineteenth-century Asia, that is to say, the incremental and 
piecemeal implementation of the industrial project in sugar manufacture in Java 
(see below) had to take place in the context of a persisting pre-industrial production 
of the commodity. In the short run, at least, this had the capacity to undercut its 
more 'advanced' counterparts. It was one of the factors — not, of course, the only 
one — which made so very hazardous the take-up of new industrial technologies 
and consequent adaptation of the industry to their structural requirements. In 
this context, the Cultuurstelsel's achievement was remarkable. As nowhere else in 
nineteenth-century Asia, it contrived over time to subordinate agrarian resources to 
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the industrialised manufacture of sugar in ways that resolved (for a time at least) 
the potential contradictions between 'peasant production' and the requirements of 
the new international sugar economy that grew out of the industrial revolution. It 
was managed, as we have seen, through a mixture of coercion and accommodation, 
impacting on both supra-village elites and those powerful groups within the now 
consolidated 'village' whose formation formed a crucial part of the creation of a 
colonial peasantry.
What took place in rural Java during the middle decades of the nineteenth 
century, that is to say, proved to be a crucial step in the suppression of those tensions 
between pre-industrial, 'peasant' production and the claims of factory-made sugar 
which were apparent throughout the major sugar-producing regions of Asia in the 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.250 In Java, moreover, another development 
was at least as critical. Commodity rice production, the long-standing staple of the 
lowlands of Central and East Java, was made subservient to the cultivation of cane. 
In this sense, during the middle decades of the nineteenth century, the Cultuurstelsel 
and the arrangements surrounding it managed to do something that was not achieved 
elsewhere in Asia until considerably later, if at all.
Of course, none of this would have counted for much had not other factors 
been present. One such factor was the extent to which the Dutch colonial presence 
in Java in the mid-nineteenth century — a far more intense presence than any such 
presence elsewhere in the region — facilitated the emergence, as we have already seen, 
of a Creole Prometheus on the colonial frontier (in the sense of the adoption and 
adaptation of technology and science). But industrial projects of this kind also cost 
money and pre-supposed the existence of institutions and of moneyed men — and 
women — who were prepared to underwrite them.
It is to that aspect of the rise of sugar in Java in the mid-nineteenth century 
that we can now turn. There can be no dispute that the large-scale commandeering 
of labour and the requisition for cane of some of the island's best farm-land played a 
highly significant part in the reconstruction of Java's sugar industry, which had begun 
with the inauguration of the Cultuurstelsel in 1830. Nonetheless, the relationship 
turns out to have been a highly complex one. In the broad term, the stereotypical 
250 For illuminating discussions of this problem in the East Asian context, see Mazumdar, 




Stelsel inputs created the potential for Java sugar's mid-century trajectory — but they 
did not ensure it.
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In the mid-1880s, when most sugar manufacturers in Java were in extremis on 
account of a sudden and dramatic fall in world sugar prices, an apologist for the 
industry published a book in Amsterdam under the polyglot title of Suikerlords [Sugar 
lords].251 It was a spirited defence of Java's sugar manufacturers and traders, whose 
purportedly profligate behaviour over the preceding years was widely blamed for the 
financial predicament in which they now found themselves. Yet the book was no 
mere polemic, since it drew on the author's extensive experience of the Indies over 
the preceding twenty or more years, and came from the pen of a man who was well-
known and respected in Dutch business circles. He had been the founder, a few years 
earlier, of the Koloniale Bank, an enterprise that became one of the major pillars of 
the Java sugar industry for the next half-century of its colonial-era existence. The title 
that Jan Hudig had chosen was deliberately ironic. Indeed, the whole point of his 
account was to establish the solid bourgeois rather than quasi-'Asiatic' or seigniorial 
credentials of the Indies sugar manufacturers who had dominated the Java industry 
over the last few decades. It was to their formidable accumulation and investment of 
capital that he now he sought to draw attention (and to which we shall return later 
in the chapter).
Despite the efforts of Hudig (and, until recently, very few others), the colonial or 
'Indies' bourgeoisie of nineteenth-century Java have enjoyed a mixed history. Indeed, 
according to some accounts they scarcely figured at all. Rather, the bourgeoisie were 
judged to have been marginal to projects for large-scale commodity production in the 
251 Jan Hudig Dzn, Suikerlords, Amsterdam, PN van Kampen, 1886.




colony, since such projects continued to be masterminded by the Indies state through 
the middle decades of the nineteenth century. This judgement is simply wrong. 
Between the 1840s and 1880s, Java sugar had been transformed (as we have seen) by 
an industrial project, grounded in the state's commandeering of land and labour and, 
initially, by the state's direct provision of finance. Contrary to some lingering notions 
about the dynamics of capital in Java in the mid-nineteenth century, however, this 
industrial project was closely linked to the spawning of a bourgeoisie, without whom 
it would scarcely have reached the stage of development that it did.
Nonetheless, it would be a mistake to conceive of that bourgeoisie solely or 
exclusively as a 'colonial' one. Rather, it was one whose organic links to its counterpart 
in the Dutch metropolis played a key role in both its rise and its subsequent history. 
Allowing for the term's not entirely inappropriate pejorative connotations, the 
bourgeoisie was Janus-faced. Comprising people manufacturing and trading sugar 
and other commodities — and their associates in the Indies Government service — it 
was a bourgeoisie that looked both to the Netherlands and to the Indies. What are 
usefully termed 'Empire Families' played an important part here.252 At an elite level, 
such families bridged the notional divide between centre and periphery. Their high 
colonial status was defined by the sojourns they and their kith and kin made back and 
forth between the Indies and Holland, and by the ties they carefully nurtured in the 
metropolis (mainly through education and marriage).253
Empire Families and their associates, moreover, had an economic as well 
as social significance. In this context, as in others, once-fashionable notions of 
the 'isolation' of the Indies in the mid-nineteenth century need to be discarded. 
252 The concept has been most fully explored in the context of British India in the opening 
decades of the twentieth century, where Empire Families were said to have displayed a number 
of key characteristics. These included, first and foremost, 'a … bourgeois identity [that] 
became predicated on travels to, and formal education in, Britain …'. Hence Empire Families 
embraced people who identified themselves as '… sojourners in the [Indian] subcontinent 
who maintained a secure foothold in the metropole'. In this context, 'repetitive journeys 
between, and alternating residence' in, colony and patria proved 'crucial to creating and 
stabilising … middle class status'. See Elizabeth Buettner, Empire Families: Britons and Late 
Imperial India, Oxford & New York, Oxford University Press, 2004, pp. 9-13.
253 See, in particular, Ulbe Bosma, 'Sailing through Suez from the South: The Emergence 
of an Indies-Dutch Migration Circuit, 1815-1940', International Migration Review, vol. 41, 
no. 2, 2007, pp. 511-36; Ulbe Bosma, Indiëgangers: Verhalen van Nederlanders die naar Indië 
Trokken, Amsterdam, Bert Bakker, 2010.
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Metropolitan capital played a very minor role in establishing the industrial project in 
Java sugar. Instead, the industrial project was largely sustained during the mid-century 
decades by capital accumulated locally, in Java itself. Nonetheless, this accumulation 
and investment took place within a framework in which an ongoing nexus between 
colony and metropolis was a vital sinew of bourgeois existence in both locations. In 
one key respect, therefore, mid-century Java provides evidence for a wider critique of 
the notion (in so far as it retains any credibility) which posits metropolitan capital 
penetration as the key to 'plantation' development.254 Nonetheless, such a revision 
does not run along the lines of asserting the exclusive character of bourgeois capital 
formation within the colony itself. Rather, it is based on a critique of the colonial-
metropolitan binary per se.
This part-colonial, part-metropolitan bourgeoisie had a vital role to play in 
sustaining the industrial project in Java sugar. Somewhat differently constituted 
than their more purely domestically-based counterparts in contemporary Cuba, the 
bourgeoisie in Java were not, as were the Cuban bourgeoisie, the 'prime movers' in 
initiating the industrial project.255 Initially, in the 1830s and 1840s, that role was 
taken by the Indies Government itself, albeit somewhat ambiguously (because it 
is not clear how committed the Government was to it). Nonetheless, from around 
the mid-century onward the activities of the Indies bourgeoisie in importing both 
machinery and the men to manage it — activities that mirrored almost exactly those 
of their Cuba counterparts — became the sine qua non of the industrial project's 
continuance in the Dutch colony.
Capital Formation in Java in the Mid-nineteenth Century
Capital formation took place in Java in the mid-nineteenth century on different lines 
than those experienced in most other major sectors of the evolving international 
254 For a recent and cogent argument about the importance of locally accumulated capital 
and the 'need to look more closely at the dynamics of capital formation in colonial sugar 
economies', and, in particular, about the need for a reappraisal of the idea that the social and 
economic history of 'plantation colonies' is invariably to be 'described and analysed in terms 
of metropolitan capital's penetration into the colonial world, and the attendant consequences 
of incorporation into the modern capitalist world economy', see Allen, Slaves, Freedmen and 
Indentured Labourers, pp. 2-8.
255 For the contemporary situation in Cuba, see in particular Curry-Machado, Cuban Sugar, 
pp. 20, 35, 40.
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sugar economy. For an understanding of the situation we need to go back to events 
that took place in the colony in the decades immediately following the collapse of 
the VOC at the close of the previous century. The import of these events was far-
reaching. Very briefly, in the second decade of the nineteenth century, considerable 
tracts of land (notably in West Java but also in the Oosthoek) were alienated by the 
Company's successor regimes to colonial European and Chinese-Indonesian interests. 
At about the same time — particularly, though not exclusively, in the Vorstenlanden 
[Principalities] of Central Java — a significant number of colonial entrepreneurs 
emerged, chiefly engaged in the production of commodities such as coffee and, to a 
lesser extent, indigo and sugar. For a variety of reasons, however, both they and the 
owners of the newly created estates failed to prosper. In the Vorstenlanden, official 
Dutch hostility and the Java War (1825-30) temporarily interrupted the emergence 
of a European planter class. Elsewhere in the colony, neither estates nor planters made 
much headway in the production of commodities.256 By the late 1820s, moreover, 
the mercantile sector of the colonial economy — which was made up of European, 
Chinese, Arab and Armenian trading firms who had established themselves in 
Java's main ports over the previous decade — was in deep trouble, caught up in the 
vicissitudes of global commodity chains (above all, cotton goods and coffee) over 
which it had minimal control.
The consequent failure of an incipient colonial bourgeoisie to establish itself 
in Java in the opening decades of the nineteenth century had important and long-
term consequences. It meant that subsequent capital formation took place there in a 
different context, and on different lines, than that found in many other contemporary 
'sugar colonies'. Global comparisons help make sense of this difference. Westward of 
Java, across the Indian Ocean in Mauritius (which was the mid-century location, 
as we have seen, of a technologically precocious industry that for a while clearly 
outpaced Java's), the formation of domestic capital took place around a nucleus of 
both landholding and labour ownership (in one form or another). To the north of 
the Indies, in the Philippines — where sugar production flourished on both Luzon 
and Negros — landholding and its associated peonage was again at the base of capital 
formation. In Cuba — Java's occidental coeval and after the mid-century the largest 
256 On the entrepreneurs and landowners of this period, see EMC van Enk, 'Britse 
Kooplieden en de Cultures op Java: Harvey Thompson (1790-1837), en zijn Financiers', 
Proefschrift, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, 1999; Knight, 'From Plantation to Padi-Field', 
passim; Bosma & Raben, pp. 109-44.
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sugar exporter in the world — the ownership of African slaves as well as of land 
constituted the nucleus of bourgeois capital until late in the century.257
Java was different. In the so-called Government Lands (i.e. those parts of the 
island where the Dutch governed directly) along the island's Northeast Coast and in 
the Oosthoek, where the bulk of sugar production in the mid-nineteenth century took 
place, neither landownership nor direct control over labour constituted the main 
foundation for capital formation. The state itself laid claim to ownership of the soil and, 
at least after the return of the colony to the Dutch in 1816, was reluctant to alienate 
it. Nor was the state prepared to sanction the direct expropriation of the island's petty 
landholders in favour of a class of colonial sugar planters. In consequence, the nucleus 
around which colonial sugar capital began to form, from 1830 onward, was not the 
possession of latifundia or of servile labour. Instead, it revolved around the possession 
of sugar factories and — above all — of state contracts for the manufacture of sugar 
issued in association with the Cultuurstelsel.
At the core of this emergent bourgeois presence on the island were state sugar 
Contractors. Between 1830 and 1850, nearly 100 concessions to manufacture the 
commodity had been granted by the Indies Government, and by the end of that 
period there were around 180 individuals involved in owning or managing the 
factories concerned. The majority of such people were Europeans, generally from 
the Netherlands but also from the United Kingdom. Some were new or relatively 
new arrivals in the Indies, but others were individuals who had previous careers in 
the Indies and extensive ties to the Indies-born Dutch colonial community. Some 
belonged to what have already been described as Empire Families. A minority of 
Contractors, amounting to some 27 named individuals, were Chinese-Indonesians, 
who owned around a dozen of the colony's 'contract' sugar factories.258 Some of 
257 For Mauritius, see Allen, Slaves, Freedmen, and Indentured Labourers; for the Philippines, 
see e.g. Larkin, Sugar and Philippine Society; McCoy, 'A Queen Dies Slowly'; Aguilar, Clash 
of Spirits; Michael S Billig, 'The Death and Rebirth of Entrepreneurism on Negros Island, 
Philippines: A Critique of Cultural Theories of Enterprise', Journal of Economic Studies, 
vol. 28, no. 3, 1994, pp. 659-78. For Cuba, see e.g. Bergad, Cuban Rural Society; Franklin 
W Knight, 'Origins of Wealth and the Sugar Revolution in Cuba, 1750-1850', The Hispanic 
American Historical Review, vol. 57, no. 2, 1977, pp. 231-53; Gert J Oostindie, 'La Burguesia 
Cubana y sus Caminos de Hierro, 1830-1868', Boletin de Estudios Latinoamericanos y del 
Caribe, vol. 37, 1984, pp. 99-115.
258 For a Residency-by-Residency listing (circa 1856) of factories, their owners, general 
managers (administrateurs) and other interested parties, etc., see SU, Bijl. D.
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them, at least, were members of families who (as we saw in an earlier chapter) had 
long been connected to the island's sugar industry.
The Cultuurstelsel, Bourgeoisie and Bureaucratic Polity
The close and long-term involvement of the Indies state in the expansion of sugar 
production and the formation of capital implied by the system of contracts has 
had a profound impact on the historiography of the era. An older orthodoxy, still 
apparently deeply entrenched though not unchallenged, maintains that under the 
impress of the Cultuurstelsel Java evolved into a kind of bureaucratic polity avant 
le lettre. Virtually by definition, it was a polity in which the state and its officials 
monopolised access to resources.259 On this reading, bourgeois impulses were either 
stifled or, at best, relegated to the margins of society and economy. Such 'private' 
colonial entrepreneurial activity as did take place suffered from its 'pariah' status. 
One highly respected commentator has remarked (albeit only in passing) on what 
he perceived as a 'twenty-year struggle of the Kultuurstelsel's beamtenstaat against 
private colonial capital (1848-68).'260 A parallel reading stresses that the ostensible 
bourgeoisie of sugar Contractors and the like which emerged within the confines of 
the Stelsel was, in reality, composed of people who were no more than the privileged 
clients of a bureaucratic state. In modern parlance, they were 'ersatz' capitalists. 
Expressed somewhat differently, in a manner redolent of the 'good old days' — the 
afore-mentioned Tempo Doeloe — of a fancifully remembered Netherlands Indies of 
259 For a classic statement, see JS Furnivall, Netherlands India: A Study of Plural Economy, 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1939, p. 121: 'the Culture System grew until it 
overshadowed and blighted the whole economic organisation of the country, and nothing 
remained but the Government as a planter on a superhuman scale, with the NHM as its 
sole agent'. More recent literature, heavily focused on the impact of the Cultuurstelsel on the 
society and economy of rural Java (e.g. Elson, Village Java), has done little to open up the 
subject, though much of the work of Robert Van Niel (Java under the Cultivation System, 
and Northeast Coast) and C Fasseur (Colonial Exploitation; and Indischgasten, Amsterdam, 
Ooievaar, 1996) is pregnant with implications.
260 BRO'G Anderson, 'Old State and New Society: Indonesia's New Order in Comparative 
Historical Perspective', Journal of Asian Studies, vol. 42, no. 3, 1983, pp. 477-96, here p. 489 
(the Germanic spelling in the quotation is Anderson's own invention). The concept of the 
colonial beamtenstaat — a state run by an autonomous bureaucracy, largely for its own 
purposes — was given wide circulation by Harry J Benda (e.g. 'The Pattern of Administrative 
Reforms in the Closing Years of Dutch Rule in Indonesia', Journal of Asian Studies, vol. 25, 
no. 4, 1966, pp. 589-605, here pp. 591-3). It reflects, however, a set of assumptions about the 
'Indies state' which has a much older history.
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the nineteenth century, they were Suikerlords, variously 'feudal' or 'quasi-Oriental' in 
character.
According to this scenario — which is, as we shall see, a highly disputable 
one — the historical consequences of these developements were far-reaching. In 
the 1870s, under pressure from the metropolitan legislature, the Indies bureaucracy 
was forced to relinquish some degree of its economic control, though many facets 
of the Cultuurstelsel were gradually phased out rather than suddenly terminated. 
Commercial crisis in the following decade, however, when the world price of sugar 
suddenly fell by nearly half — revealing that the industry required large-scale new 
investment if it was to survive — finally settled the issue. Given the way in which 
the Stelsel had purportedly worked against their interests, there was no substantial 
local, Indies bourgeoisie to take the place of the state, and the way was open for 
metropolitan Dutch financial and commercial interests to step in. In one form or 
another, these interests continued to hold sway until the transfer of power to the 
Indonesian republic at the end of the 1940s. In the wake of the Cultuurstelsel, in short, 
Java developed along the 'classic' lines of a colony where the dominant dynamic was 
provided by metropolitan capital, albeit with significant variations brought about by 
the uncommon strength of its state bureaucracy.
On none of these broadly complementary readings did the Cultuurstelsel leave 
significant interstices in which 'private' colonial capital might hope to develop and 
in which an Indies bourgeoisie might be expected to flourish. Yet flourish it did, and 
for a variety of reasons. A crucial one was that the state in which the bourgeoisie 
was situated was far less hostile to its evolution than has sometimes been imagined. 
To be sure, there were significant and heated disputes between sugar Contractors 
and the Indies Government. More often than not, these disputes centred on two 
things: firstly, on the state's unwillingness to continue commandeering labour on 
the industry's behalf — or, more precisely, on the scale that the industry expected — 
and secondly, on the conditions under which the Contractors could dispose of their 
output. The two things were often linked. When world sugar prices were buoyant 
during the 1850s, Contractors wanted to be able to freely dispose of their sugar rather 
than have to deliver it to the Government at a fixed price. At the same time, they 
were hostile to any quid pro quo that reduced their access to compulsory labour.261 
261 Well-documented examples are to be found in Fasseur, Colonial Exploitation, pp. 198-9; 
and R Reinsma, Het Verval van het Cultuurstelsel, Den Haag, Van Keulen, 1955, p. 65.
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This was no mere paper war. In 1864, for example, commenting on the ongoing 
enactments by the metropolitan Government designed to 'reform' the relations 
between state and industry, the NHM's Batavia office (the factorij) observed — albeit 
with a certain degree of hyperbole — that for the majority of factories the latest 
regulation threatened a total 'annihilation of their enterprise' and that 'the future of 
the industry has never seemed darker than at present'.262 
To focus exclusively or even predominantly on such antagonisms, however, is 
bad history. Far from being representative of a fundamental and unswerving hostility 
to the emergence of 'private capital' on the part of state officials, these disputes were an 
integral part of the dynamics of an emergent bourgeoisie. More specifically, we need 
to take cognisance of the 'half-formed' character of the Indies colonial bureaucracy 
of the mid-nineteenth century.263 Rather than being an autonomous entity (as the 
beamtenstaat thesis would have it), this bureaucracy was an essentially porous one. As 
such, it was deeply permeated, as a number of historians have been quietly insisting in 
recent decades, by family and familiar relationships that bound together the interests 
of state officials with sugar manufacturers, estate-owners and partners in the colony's 
leading mercantile houses.264 In this overall context, we also need to recognise that 
(contrary to lingering notions on this score) Java under the Cultuurstelsel was not a 
'closed' colony shut off by Government monopoly to all but 'official' Europeans and 
state clients.265
The Indies State as Industry Financier
Compared to their counterparts elsewhere in the international sugar economy of the 
day, Java's sugar Contractors in the mid-nineteenth century were singularly fortunate. 
Their requirements for capital were significantly less than was the case in the New 
262 JVFB, vol. 39, 1863-4, pp. 35-45. For other contemporary comment on the difficulties 
facing the industry in the 1860s, see e.g. [Kamer van Nijverheid en Koophandel te Semarang], 
Memorie over de Suikerindustrie in de Governments Residentien van Midden Java, Semarang, 
Van Dorp, 1865; J Millard, De Suikerindustrie op Java, The Hague, Nijhoff, 1869.
263 Sutherland, Bureaucratic Elite, pp. 16, 35.
264 For notable examples, see Robert Van Niel, 'The Alfred A Reed Papers', Bijdragen tot de 
Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde, vol. 120, 1964, pp. 224-30; Rush, Opium to Java, pp. 118-19, 
147-9; Fasseur, Indischgasten, passim; Bosma & Raben, passim.
265 For a cogent argument against this position, see Ulbe Bosma, 'Het Cultuurstelsel en zijn 
Buitenlandse Ondernemers: Java tussen Oud en Nieuw Kolonialisme', Tijdschrift voor Sociale 
en Economische Geschiedenis, vol. 2, no. 2, 2005, pp. 3-28.
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World — and in other industry sectors elsewhere in Asia. The way in which the Java 
sugar industry functioned under the aegis of the Cultuurstelsel meant that would-be 
manufacturers did not have to stump up the money to buy a plantation, nor did they 
have to meet the capital costs of imported slaves or indentured labourers. Instead, 
their raw material came (as we saw in the previous chapter) from requisitioned 
peasant farm-land, and their workforce was amply available locally at minimal cost.
Nonetheless, the equipment used in manufacturing sugar had indeed to be 
paid for at fully commercial rates, and factories also required working capital to cover 
their annual running costs. The advanced steam-operated installations for the boiling 
house which both Lucassen and his erstwhile brother-in-law Jonkheer Otto Carel 
Holmberg de Beckfelt (both of whom we met earlier in this book) brought back 
with them to Java at the beginning of the 1840s are a case in point. Manufactured in 
France and Belgium by the celebrated firm of Derosne et Cail266, together with freight 
and insurance, the total cost of the package would have been in the region of 150 000 
to 200 000 guilders.267 The costs of such apparatus, moreover, were far from being a 
once-off affair. Factories needed to be continually upgraded if they were to keep up 
with the industrial revolution in sugar manufacture which was going on worldwide 
from the late eighteenth century onward. The Lucassens, for example, faced bills for 
installing a major new milling system for grinding their cane at the end of the 1850s, 
and later still had to find the money for a Multiple Effect.
Initially, some percentage of these costs was met out of the public purse. 
During the first two decades of operation of the Cultuurstelsel, the provision of state 
capital to contracting manufacturers took the form of low-interest loans from the 
Indies Government's treasury. On this basis, between 1830 and the late 1840s, the 
Indies Government lent something in excess of 8.5 million guilders to nearly 60 
sugar Contractors. The amounts of money involved varied very considerably. Some 
Contractors borrowed as little as 30 000 or 50 000 guilders, suggesting that the 
266 For Derosne et Cail, see Leidelmeijer, Grootbedrijf, pp. 150-5; and Curry-Machado, 
Cuban Sugar, pp. 37-8.
267 Leidelmeijer, Grootbedrijf, pp. 166-7. Lucassen was initially provided with 120 000 
guilders to buy Derosne et Cail apparatus at the beginning of the 1840s (and a further 130 000 
to build his factory — a sum so large that it must have included the cost of other equipment, 
possibly the mills for grinding the cane). However, the state's advances to Lucassen eventually 
amounted to 550 000 guilders, which would suggest that he spent considerably more than the 
initial 130 000 guilders on equipping both his factories.
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operations they sought to finance were very modest ones or, rather more probably, that 
they had other sources of finance. At the opposite end of the scale, four Contractors 
stood out in terms of the size of their loans, all over 400 000 guilders.
The list was headed by an Englishman, one William 'Jack' Stavers (mentioned 
earlier in the book), who was the front man for a small consortium of Dutch interests 
and to whom we shall return shortly. He and his associates received a massive 673 368 
guilders to build the Koning Willem II sugar factory in East Java's Surabaya Residency. 
Next were Holmberg and Lucassen, who between them were in receipt of more than 1 
million guilders (Lucassen got 555 000 guilders and Holmberg 488 000 guilders) for 
their adjoining factories near Tegal on the north coast of Central Java. The fourth and 
last of the 'big four' was one CFE Praetorius, who obtained a loan of 428 435 guilders 
in 1844 to upgrade the Phaiton sugar factory in the Oosthoek. Praetorius was the 
recently retired Director of Cultivations — the CEO of the Cultuurstelsel, one might 
say — who had begun a career as a Government official some two decades earlier, and 
might now look forward to a prosperous retirement. (In fact, he died two years later.) 
In all, the sugar industry accounted for more than four-fifths of the money dispersed 
by the Indies Government to foster large-scale commodity production during the 
formative phase of the Stelsel.268
In terms of developments elsewhere in the international sugar economy of 
the mid-nineteenth century, the provision of state finance on this scale was without 
parallel. In Cuba, the state authorities might assist the industry in all sorts of ways, 
not least by turning a blind eye to the continued, large-scale and 'illicit' importation 
of the black African slaves on whom the industry depended for its workforce. 
Nonetheless, direct financial subvention of the industry was unknown there, as 
was the case elsewhere in the New World and in those areas of Asia — notably the 
Mascerenes, Siam, Formosa, the Philippines and the Indian subcontinent — where 
the export production of sugar burgeoned during the mid-century decades. The 
unique importance to the Java industry of state finance embedded in the system of 
sugar contracts had, moreover, further ramifications that were of vital importance to 
the industrial project during its initial phase.
268 The data in this paragraph are derived from 'Cultuurinrigtingen op Java … tot Ultimo 
1844', Exh. 1.2.1847/22. GG Rochussen estimated in 1845 that around 10 million guilders 
had been expended on loans to sugar, tea and tobacco Contractors (see Fasseur, Colonial 
Exploitation, p. 92, fn. 40). This reflected the fact that capital required to process tea and 
tobacco was relatively modest (as no expensive machinery was involved).
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In particular, state finance bolstered the Java sugar Contractors at a time 
when the vagaries of the international price of the commodity might otherwise have 
brought the industrial project to its knees. For the first twenty or more years of their 
existence, the Contractors were (in effect) insulated from the impact of the world 
market. In addition to privileged, low-cost access to labour and raw material and to 
cheap finance from the public purse, they were guaranteed a fixed price for the sugar 
they delivered to the Indies Government's warehouses. This was no small matter. As 
one singularly acute scholar long ago pointed out, a fall in sugar prices in Amsterdam 
in the early 1840s meant that for several years — key years in the establishment of the 
industry — the Indies Government was paying its Contractors well over the market 
rate for the commodity.269 It was not the only way, however, in which the emergent 
bourgeoisie of sugar Contractors and their associates were able to manipulate their 
relations with the colonial state.
Bourgeois Snouts in the Trough and the Progress of the Industrial Project
There can be no serious doubt that during the mid-century decades the snouts of 
the bourgeoisie were to be found firmly positioned in the trough. It was, after all, 
their habit! What is highly disputable, however, is whether this amounted to the 
behaviour of mere 'rent seekers' or wealthy sinecurists.270 Much more convincingly, 
it is better designated in terms of the corruption and sheer graft naturally inseparable 
from successful capitalist entrepreneurship.271 Patently, a significant number of 
concessionaires were not content merely to exploit their privileged access to the state to 
269 Fasseur, Colonial Exploitation, pp. 86-91. The Java industry was being heavily subsidised 
by the Indies Government (which had signed twenty-year contracts to obtain sugar at a fixed 
price). In 1841 sugar was sold in Amsterdam for little more than 50 per cent of what the 
Indies Government had paid for it, and in 1840-44 the Indies Government lost well over 
8 million guilders on its sugar sales.
270 The point needs to be underlined because of the propensity in contemporary 'liberal' 
polemic against the Cultuurstelsel to cast the Contractors in general in precisely that role. As 
part of a more extensive and heterogeneous critique of the Stelsel itself, which developed in 
Holland during the 1850s and 1860s, the Contractors came to be anathematised as wealthy 
sinecurists, 'bekleed met eene geheime macht in der staat en daardoor aan de minachting van 
het volk prijs gegeven' ['clad with a secret power in the state and thereby deserving of popular 
contempt']. See Millard, Suikerindustrie, p. 58.
271 For a notable general discussion, see RT McVey, 'The Materialisation of the Southeast 
Asian Entrepreneur', in RT McVey (ed.), Southeast Asian Capitalists, Ithaca, NY, Cornell 
University, Southeast Asia Program, Studies in Southeast Asian History, 1992, pp. 8-21.
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guarantee a steady income from the sugar manufacturing. Instead, they were imbued 
with entrepreneurial ambitions, reflected in their taste, already demonstrated, 
for furthering the industrial project through the importation both of up-to-date 
machinery and of people qualified to operate and maintain it.
A remarkable case in point is what happened chez Lucassen after the family 
patriarch had repatriated to Holland at the beginning of the 1850s. Two of the 
Colonel's sons, the stepbrothers Theodore Nicolaas Reinier Lucassen (1830-1897) 
and Donald Francois Willem Lucassen (1837-1892), remained in Java to run the Tegal 
factories, thereby keeping things in the family, as was frequently the case throughout 
the industry. This was even though, as the family's chief financiers dryly observed, 
Donald Lucassen was a youth of very tender years with absolutely no experience of 
the sugar business.272 What the two stepbrothers lacked in expertise, however, they 
made up for in 'connection'.
In this case, their 'connection' was much enhanced as a result of their father's 
second marriage (in 1832) to Susanna Pietermaat, a young woman who was singularly 
well-connected in the 'Old Indies World'. She herself was the daughter of a Resident 
(and, one suspects, a formidable absentee dowager after the Colonel's death in The 
Hague in 1854). It was the marital history of her sisters, however, which really 
counted. Indeed, they made such good marriages as perhaps to make her reflect on 
her own 'choice' of husband. One of her sisters married a future Governor-General 
and subsequently Colonial Minister (Pieter Mijer), thereby shoring up this Empire 
Family's interest in both 'home' and the colony in a laudably economic fashion. 
Not to be outdone, however, another sister wed a man who subsequently became 
a member of the Council of the Indies, the Governor-General's supreme advisory 
body.273 As if this was not sufficient, among the Lucassen 'connection' in the Indies 
was yet another brother-in-law, Otto van Rees, the 'Coming Man' of the Indies 
bureaucracy (he was also related to Holmberg).274
The Lucassen brothers were to use this influence in Batavia to good effect in 
relation to the updating of their sugar factories in line with current global best practice. 
To squeals of outrage from The Hague, they persuaded the Indies Government to alter 
272 NFB, 5.12.1860/668.
273 NP, vol. 12, 1921-22, pp. 390-2.
274 For Otto van Rees, see Fasseur, Indischgasten, pp. 113-51.
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their contracts so as to give them the free disposal of most of the sugar they produced 
(which had previously been delivered to the Government at a fixed price).275 This was 
no mere windfall gain, however, for they promptly used the advantage they thereby 
gained as collateral for a substantial loan (from the NHM factorij) to enable them to 
buy new equipment.276
The classic example of the way in which the connection — and corruption 
— associated with the nexus between the state and the industrial project prevailing 
in Java sugar around the middle of the century might yet advance rather than retard 
the industrial project does not relate, however, to the Lucassens and their operations 
in Tegal. Rather, it relates to the great East Java sugar factory known as 'Koning 
Willem II' and to the nefarious dealings in The Hague which led to its establishment. 
The Government Contractor at the Koning Willem II factory — the man who held 
the concession to manufacture sugar there — was, as we have seen, William 'Jack' 
Stavers (1789-1864). Stavers was born to the east of the City of London in the 
dockland area of Rotherhithe.277 Perhaps his upbringing there accounted for a certain 
lack of polish. Leastways, he was described by one acquaintance who had known him 
275 Exh. 20.10.1859/17 & Exh.Geheim 29.2.1860/54; NFB, 29.9.1858/409; NFB, 
1.3.1859/449; NFB, 17.9.1859/512 & NFB, 17.1.1860/549; NHMR, 4796.
276 This enabled them to buy a state of-the-art steam mill (costing 80 000 guilders) from 
the London firm of Robinson. Contemporaneously, Holmberg's son-in-law and successor, 
Hubertus Hoevenaar (see below), borrowed 360 000 guilders from the NHM, and — like 
the Lucassens — entered into long-term consignment contracts with them, under the terms 
of which they provided him with annual working capital. See NFB, 2.3.1860/57; NHMR, 
4796.
277 See the 'Journal' of his brother, Thomas Reed Stavers, at http://www.du.edu/~ttyler/
ploughboy/trstaversjournal.htm (accessed 15 August 2014). For other information in the 
following paragraphs about Stavers, his career in Java and his connections in Holland see 
HG Nahuijs van Burgst, Herinneringen van het Openbare en Bijzondere Leven (1799-1849) 
van Mr HG Baron Nahuijs van Burgst, Utrecht, Gebroeders Muller, 1852, p. 13; see also 
the following documents from Letter Books of John Palmer, Bodleian Library, Oxford: John 
Palmer to William Stavers, 2.5.1825, Eng. Lett. c. 102, p. 68; John Palmer to Edward Watson, 
13.11.1832, Eng. Lett. c. 122, pp. 398-400; John Palmer to Gillian Maclaine, 6.4.1833, Lett. 
c. 123, p. 387. See also Willem van Hogendorp to GK van Hogendorp, 28.2.1826, NA, 
Collectie Van Hogendorp, 91; IB, 26.8.1823/23 & IB, 28.12.1824/13, MK, 2779 & 2786; 
Bataviasche Courant, 22 June 1822/25 & 13 November 1824/11; VMK, 17.11.1826/56; 
Stavers to Nahuijs, 17.10.1823, Nahuijs Papers, vol. 8, no. 3, Leiden Universiteits 
Bibliotheek, MSS 616; IB, 17.1.1834/9, MK, 2846; 'Aantoning der op Java gevestigde Suiker 




in Java in the early 1820s as
a very kind, excellent hearted rough fellow, in whose house I have spent many a 
happy day. He was formerly an officer of cavalry here, and after the island was 
given to the Dutch, settled at the Native Capital of Solo [Surakarta], where he 
has made some money …278
He may indeed have 'made some money' in the Vorstenlanden, but prior to becoming 
a sugar Contractor, Stavers's fortunes had been very mixed indeed. When the Java 
War broke out in 1825, the former cavalryman put his military experience to good use 
and performed sterling service for a suitably grateful colonial Government. Sometime 
after the war ended, however, he relocated to East Java, where, early in the 1830s, he 
became involved in the area's burgeoning sugar industry. It does not appear to have 
been an entirely happy experience. One contemporary letter speaks of
poor Jack Stavers … reduced to [overseer on] a sugar plantation after his 
enterprising, spirited and useful toils in various more distinguished courses of 
life. But he is well and in high feathers, you say …279
Subsequently, however, he became embroiled in a dispute with the Indies Government 
which saw him banned from living in the area, and the close of the 1830s found 
him back in England, where a further venture, involving running a coastal steamer, 
appears to have met with little success. At this point, however, his luck changed.
Stavers's contacts in Holland — all dating from his and their days together in 
Java in the previous decade — included the influential and ambitious Colonel Nahuijs 
van Burgst, formerly the Dutch Resident at the Court of Yogyakarta and, subsequently, 
Surakarta (indeed, early in 1830, Stavers had been managing a plantation belonging 
to Nahuijs in South-Central Java).280 Nahuijs was now retired and living back in the 
Netherlands, but he remained far from inactive in colonial circles. Indeed, there is 
some suggestion that he held out hopes of being appointed Governor-General. By the 
end of the 1830s, he and some of his friends were keen to get a stake in the profits 
of the Cultuurstelsel. What they needed, however, was a front man, since at least one 
of the would-be concessionaires was still on active service with the Indies Government 
278 Gillian Maclaine to John Gregorson, Salatiga, 29.5.1822, Gloucestershire Archives, 
Osborne-Maclaine, MSS D3330, Box 18.
279 John Palmer to Gillian Maclaine, 6.4.1833, Letter Books of John Palmer, Bodleian Library, 
Oxford, Eng. Lett.c. 123, p. 387.
280 Nahuijs to Merkus, 22.6.1830, in VMK, 13.5.1831/25-114.
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and hence formally disqualified. They also needed somebody who was prepared to go 
out to Java and look after their interests. Stavers, down on his luck — but with a great 
deal of experience in Java, and known to be reliable — was their choice.
How this small coterie of well-placed individuals succeeded in obtaining a 
sugar manufacturing concession in the first place, however, was something else again. 
Along with Nahuijs, the repatriated sugar Contractor and merchant Johann Erich 
Banck was also involved.281 Banck had made a great deal of money in East Java during 
the course of the 1830s and was what today would be called a 'white collar' criminal. 
Reviewing Banck's history a decade later, the Governor-General of the day was 
singularly unflattering, describing him as een schurk [a scoundrel] who had swindled 
the Indies Government and presumably anyone else who had the misfortune to be 
in his proximity. He had also played fast and loose with the funds of the Surabaya 
branch of the Javasche Bank (De Javasche Bank).282 None of this disqualified him, 
however, from standing surety, together with Nahuijs, for the huge loan that was 
part of the contract that Stavers was eventually awarded. Nonetheless, the key person 
concerned in obtaining the contract, albeit covertly, was the Dutch nobleman RL 
Van Andringa de Kempenaer. As an officer in the Indies army, Van Andringa de 
Kempenaer had fought, like Stavers himself, in the Java War and was an associate of 
Nahuijs. Most important of all, however, he was one of a select group of individuals 
with inside knowledge — obtained during his Java days — about an affair that had 
once threatened to engulf the Dutch king, Willem II, while Willem was still the 
youthful heir to the throne some two decades earlier.
Whether there had actually been a plot to assassinate his father, and whether 
the young Willem was involved in this plot, is immaterial. What mattered was that 
Van Andringa de Kempenaer knew about it from one of the 'conspirators' who had 
281 For Banck's career, see Ulbe Bosma, Koloniaal Circuit: De Migratie tussen Nederland en 
Indië 1816-1962, Amsterdam, IISG, 2009, pp. 40-2.
282 Rochussen to Baud, 26.6.1847 & Rochussen to Baud, 29.10.1847, in Jhr. Mr WA Baud, 
De Semi-Officiele en Particuliere Briefwisseling tussen JC Baud en JJ Rochussen, 1845-1851, 
vol. 2, Assen, Van Gorkom, 1983, pp. 262, 304, no. 3. Banck appears to have used the funds 
of the bank, of which he was local trustee, to finance his own business operations. See Baud, 
Briefwisseling Baud-Rochussen, vol. 3, p. 155, no. 4. Nonetheless, he declined to initiate a 
full investigation on the grounds that '… zulks kan, onder de gegeven omstandigheden, alleen 
strekken om hem [Banck] te plaatsen in een donkere ligt dan in hetwelk hij reeds geplaatst is' ['such 
an [investigation], under the prevailing circumstances, would only serve to depict Banck in an 
even worse light than is already the case'].
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been exiled to Central Java in its wake. As a result, he is widely thought to have 
been blackmailing the newly enthroned monarch, who succeeded his father late in 
1841, after the latter's characteristically impetuous departure from the throne and 
retirement to Berlin. Willem II was said subsequently to have lent Van Andringa 
de Kempenaer a large sum of money (at least 8000 guilders) to cover the latter's 
gambling debts, to be repaid from the profits of the sugar contract, a 50 per cent 
share in which was quietly transferred to him by Stavers soon after it was awarded by 
Colonial Minister JC Baud (without any reference to the Indies Government, which 
might normally have been expected to be consulted on such matters).283
The granting of the contract for the eponymously named sugar factory — it 
was indeed a nice touch to name it this way — was presumably one of the fruits of 
this endeavour. Nonetheless, the dealings that very evidently went into the making of 
the Willem II factory were by no means inimical to promoting the industrial project. 
Stavers and his backers secured state finance to the tune of a little under 700 000 
guilders, but they put some, at least, of their windfall to work in establishing Willem II 
as one of the largest and best equipped factories in mid-century Java. Indeed, in all 
probability, only the NHM's Wonopringgo surpassed it. In the late 1850s, the factory 
had 800 bau of cane planted on its behalf (making it, on this measure, the largest 
such enterprise in Java) along with steam-operated equipment in its boiling house 
manufactured by Derosne et Cail in Paris and the Glasgow firm of Napier. Output 
in 1856 was something over 2000 MT, making it the highest-producing factory in 
the colony.284
The state's largesse (such as it was) came to an end in respect to sugar industry 
finance at the close of the 1840s. Having hitherto primed the pump of bourgeois 
capital accumulation by providing a substantial part of the capital flowing into the 
industry, the state stopped making capital loans to Contractors in 1847. A little over 
a decade later, it also stopped providing them with annual subventions of working 
capital.285 Thereafter, industry finance was garnered outside the immediate orbit of 
283 On Van Andringa de Kempenaer and his involvement in blackmail, etc., see Baud, 
Briefwisseling Baud-Rochussen, vol. 1, p. 167, and the references therein; Fasseur, Colonial 
Exploitation, p. 187; WR Hugenholtz, Het Geheim van Paleis Kneuterdijk: De Wekelijkse 
Gesprekken van Koning Willem II met zijn Minister JC Baud over het Koloniale Beleid en de 
Herziening van de Grondwet 1841-1848, Leiden, KITLV Press, 2008, pp. 100, 111-12, 119.
284 See SU, Bijl. E, G & H.
285 Fasseur, Colonial Exploitation, pp. 92-3.
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the Government treasury. By far the greater part of it, moreover, came from sources 
operating within the colony itself. Indeed, the most immediately striking thing about 
the investment in sugar in Java in the mid-nineteenth century was the extent to 
which it took place without a direct call on metropolitan capital. Holland was not a 
particularly wealthy country and its overseas investment flows tended to go elsewhere 
than Java. As a result, the colony's mid-century industry, though it certainly drew on 
metropolitan capital to a limited extent, was predominantly financed from capital 
accumulated in the colony itself.
Flagship of the Bourgeoisie: The NHM factorij as Industry Financier
By the late 1850s, arrangements for the provision of capital to the sugar industry had 
departed substantially from their initial moorings. The state took a back seat, and in 
its place a substantial amount of the finance available for the industrial project came 
from Batavia Branch Office — otherwise the factorij — of the NHM. Indeed, at one 
time or another in the 1850s and 1860s, the factorij financed (in one mode or another) 
almost 20 per cent of Java's 'contract' sugar factories. Nonetheless, the NHM's role is 
in need of some clarification. As a heavily capitalised commercial and (subsequently) 
banking corporation founded under royal patronage in the Netherlands in 1824, it 
could be regarded, at least in its mid-century manifestation, as essentially an arm of 
the metropolitan state and as strongly representative of metropolitan interests. In fact, 
however, neither of these suppositions is entirely correct.
Not for the first time on the colonial frontier, the tail often managed to wag 
the dog. This was certainly true of the dynamics of the relationship between the 
NHM's metropolitan headquarters and its Indies branch. Around the middle of the 
century, and even allowing for the newly minted speed of communication made 
possible by the development of the so-called Overland Mail route, the 'turnaround' 
time for letters to and from the Indies can scarcely have been less than twelve weeks, 
and could well have been much more. To be sure, the telegraph linked Amsterdam 
to Batavia (via Singapore) by the end of the 1860s, but this mode of communication 
remained both cumbersome and expensive, while the mail from Holland still took 
well over a month to reach Java. The result was that close or detailed management by 
Head Office was all but impossible. Local interests tended to override attempts in the 
centre to exert authority.
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This aspect of the dynamics of the relationship between centre and periphery 
is only one part of the story. The other part concerns how we 'read' the NHM in 
relation to the state. It still remains possible to construe the role of the NHM as 
evidence that the Indies bourgeoisie was too under-developed to take over where 
the Indies Government had left off, and that in consequence the financing of the 
industry had to be taken over by a body intimately linked to the state. Yet this view 
risks misconceiving the real situation. Indeed, altogether more plausible is the view 
that the Batavia factorij was so effectively 'infiltrated' in the mid-century decades by 
local, colonial interests as to become, at least temporarily, the flagship (along with the 
Javasche Bank)286 of the emergent Indies bourgeoisie.
During the period 1840-80, to cite some prime evidence for this thesis, the 
senior management of the factorij was overwhelmingly composed of individuals 
who had come out to the Indies as young men in junior positions and who had 
been absorbed through marriage and acquaintance into the Indies milieu — more 
specifically, into the ranks of the local bourgeoisie. Notably, only one President of the 
factorij during this period (the resonantly named Nicholaas van Taack Tra Kranen, 
1859-66) was an 'expatriate' manager, sent out from the metropolitan Head Office 
— and his dispatch was a highly particular response to the murder of his recently 
appointed predecessor by a household servant.287 For the rest, the factorij's top 
personnel were people whose 'business culture' had been shaped pre-eminently by 
their experience in the colony and whose connections and loyalties were more likely 
to be rooted in the Indies than in Holland.
Take, for example, Jan Louis van Gennep (1820-1873), President of the factorij 
in the early 1870s. Born in The Hague, van Gennep arrived in the Indies in his 
twenties, and by the age of thirty-one he was the NHM's agent at Padang on the west 
coast of Sumatra. He evidently impressed his employers, because within a decade he 
was appointed as the firm's agent in Surabaya, the de facto commercial capital of the 
286 For a reassessment of the Javasche Bank's role in assisting the growth of the Indies 
bourgeoise, see Alexander Claver, Dutch Commerce and Chinese Merchants in Java: Colonial 
Relationships in Trade and Finance, 1800-1942, Brill, Leiden and Boston, 2014, passim. It 
should be noted, however, that the bank's statutes prohibited it from becoming a direct 
investor in the sugar industry or any other agricultural ventures. This would not appear to 
have stopped it from lending money to firms that were direct investors.
287 See the genealogy of the leading personnel of the NHM Factorij Batavia, 1826-1884, 
researched by Peter Christiaans (see Christiaans, forthcoming). On the murder of Jan 
Constantin Teengs in June 1859, see Factorij to A'dam, 20.6.1859/176.
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Indies. It was there that he met and married his wife, the Indies-born Anna Paulina 
Morrees (1826-1863), scion of an elite colonial family long-established in the colony. 
By 1867, he had been transferred to Batavia, where he was one of the small group of 
top executives at the factorij, before being promoted, finally, to the position of CEO. 
He died while on leave in Holland some three years later.288
Consistent with this local identification was the factorij's vigorous advocacy 
during the 1860s of the interests of Java's colonial sugar factories against attempts 
by the metropolitan Government to alter the terms on which the industry interacted 
with the state.289 Equally indicative was the factorij's behaviour toward its Java 
clients. In the mid-1870s, for example, the factorij extended further credit to bail 
out Donald Lucassen — one of the late Colonel Lucassen's two sugar-manufacturer 
sons — at his Tegal factory, ignoring the protest telegraphed from the corporation's 
Amsterdam office (on 11 October 1876) that 'we do not approve transaction entered 
into regarding Doekoewringin'.290
What the Lucassen case is also indicative of, however, is the extent to which, 
during the 1850s and 1860s (there was some falling-off towards the end of the latter 
decade), the factorij had developed extensive financial links with the sugar industry. 
Some of its investment took the form of working capital, provided on an annual basis 
and in return for consignment of that year's output. Altogether more important, 
however, were the capital loans that the factorij made to individual producers — like 
Donald Lucassen — secured in the form of mortgages on their factories. A rough 
calculation would be that by the end of the 1860s, the NHM factorij had invested 
nearly 6.5 million guilders in the sugar industry in this form. NHM investment 
was at its strongest in the sugar belt along the north coast of Central Java but fairly 
weak in the rich sugar districts of East Java. There and elsewhere — notably in the 
Vorstenlanden — the finance needed to support the industrial project came from 
different sources.291
288 NP, vol. 9, 1918, pp. 122-3.
289 See, e.g., JVFB, vol. 39, 1863-64, pp. 35-45.
290 NHMR, 4796-4797. Part of the problem was that Donald Lucassen's mother (Susanna 
Lucassen-Pietermaat) had a mortgage on the factory for 145 000 guilders — and an 
outstanding claim for 15 000 guilders in interest.




The Sugar Industry and the Indies Merchant Houses
The emergence of an Indies bourgeoisie was based not simply on the manufacture 
of sugar but also on trade in sugar and other commodities. It is one of the persistent 
myths about Java in the mid-nineteenth century that until the Cultuurstelsel itself was 
formally dismantled from about 1870 onward, the NHM (as the agent for the sale of 
the Stelsel's output) effectively monopolised the trade in Java's main commodities. In 
fact, nothing could be further from the truth.292 The emergent bourgeoisie was closely 
associated not only with the NHM but also with the growth of merchant houses at 
Batavia and the other major ports of Semarang and Surabaya. In turn, this growth 
was fueled from around the mid-century onward by profits from the trade in sugar 
and other colonial commodities. The figures from the Indies Government's trade 
statistics tell their own story. By 1860, in terms of value, mercantile firms other than 
the NHM accounted for 46 per cent of the Netherlands Indies' total export trade, 
and for some 65 per cent of the export value of Java sugar itself. A decade later, in 
1870, the comparable figures were 51 and 72 per cent.293
As far as Java's contract sugar factories were concerned, the immediate point 
of connection with the growing colonial mercantile community of the island's three 
major ports was the insistence of the Indies Government on borgen [guarantors] for 
the contracts that the concessionaires entered into. Some of these guarantors were 
people of little substance or, somewhat surprisingly perhaps, other Contractors. A 
goodly number of them, however, were partners in the colony's European mercantile 
houses. The substantial Batavia firm of Paine Stricker & Co was an example.294 Two 
of the firm's partners — Alfred A Reed, a businessman born in New England, and 
the Dutchman EW Cramerus — were guarantors for a quasi-contract sugar factory 
in the north coast of Central Java, whose output they no doubt acquired in return.295
292 G Roger Knight, 'Rescued from the Myths of Time: Toward a Reappraisal of European 
Mercantile Houses in Mid-Nineteenth Century Java, c. 1830-1870' (forthcoming).
293 The relevant data (and an authoritative commentary) are in WL Korthals Altes, Changing 
Economy in Indonesia (12A), General Trade Statistics 1822-1940, Amsterdam, Royal Tropical 
Institute, 1991, pp. 13ff., 142-6. Others have touched on the point, e.g. Vincent JH Houben, 
'Private Estates in Java in the Nineteenth Century: A Reappraisal', in Thomas J Lindblad 
(ed.), New Challenges in the Modern Economic History of Indonesia, Leiden, Programme of 
Indonesian Studies, 1993, pp. 47-66.
294 Knight (forthcoming).
295 AA Reed (on whom see Van Niel, 'Alfred A Reed') and the Dutchman EW Cramerus 
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For such people, the attraction of standing as guarantor lay in the possibility 
of favourable access to the Contractor's 'free disposal' sugar — the part of the 
factory's output which the manufacturer was not obliged to deliver to the Indies 
Government's warehouses. The percentage of free disposal sugar on the local market 
stood at around 25 per cent circa 1850, and thereafter increased significantly, in 
tandem with the Government's backing away from the overall package of support 
which it had hitherto provided (which included capital loans, working capital and 
unlimited access to semi-servile labour).296 Indeed, by 1860 around half of the output 
of Java's contract factories took the form of free disposal sugar, as was likewise the case 
at the end of the decade.297 Standing as a guarantor for a particular sugar Contractor, 
moreover, also appears to have been part of a wider arrangement in which merchant 
houses in the colony acted as middlemen for overseas principals with a stake in the 
industry. The very solid and long-lived Batavia merchant house of Reijnst & Vinju, 
for example, stood as surety for the Contractors at several East Java sugar factories in 
which their 'correspondents' in Holland, the great Rotterdam firm of Van Hoboken, 
also had an interest.298
Arrangements of this kind were not without their hazards. Early in the 1860s, 
in particular, a wave of bankruptcies among colonial merchant houses and their 
clients threatened the whole edifice of mercantile credit to the industrial project. The 
biggest collapse was that of the firm of Schimmelpenninck & Co, whose operations 
in Batavia and Surabaya embraced mainly sugar and tobacco, and whose clients 
included a prominent — and very well-connected — sugar Contractor, Anton baron 
were guarantors for the Lemahabang factory in Tegal Residency. (See 'Kultuurinrigtingen NI 
1861', Exh. 29.1.1863/5). Both men were partners (together with ARJ Cramerus) in Paine 
Stricker & Co., Batavia correspondents (1845-67) of the well-known Amsterdam firm of Van 
Eeghen & Co — see J Rogge, Het Handelshuis Van Eeghen, Amsterdam, Van Ditmar, 1949, 
pp. 206-66. Paine Stricker had interests in other sugar factories in Cirebon and Krawang, 
where Reed and Cramerus were borgen for the Sindanglaut and Sindang Blender sugar factories 
in the former Residency and for the Wonosepie factory in the latter. See 'Kultuurinrigtingen 
NI 1852 & 1853', Exh. 17.3.1854/4 & 21.3.1855/15.
296 At the beginning of the 1850s, around 25 per cent of the sugar produced by contract 
manufacturers was 'free disposal', i.e. they could sell it on their own account rather than 
deliver it to the Government. See Fasseur, Colonial Exploitation, pp. 91-2.
297 Creutzberg, Export Crops, Table 7 — comparison of lines 3 and 7.
298 Van Hoboken was initially associated in two East Java sugar factories with JE Banck (see 




van Oldruitenborgh.299 Among other major businesses that went to the wall at this 
time was the firm of Ommeren Rueb. Operating in Batavia for more than twenty 
years, it had been regarded as one of the 'most solid' of Java's European mercantile 
houses. Willem van Ommeren had been on the board of directors of the Javasche 
Bank, the colony's main financial institution, and both he and his partner, William 
Rueb, came from substantial merchant families in Rotterdam.300
A major contributory factor to the firm's collapse was the sudden death of 
one of their major clients, Johannes Herderschee, in May 1862. Herderschee's career 
in mid-century Java is important on a number of counts. As well as exposing debts 
reportedly approaching 3 million guilders — the lion's share of which was said to 
be owed to Ommeren Rueb — Herderschee's post-mortem insolvency also sheds 
considerable light on the financing of commodity production in general.301 It also 
has something to say about the dynamics of the beamtenstaat in which commodity 
production was purportedly embedded.
Johannes Eliza Herderschee was born in Amsterdam in 1813 and arrived in 
the Indies during the 1830s. Shortly before his death, he had come to prominence 
— at least among people who knew and cared about these things — through his 
role in the so-called Simbang Affair. The Affair revolved around the recruitment of 
labour for work at Herderschee's big sugar factory — a non-contract operation — at 
Simbang in the Pekalongan Residency on the north coast of Central Java. At least 
according to his own account, the Affair pitted the factory owner against the Indies 
Government's Resident there, one FHJ Netscher. Perhaps more than coincidentally, 
Thomas Edwards, while administrateur at Wonopringgo, had himself clashed with 
Netscher only a few years earlier. The Affair ended in the Resident's discomfiture 
and premature retirement to Holland — hardly an indication of the all-consuming 
beamtenstaat alluded to earlier, in which the interests and agenda of an essentially 
homogeneous and autonomous officialdom supposedly enjoyed an unquestioned 
dominance.
The background to the Simbang Affair, moreover, reinforces an altogether 
broader conclusion about sugar capital in Java in the mid-nineteenth century, in so far 
299 Knight (forthcoming); Fasseur, Colonial Exploitation, pp. 169-72; NFB, 11.2.1863/ 827.
300 JVFB, vol. 38, 1862-3, pp. 20-5.
301 FHJ Netscher, Regt en Onregt of de Toestand der Gewestelijke Besturen in Indie tegenover de 
Particuliere Industrie, The Hague, HC Susan, 1864, pp. 41-3.
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as it reveals the debateable nature of attempts — both at the time and subsequently — 
to juxtapose 'private' capital with the operations of the state's Cultuurstelsel. In fact, 
the putative divide between the two was at least as porous as it was contested and, 
in so far as the emergent bourgeoisie and their promotion of the industrial project 
were concerned, notions of a 'state' as opposed to a 'private' sphere are somewhat 
overdrawn. The world of Contractors working for the Indies Government was not 
self-contained or autonomous; nor was it fundamentally in conflict with 'private' 
capital. Instead, state ('contract') and non-Government (aka 'private') enterprises in 
sugar (and other commodities) largely complemented each other, and individuals and 
firms moved easily — and profitably — between them.
Established during the 1830s as a commodity trader in Batavia (where he 
married Johanina Clasina Kool in November 1834), Herderschee appears, even then, 
to have been an individual of some substance and connection, for he belonged to 
the 'The Star in the East' Freemason's Lodge and was an officer of the City Guard 
or Schutterij. Suggestive, furthermore, of well-rounded bourgeois interests is the fact 
that he was a member of both the Batavia Society of the Arts and Sciences, one 
of the oldest such foundations in the colonial 'East', and of the recently founded 
Netherlands Indies Society for Industry.302 Evidently, he prospered. During the course 
of the following twenty years he came to own the Simbang factory on the north 
coast of Central Java and another in the Vorstenlanden.303 It was there, in Central 
Java, that during the mid-century decades a significant number of entrepreneurs 
established a substantial sugar industry that exploited the area's cheap, semi-servile 
labour. The Javanese aristocracy of the Princely Courts sought to profit from this 
situation by leasing their landholdings to European planters with whom they also 
mingled socially.304
Herderschee was obviously at home in this world, as well as in the so-called 
Government Lands down on the coast, where he also had a presence within the 
contract system established under the Cultuurstelsel. His brother's wife was a daughter 
of the 'notorious' Contractor Louis Vitalis, owner of the Sragie sugar factory, located, 
as was Herderschee's own, in Pekalongan Residency. Vitalis was notorious on account 
302 Respectively, the Bataviaasch Genootschap van Kunsten en Wetenschappen, and the 
Nederlandsch-Indische Mij. van Nijverheid. See IN, vol. 7, 1994, p. 205.
303 NHMR, 4796.
304 See Bosma, 'Sugar and Dynasty', pp. 73-94.
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of his decades-long battle with the Indies bureaucracy of which — as an Inspector 
of Cultivations — he had once been a senior member. He was likewise notorious 
for his role as a prominent absentee proprietor who had retired to live in Paris once 
the factory was operational. Herderschee's connection with Vitalis, however, was not 
simply that of family. At one time or another, according to his own account at least, 
he both helped finance Sragie and even, at one time, managed operations there.305
Herderschee's capital seems to have come from a number of sources. He had a 
relatively small loan (160 000 guilders) from the Widows' Pension Fund for Officers 
in the Netherlands Indies Army. Another 700 000 guilders or more of his capital 
represented the investment in his business of a number of individuals living in the 
colony. The bulk of the funds available to him, however, came in the form of credit 
extended by Ommeren Rueb, said to amount to 1.7 million guilders.306 In short, he 
was evidently a well-connected — as well as persuasive — capitalist entrepreneur 
of some standing, whose interests embraced both the state contract system and the 
'private' business and investment world that grew up alongside and in conjunction 
with it. Hardly surprisingly in the circumstances, the crisis of 1862-63, in which 
Ommeren Rueb and Herderschee were so deeply implicated, caused a deal of havoc 
in the small community of Indies merchants and the manufacturers and planters with 
whom they associated.
Notwithstanding this, the secular trend was toward the growth in investment 
in sugar by the cream of Java's mercantile bourgeoisie. One of the key companies was 
the Maclaine Watson 'group', consisting of a trio of firms based in Batavia (Maclaine 
Watson), Semarang (McNeill & Co) and Surabaya (Fraser Eaton & Co). All three 
were founded within ten years of each other and their interests, commercial and 
plantation, sprawled across Java. The founder of the Batavia house, Gillian Maclaine 
(1798-1840) had married very well indeed into official and 'old' landowner circles 
in the colony, and one of his successors in the business, his cousin Donald Maclaine 
of Lochbuie, did even better: among his in-laws were a Governor-General and the 
President of the NHM factorij.307 The Maclaine businesses were big in the 'private' 
305 De Zaken van het Land Simbang Nader Toegelicht (Uitegeven door de Kommissie van 
Liquidatie des Boedels van Wijlen den Heer JE Herderschee), The Hague, Nijhoff, 1866, p. 72. 
On the Herderschee family's relationship to Vitalis, see IN, vol. 1, 1934, p. 16.
306 NHMR, 4796; Netscher, Regt en Onregt, pp. 41-3.
307 Donald Maclaine (1816-1863) married Emilie Vincent in Batavia in 1844. Subsequently, 
her sister Elizabeth (who died young) married Governor-General (and subsequently leading 
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sector, and at one stage had investments in the Vorstenlanden — that is to say, outside 
the sphere of the state's own operations in commodity production. At the same 
time, however, they were also heavily involved in the Cultuurstelsel, as themselves the 
owners of contract sugar factories and as the financiers and guarantors [borgen] of 
other Contractors.308 By the 1880s, they were very big indeed in sugar, and in 1884 it 
was reckoned that the Maclaines and their associates in Semarang and Surabaya were 
reliably reckoned to have bought around 40 per cent of the colony's total sugar crop, 
much of it from factories 'in which they had an interest'.309
How much 'colonial' money was invested in the industrial project? The well-
placed contemporary whom we met at the beginning of this chapter, the Koloniale 
Bank's Jan Hudig, estimated (in the wake of the crisis of the mid-1880s) that 
100 million guilders had been invested in the colony's export agricultural sector in 
the decade or so prior to 1884, and that as much as 75 per cent of that money had 
come from within the Indies.310 His larger argument was that the so-called Suikerlords 
had ploughed the 'greater part' of their profits into improvements to existing factories, 
into building new factories, and even into agricultural ventures outside the immediate 
range of the industry itself.311
Metropolitan Investment: The 'Big Five' of the Period 1860-84
The Indies bourgeoisie did not stand alone in making investments such as those 
described by Hudig, and they cannot be viewed in isolation from, and juxtaposed 
with, those of their metropolitan counterparts. Indeed, quite the contrary: it had 
long been the case that Dutch metropolitan commercial and financial networks had 
worked together with the colonial bourgeoisie. In turn, this constituted an important 
Dutch parliamentarian) Jan Jacobus Rochussen; another sister married CA Granpré Molière, 
partner [lid] and subsequently President [CEO] of the NHM factorij in Batavia; and a brother 
married Anna Catherina Hofland, daughter of TB Hofland, one of the colony's richest 
landowners and sugar manufacturers. See IN, vol. 2, 1988-9, p. 50; IN, vol. 16, 2003, pp. 1-7.
308 In the 1850s, for example, one of the partners in Fraser Eaton was also co-owner of a sugar 
factory in Kediri in East Java (SU, Bijl. D); for Fraser Eaton, Maclaine Watson & A McNeill 
& Co as borgen in a number of factories in Surabaya and the Oosthoek, see 'Kultuurinrigtingen 
op Java 1852', Exh. 17.3.1854/4. In West Java, Maclaine Watson owned at least one major 
sugar factory, in Cirebon Residency: see NHMR, 4976.
309 JVFB, vol. 59, 1884, p. 7.
310 Hudig, Suikerlords, p. 28.
311 Hudig, Suikerlords, pp. 16-23.
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dynamic of bourgeois capital formation in colonial Java between the 1850s and 
the 1880s. Back in the 1850s, for instance, several of the Java firms that acted as 
guarantors for sugar contracts were closely connected to commodity traders in the 
Netherlands. The well-known Rotterdam firm of Van Hoboken and the Amsterdam 
firm of Van Eeghen were cases in point. From the early 1860s, following in the 
wake of the commercial crisis in Java discussed earlier, the connections became 
more institutionalised. Financial and mercantile capital came together, for example, 
in setting up the Nederlandsch-Indische Handelsbank [Netherlands Indies Trading 
Bank] and the Credit en Handelsvereeniging 'Rotterdam' [The Credit and Commerce 
Association 'Rotterdam'], better known as Internatio.312 In consequence, there were 
increasing inflows of metropolitan capital into Java sugar during the 1870s and early 
1880s.
This was well ahead, that is to say, of the sugar crisis of 1884, which has often 
been seen as the critical date for the onset of such investment. As Hudig argued, 
however, the extent of this metropolitan investment should not be overestimated. 
Nor was 1870 — the date of the legislation in the Dutch Parliament which laid the 
legal groundwork for the dismantlement of the Cultuurstelsel and hence notionally 
'opened up' the colony for 'private' investment — anything like the watershed 
historians have sometimes assumed it to have been. As one authority has remarked, 
'there was absolutely no question of private [metropolitan] entrepreneurs taking Java 
by storm after that year'.313 Conversely, they and their associates had already been 
there for decades.
For several of these early 'metropolitan' investors, moreover, the experience of 
investing capital in agricultural speculations in Java was hardly a happy one. Internatio, 
one of the original metropolitan investors from a decade earlier, appears to have burnt 
its fingers as a direct investor in sugar factories in the 1870s. The firm subsequently 
confined itself to the modest provision of working capital and associated consignment 
312 NP van den Berg, Munt-, Crediet- en Bankwezen, Handel en Scheepvaart in Nederlandsch 
Indië: Historisch-statistische Bijdragen, The Hague, Nijhoff, 1907, pp. 115-30. On the 
Handelsbank in particular, see WL Korthals Altes, Tussen Cultures en Kredieten: Een Institutionele 
Gescheidenis van de Nederlandsch-Indische Handelsbank en Nationale Handelsbank, 1863-1964, 
Amsterdam, Nederlands Instituut voor het Bank, Verzekerings-en-Effectenbedrief, 2004.
313 C Fasseur, 'Purse or Principle: Dutch Colonial Policy in the 1860s and the Decline of 
the Cultivation System', Modern Asian Studies, vol. 25, no. 1, 1991, pp. 33-52, here p. 42.
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contracts.314 The Handelsbank had a significant enough portfolio of sugar and other 
agricultural investments by the time of the 1884 crisis for it to come within a hair's 
breadth of disaster.315 Like Internatio, however, the Handelsbank had held back from 
any major investment in the building of new factories or the renovation of old ones. 
It had 'relations' with some thirty factories, and nearly 13 million guilders invested 
in cultuurrelaties [plantation investements] in general, though these consisted (so it 
would appear) of working capital-consignment contracts.316
On the capital investment front, only the Koloniale Bank and the NHM were 
more ambitious. In the early 1880s, the NHM factorij owned, or largely controlled, 
a string of sugar factories along Java's Northeast Coast.317 The total value of such 
capital investments (by that date the firm had reduced its involvement in purely 
consignment contracts) amounted to something in excess of 3 million guilders.318 In 
comparison with its smaller rivals, this figure might seem on the low side: however, 
the factorij had become cautious in its agricultural investments by the early 1880s 
— which is no doubt one of the reasons that it escaped the crisis of 1884 with 
relatively little damage. Meanwhile, the newly arrived Koloniale Bank, established 
in 1881, had become involved in financing five new factories and in working on 
314 The amount of sugar involved in such contracts was fairly inconsiderable: as late as 1883 
it amounted to around 12 300 MT, less than 4 per cent of Java's total output. The information 
relating to Internatio's investments in sugar in the years prior to 1885 comes from Jaarverslagen 
Internatio, 1863-1887, Gemeente Archief Rotterdam, Archief van de Internationale Crediet-
en-Handelsvereeniging 'Rotterdam' (Internatio), Inventaris no. 76. I am grateful to Drs Jasper 
van de Kerkhof for kindly supplying me with this information.
315 Van den Berg, Muntwezen, pp. 212-14; Kortes Altes, Tussen Cultuures en Kreditien, 
pp. 99-143.
316 JCF Schor (Directeur Koloniale Bank, 1940-45), 'Gedenkboek Koloniale Bank' [MSS], 
NA, Archief Koloniale Bank, 2.20.04/883, pp. 91-4; Jaarverslagen NI Handelsbank, 1865-
1884, NA, Archief Nederlandsch-Indische Handelsbank, p. 190; Van den Berg, Muntwezen, 
pp. 203-5.
317 That is to say, the factorij directly owned some factories, such as Wonopringgo (Pekalongan) 
and Kemantran (Tegal), whereas in the case of others such as Kalimatie (Pekalongan) the 
owners were so deeply in debt to the factorij that the latter exercised de facto control over 
them.
318 This is calculated on the basis of information about the book value of its own sugar 
factories (950 000 guilders) and loans to other manufacturers in JVFB, vol. 57, 1882, 
pp. 55-8; & JVFB, vol. 59, 1884, p. 71. Given the somewhat fragmentary nature of the 
evidence, it may be that this figure (of capital sugar investments only) somewhat understates 
the factorij's total commitment.
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exclusive capital-consignment arrangements with four more. Its total investment in 
sugar by 1884 amounted to the better part of 6 million guilders.319 The last of the 
'new arrivals' — its founders had already been operating in Java for a decade — was 
the Handelsvereeniging Amsterdam [Commercial Assocation 'Amsterdam'], though 
its investments remained modest — a little over 1 million guilders in 1884 — until 
the late 1880s.320
A Financial Enigma: The Place of Chinese-Indonesian Capital
Not only the colony's European mercantile houses and, towards the end of our period, 
metropolitan trading houses and financiers were engaged in providing capital to 
industrial projects in sugar. Back in the 1830s, for example, when the shady Surabaya 
businessman Johann Erich Banck and his partners, the Hofland brothers, needed 
money to finance their operation in sugar on behalf of the Indies Government, the 
people to whom they turned belonged to the Chinese-Indonesian communities that 
had flourished in the city and the adjacent Oosthoek districts since the mid-eighteenth 
century or earlier. Apart from the Dutch, Indies-Dutch and British components of 
the emergent bourgeoisie, that is to say, there was also a Chinese-Indonesian one 
(and, although harder to discern in present evidence, an Arab and an Armenian one). 
The role of such capital, probably locally or regionally generated, was a significant 
factor in the mid-century promotion of the industrial project. Given the importance 
of Chinese capital, in particular, throughout the nineteenth-century Nanyang in 
China's southern seas, this could hardly have been otherwise. The problem is to trace 
the capital and access its relative importance.
Until late in the century, opium farm revenues and the profits of the trade in 
Java's interior to which the farms gave de facto access are generally considered to have 
formed the basis for capital accumulation among the Chinese-Indonesian element of 
the colony's nineteenth-century bourgeoisie.321 Prior to 1830, the Chinese had run 
the great bulk of the island's sugar industry, and their capital was not easily displaced 
thereafter, nor found to be dispensable. Among the sugar Contractors, as we have 
319 The exact sum was 5 712 000 guilders (with another 1 621 000 invested in coffee 
plantations). See Schor, 'Gedenkboek', pp. 18, 73.
320 Claver, Dutch Commerce and Chinese Merchants, pp. 88-9; Alexander Claver, 'The 
Colonial Flow of Trade, Credit and Information: The Chinese-Arab Clientele System of Van 
Beek, Reineke and Co/HVA (1870s-1880s)', Itinerario, vol. 26, no. 2, 2012, pp. 113-21.
321 Rush, Opium to Java, pp. 83-107.
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seen, there was a minority Chinese-Indonesian presence during the Cultuurstelsel. 
Chinese interests also had capital invested with European Contractors.
This was where Banck and the Hofland brothers came into the picture.322 
Around the mid-century, it was reliably reported that the Hoflands — who were East 
Java sugar Contractors and also the proprietors, as we have already seen, of the huge 
P&T estate in West Java — owed 'great sums of money' to the recently deceased 
Chinese merchant Kwee Yang Ho. The latter's family also owned several contract 
factories in East Java, dating from the early years of the Stelsel.323 The Hoflands' long-
term business associate, Johann Erich Banck, was likewise heavily involved.324 Banck 
had begun business in Surabaya in the mid-1820s325, and evidently put the close ties 
he had subsequently developed with the Chinese-Indonesian business community in 
East Java to good use in exploiting the possibilities opened up by the introduction of 
the Cultuurstelsel in that part of the colony. Inter alia, he subcontracted a concession 
he had obtained from the Indies Government for the delivery of large quantities of 
sugar to nearly a score of local Chinese sugar makers throughout the Oosthoek. Perhaps 
most important of all, he was the long-time business partner of the 'Captain China' 
of Surabaya, the Goan Tjing, the most powerful Chinese-Indonesian businessman in 
the area. He and Banck owned the large Tjandi sugar factory just outside the city, an 
enterprise that was still in operation a century later.326
322 On the Hoflands, see Bosma and Raben, pp. 126-7 and (for their East Java dealings in 
the 1830s) Van Niel, Northeast Coast, pp. 368-70.
323 See 'Extract Kontracten … Vervaardigen en Verzending Stoomtoestellen tot het Kooken 
van Suiker', NA, NHM, 7999, file 588. For the Kwee family, and for their factories in East 
Java in the mid-1850s, see Claudine Salmon, 'The Han Family of East Java: Entrepreneurship 
and Politics (18th-19th Centuries)', Archipel, vol. 41, 1991, pp. 53-87, here p. 84; SU, Bijl. D.
324 Banck was the Contractor for two large factories in Pasuruan Residency. He was born in 
Schleswig in 1797 and died in The Hague in 1857. For more information about his connection 
with the Goan Tjing, mentioned shortly, see SU, Bijl. D; Tjoa Tjwan Phing & JJ Moolenaar, 
125 Jaren Tjandi, 1832-1957, Surabaja, Fuhri & Co, 1957, pp. 15-22.
325 From the beginning of 1824, Banck was a member of the firm of Jessen Trail & Co 
(Junior) of Surabaya (Bataviasche Courant, 24 January 1824/4), founded by Josias Jessen & 
David Trail four years earlier (Bataviasche Courant, 30 September 1820/40). Following David 
Trail's death on 5 June 1824 (Bataviasche Courant, 19 June 1824/25), the firm was continued 
as Jessen & Co, with Banck as a partner (Bataviasche Courant, 11 December 1824/50). The 
firm was dissolved as of 31 October 1827, and Banck continued in business as Banck & Co 
(Javasche Courant, 20 October 1827/99).
326 For the Tjandi [Candi] sugar factory, see Tjoa & Moolenaar, Tjandi, pp. 15-22. After the 
Goan Tjing's death, the arrangement was continued with his heirs, who included the Boen Bee 
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Chinese-Indonesian interests also owned or financed 'backwoods' sugar-
making operations in Java's 'Government Lands' and, in addition, were notably 
active in the substantial sugar industry that grew up in the Vorstenlanden of Central 
Java from the mid-century onward, outside the purview of the Cultuurstelsel. What 
is also worth noting — in light of a subsequent, late colonial 'archive' that tended to 
denigrate Chinese enterprise — is evidence that around the mid-century, Chinese-
Indonesian factory owners were as keen to industrialise manufacture as their Dutch 
counterparts were. Around 1850, for example, a number of Chinese sugar Contractors 
in the Oosthoek utilised their local Dutch business connections to order Vacuum Pans 
for their factories from Western European manufacturers.327 
It is possible, nevertheless, to overstate the degree of Chinese-Indonesian 
involvement in ownership of the industry. After the mid-century, it may well have 
been in decline, not least perhaps because of a certain amount of official hostility 
toward the Chinese presence in the industry. After 1837, for instance, no further 
Government contracts were given to Chinese-Indonesians. To be sure, regulations 
like this were easily circumvented, not least because of the enduring ties that existed 
between European Contractors and Chinese-Indonesian capitalists. The case of the 
Pagongan sugar factory just outside the north Java coastal city of Tegal (discussed 
in the following chapter) was presumably just one instance of an altogether wider 
phenomenon of Chinese-Indonesian sugar interests maintaining a de facto presence 
inside the contract system despite de jure attempts to curtail their activities.
Nonetheless, the overall position of Chinese capital in the industry may indeed 
have been weakened by the Indies' state's hostility. One well-respected authority 
remarked, for example, that 'in the 1870s and 1880s nearly half the private sugar mills 
and the Boen Kee (both designated as Lieutenant der Chineesen) and who were all domiciled 
in Surabaya. The existence of a family ancestral temple in Surabaya in the 1880s is noted in 
Claudine Salmon, 'Ancestral Halls and Funeral Associations, and Attempts at Resinicization 
in Nineteenth Century Netherlands India', in Anthony Reid (ed.), Sojourners and Settlers: 
Histories of Southeast Asia and the Chinese, Sydney, Allen & Unwin, 1996, pp. 183-214, here 
p. 186. In the early twentieth century, members of the family were still associated with the 
Tjandi sugar factory. By 1911 it had become a big, up-to-date enterprise run by a limited 
liability company. See also Salmon, 'The Han Family'.
327 See '[Extract] Kontracten … Vervaardigen en Verzending Stoomtoestellen tot het Kooken 
van Suiker', NHMA, 7999, file 588.
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in Java were Chinese owned' — a remark that is open to serious misinterpretation.328 
The 'private sugar mills' referred to here exclude all the (former) contract factories, 
at that date still by far the most important and productive sector of the industry. 
Nor does the reference to the number of mills convey the necessary vital information 
about productive capacity and output. An informed guess would be that many — 
though by no means all — such mills were backwoods outfits of relatively small 
capacity.
All the same, in a field well worth further investigation, we should not draw 
rash conclusions. In particular, the Oei Tjiong Ham Concern, the greatest 'Chinese' 
business operating in late colonial Java, was famously the operator of large, well-
equipped and productive sugar factories in several parts of Java. Its proprietor in 
the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, Oei Tjiong Ham himself, (1866-
1924)329 was undoubtedly a leading member of an Indies bourgeoisie that was, and 
remained until the end of the colonial era itself, a markedly cosmopolitan one. Even 
so, the European sector of the bourgeoisie is 'privileged' in regard both to surviving 
documentation and to its position in a colonial state run by Dutchmen who were 
often kith and kin. As a result, this sector inevitably stands out in any attempt to 
illuminate the role played by Indies people of wealth and connection in establishing 
and furthering the industrial project in Java sugar during the middle decades of the 
nineteenth century.
328 Rush, Opium to Java, p. 102: that is to say, the factories to which Rush refers were those 
set up outside the parameters of the Cultuurstelsel from about 1870 during the period of its 
slow dismantlement. Regrettably, Onghokham's richly suggestive treatment of the subject, 
'Chinese Capitalism in Dutch Java', in Onghokham, The Thugs, the Curtain Thief and the 
Sugar Lord: Power, Politics and Culture in Colonial Java, Jakarta, Metafor, 2003, comes devoid 
of any substantiating documentation.
329 On the Oei Tjiong Ham Concern, see Yoshihara Kunio (ed.), Oei Tiong Ham Concern: 
The First Business Empire of Southeast Asia, Kyoto, Center for Southeast Asian Studies, Kyoto 
University, 1989; and, in particular, the invaluable ongoing reconstructions of his and his 
subsequent family history being carried on by the Dutch scholar Peter Post, e.g. 'Chinese 
Business Networks and Japanese Capital in Southeast Asia 1880-1940: Some Preliminary 




The Discreet Charms of a 
Bourgeoisie: The Holmbergs 
and the Hoevenaars
Jonkeer Otto Carel Holmberg 
de Beckfelt died in Brussels on 
Christmas Eve in 1857.330 The 
city was no doubt an altogether 
more convivial spot than the grim 
confines of The Hague to which the 
Dutch Royal Court had removed 
after the secession of the 'Belgian' 
provinces in the 1830s. Its more 
worldly society may also have had 
a particular appeal to a man sixty-
three years old who had recently 
wed a young woman forty years 
his junior, and whose new wife was 
a coachman's daughter at that.331 
Holmberg has more claim to our 
attention, however, than his taste for inter-generational liaisons — something that 
in any event would have been the object of rather less prurient attention in his day 
than in ours. In the first place, he belonged indisputably to an Empire Family. Indeed, 
the Holmberg clan had an established connection of colonial service dating back to 
330 The information on Holmberg and his family in this and the following paragraphs comes 
from DNL, vol. 50, 1932, pp. 300-7; NAB, vol. 12, 1914, pp. 342-5; NAB, vol. 40, 1942, 
pp. 594-7; NAB, vol. 93, 1995, pp. 368-75. Holmberg was the scion of a noble Swedish 
family, a branch of which had relocated to Holland in the mid-eighteenth century. His father, 
Niclas Holmberg (1742-1818) — an old East India hand who had risen to the position of 
VOC koopman [merchant] at Surat, prior to returning to Europe in 1774 — had held a post 
in the household administration of the last Dutch Stadhouder, Willem V, as Raadsheer in het 
Hof van Justitie en de Rekenkamer van het Graafschap Culembourg. (He was subsequently 
Burgomeester there 1804-09). The foothold thus gained in Dutch Royal circles stood his son 
in good stead after the Orange restoration of 1814.
331 J Kortenhorst, 'Eduard Douwes Dekker in den Haag', Jaarboek Die Haghe, vol. 51, 1969, 
pp. 69-98, here pp. 88-9. The young woman was Elisabeth van der Meyde, born in The 
Hague, 5 December 1834. She married Holmberg in The Hague on 16 April 1856.
Figure 10: The successful Suikerlord: 
Jonkheer OC Holmberg de Beckfelt.
Source: Koninklijk Instituut voor Taal-, Land- 
en Volkenkunde, Leiden, no. 47A58
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the 1760s. Otto Carel's father had been in the employ of the VOC before returning 
to Holland in 1774, and two of his elder brothers, Nicholaas Anthony Holmberg 
(1779-1821), and Mr Frederick George Holmberg (1787-1817), had held official 
positions in Java.
Born in 1794 in the deeply rural Dutch province of Brabant, Otto Carel 
Holmberg himself had sailed to Java as a young — and by the looks of his portrait — 
rather dashing Hussar in 1817.332 Once there, he married an even younger woman, 
the sixteen-year-old Henriette Smissaert, who was the daughter of a Resident, and was 
hence near the pinnacle of official colonial society on the island.333 Like Holmberg, 
moreover, she was the scion of a family with deep roots in the Indies and well-
maintained connections in the Netherlands. Holmberg's father-in-law, Anthony 
Hendrik Smissaert (1777-1832), had been born in Java. Like many similarly placed 
individuals, however, he had been educated in Holland, where his patrician family 
— in addition to ties with the Indies which went back several generations — was 
well established in the province of Utrecht. On returning to the colony from Europe 
in 1802, Smissaert held a series of official positions, culminating in his promotion 
in 1823 to the post of Dutch Resident at the Sultan's Court at Yogyakarta. His 
subsequent mishandling of the delicate political situation there caused many of his 
contemporaries to blame him for the outbreak of the so-called Java War two years 
later. Smissaert's consequent dismissal and quite literal removal from office — he was 
bundled into a carriage and sent down to Semarang by an exasperated superior — 
continued to rankle with him down to his death seven years later.334
332 Holmberg was a page to King Louis Bonaparte (1807) and subsequently to Napoleon 
himself (1810). As a First Lieutenant, he had seen active service during the closing phases 
of the Napoleonic wars, and had been captured by the Russians at the Battle of Leipzig in 
1813. He was subsequently repatriated, and by 1814 was a First Lieutenant with the newly 
formed Oost-Indische Hussaren in the restored Kingdom of the Netherlands. On Holmberg's 
military career, see 'Extract uit de Stamboek der Heeren Officieren van het Nederland'sch 
Oost-Indische Leger', in VMK, 9.12.1841/9.
333 For the family history, see IN, vol. 3, 1990, pp. 12-13 & MP Smissaert, Het Geslacht 
Smissaert, Utrecht, Kemink en Zoon, 1882, pp. 84-6. The copy of this book in the Koninklijk 
Biblioteek in The Hague has a MSS, 'Genealogie', enclosed. For Hendrik Smissaert's intimate 
social (and indeed sexual) intercourse with members of the Javanese elite at the Court of 
Yogyakarta, see Houben, Kraton and Kumpani, pp. 107-8, and for an extended discussion of 
his appointment to Yogyakarta and the subsequent outbreak of the Java War, see Carey, The 
Power of Prophecy, pp. 518ff.
334 Documentation on Smissaert's removal from office and his subsequent petitions for 
restitution is in VMK, 9.11.1829/46 & VMK, 19.10.1830/21.
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Henriette Smissaert produced five children in fairly quick succession during 
the 1820s, by which time her husband had switched from military to Government 
service. Once there, he became a Resident — the same rank held by his father-in-
law — in a matter of a very few years. Influence 'back home' no doubt worked very 
much in his favour: the family had made itself useful to the House of Orange in the 
late eighteenth century, and Holmberg had evidently nurtured the connection. His 
first posting, to Pekalongan on the north coast of Central Java, was not an entirely 
happy one. In 1828, caught up in a major altercation with his deputy, which required 
investigation by the state's top legal official, Holmberg was officially reprimanded.335 
Curiously, it did him no real harm. His connections again must have come into play, 
and it may also have helped that he was a Freemason. It should cause no surprise, 
therefore, that his next posting was a somewhat better one, as Resident of the Preanger, 
in the coffee-rich hill districts of West Java.336
His wife — from whom he had separated some two years earlier — died at sea 
in August 1832, and his children (all girls) were brought up in the Netherlands.337 
335 Holmberg became embroiled in a fierce dispute there, involving his Assistant Resident 
and the Residency Secretary. There is a lingering suspicion that Henriette was also implicated. 
On his way back from official business in Semarang, the colony's Procurer Generaal was 
ordered to investigate, and on the basis of his report, the Secretary was dismissed, the 
Assistant transferred and Holmberg himself censured by Commissioner-General Du Bus, 
whose 'displeasure' [misnoegen] with the Resident was minuted in the official record. See 
IB, 21.4.1828/17, MK, 2515.
336 IB, 20.6.1828/ 9 & 10, MK, 2517.
337 Henriette's youngest child, Clara Elisabeth Holmberg de Beckfelt, was born at Cianjur 
(Preanger) on 28 August 1829; see NA, vol. 40, 1942, pp. 596-7. The couple would appear 
to have separated some time after that. In March 1832, Henriette was referred to in official 
documents as Holmberg's 'gesepaareerde huisvrouw' ['separated housewife'] to whom 100 
guilders a month would be paid from Holmberg's salary, beginning in the month following 
her departure for the Netherlands. See IB, 19.3.1832/1, MK, 2545. In April of that year, 
Anthony Smissaert, Henriette Holmberg's father, began a return journey to Holland after a 
visit to Java during which he had made a final, futile attempt to 'clear his name' in respect 
to the events in Yogyakarta some seven years earlier. Henriette joined him on the voyage, 
which was prolonged by the need to circumnavigate the British Isles in order to evade a 
British blockade of the Channel to Dutch shipping (London and The Hague were currently at 
loggerheads over the Belgian bid for independence). For Henriette, the delay proved fatal, for 
she died on board the ship Cornelia Sara on 13 August 1832, off the north coast of Scotland. 
Quite possibly there was sickness on board, because Smissaert himself died in The Hague a 
few weeks after landing. Smissaert and his family had been given free passage to the Indies, 
apparently departing early in 1830. (See VMK, 9.11.1829/46 and VMK, 19.10.1830/21.) 
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Holmberg himself, however, remained in Java in his official position for another six 
years. At some time during this period, we must assume that his thoughts turned 
to exploiting his connections in the Netherlands to transform himself into an 
incipient member of an emergent Indies bourgeoisie of sugar manufacturers, traders 
and financiers. It was in pursuit of this that he sailed to the Netherlands in 1838. 
Ostensibly, he was on leave for health reasons. In fact, however, he took advantage 
of his connections at Court not only to lobby for a peerage but also to apply for a 
Government contract to manufacture sugar back in Java.
His family's old links with the House of Orange must again have stood him in 
good stead, for the Dutch monarch, Willem I, awarded him both the peerage and the 
contract. Alternatively, maybe Holmberg was just singularly persuasive, particularly 
in so far as he came up with a scheme (as did his friend and erstwhile brother-in-
law Theodore Lucassen, whom we met in an earlier chapter) to take back to Java a 
ship-load of up-to-the-minute apparatus for making sugar. The king, susceptible in 
this respect, was always on the look-out for people who promised to modernise his 
decrepit realm. Holmberg was not the only contender for this particular contract, 
but he was clearly the better placed. In communicating the decision to the Indies 
Government, the Minister of Colonies took care to include a verbatim extract from 
the letter he had received from the king's private secretary, urging his Majesty's 
'personal interest' in the matter.338
Empire Families were predicated on the cementing of ties back home as well as 
in the colonies, and in this respect Holmberg behaved in exemplary fashion. Indeed, 
he rounded off a successful stay in the Netherlands by marrying his eldest daughter to 
Jonkheer Ludolph van Bronkhorst, private secretary to the Prince of Orange, who was 
heir to the Dutch throne. Another daughter later married Arnoldus Gallois, at that 
time an official in the service of the Indies Government and, subsequent to his return 
to Holland, Administrator of the Royal Domains for King Willem II. At this point, 
Holmberg's business affairs became inextricably bound up with those of another of 
his sons-in-law, Hubertus Hoevenaar. As we saw in a previous chapter, Hoevenaar 
In mid-1832, again at the state's expense, he took passage back to the Netherlands on the 
ship Cornelia Sara (captained by a Captain Leeuwrijk), departing Batavia — together with 
Henriette — on 1 April 1832. See VMK, 14.9.1832/23 & Javasche Courant, 3 April 1832/40.
338 The details of how Holmberg obtained his sugar contract are to be found in 
Exh. 24.6.1840/19; Exh. 6.7.1840/20 & Exh. 16.7.1840/5.
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had arrived in Java as a young man in the early 1840s as part of an entourage of the 
pioneering sugar manufacturer, Colonel Theodore Lucassen. Hoevenaar had been the 
leading individual in settling up the new steam-operated sugar factory that Lucassen 
was contracted to build — but had subsequently fallen out with the Colonel and 
switched his allegiance to Holmberg, one of whose daughters he promptly married.
Unlike either of his patrons, Hoevenaar was knowledgeable in the ways 
of steam, steel and sugar — and became a great deal more so during the twenty 
years or more that he spent in Java before retiring to Holland in the mid-1860s. 
The executives at the NHM's Batavia factorij — not people much given to high 
praise in this context — awarded him the rare accolade of 'known to us as a skilled 
sugar maker'.339 Hoevenaar, moreover, was evidently a very astute man of business. 
Theodore Lucassen, who demonstrably came to loathe his former protégé, might 
have put it rather differently.340
The details of Hubertus Hoevenaar's subsequent business dealings after his 
break with Lucassen remain, somewhat appropriately, murky. It looks very much, 
however, as if he forged relations with his newly acquired father-in-law's associates in 
Court circles in the Netherlands to consolidate his own position as a leading Indies 
sugar maker. Hoevenaar became deeply implicated in the convoluted dealings over 
the Pangka sugar factory, near Holmberg's (and his) factories in Tegal. The Indies 
Government and the Dutch Contractor at Pangka, van Vloten (perhaps more than 
coincidently a lawyer), became involved in an acrimonious struggle over labour that 
culminated in the termination of the contract, a protracted court case and, finally 
— after many twists and turns — the downfall of a Colonial Minister. At one stage 
or another, Hoevenaar held power of attorney for van Vloten, was administrateur of 
Pangka and subsequently lease-holder of the factory (which was used to process cane 
grown elsewhere) and, later still, its part-owner. For good measure, he was also the 
brother-in-law of the two men (van Bronckhorst and Gallois) who finally extracted a 
new contract for the factory from a reluctant Dutch Colonial Office.341
339 NFB, 26.9.1860/627.
340 It is demonstrable due to a document by Lucassen, headed 'Weldaden met Ondank 
Beloond ' ['Good Deeds Repaid with Ingratitude'], in which he lists his vividly remembered 
slights and grudges, which may or may not be accurate. Categorically, however, it establishes 
the fact of the complete breakdown of his relations with Hoevenaar. I am very grateful to Dr 
Margaret Leidelmeijer for kindly providing me with a copy of this document (which is in 
private hands in the Netherlands).
341 Fasseur, Colonial Exploitation, pp. 198-202, 223-30.
169
Sugar, Steam and Steel
The end result of twenty years of wheeling and dealing was that Hoevenaar 
became owner of a small clutch of sugar factories — they became known in the 
business world as the 'Hoevenaar Concerns' and continued to operate under that 
name until the Second World War — and had a stake in several others.342 After 
342 In addition to his late father-in-law's two factories (i.e. Adiwerna and Djatibarang), he 
was at one time or another in the mid-century decades the owner or part-owner of the nearby 
Pangka sugar factory (where for some years prior to that he had been the lessee) and of two 
factories in neighbouring Cirebon Residency (Soerawinangan and Sindang Laut). For some 
years, he was also the owner of the Lemahabang factory in the western part of Tegal. Hoevenaar 
was at various times administrateur of Pangka (prior to its temporary closure in 1851), lessee 
Figure 11: A rare glimpse inside a nineteenth-century Java sugar factory: Pangka, 
North-Central Java, 1870s. Note the record keeper seated at his table and the 
(shadowy) presence of Javanese women operating the centrifuges in which half-
dry sugar was spun into crystalline form.
Source: Koninklijk Instituut voor Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde, Leiden, no. 10751
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initially working for his father-in-law, Hoevenaar, some time around 1860 after his 
father-in-law's death, took over these factories, buying out the other heirs in the 
process. In order to finance this, he borrowed 360 000 guilders from the NHM's 
Batavia factorij, and entered into long-term consignment contracts with the firm, 
under the terms of which they provided him with annual working capital.343
of the factory and then co-owner with Willem Jacob Hendrik van Rijck (1827-1880). The 
latter was married to Hoevenaar's stepsister Melanie (after her death in 1881, he married 
Hoevenaar's daughter Clara) and subsequently bought out his brother-in-law's interest in 
Pangka. See SU, Bijl. D ; NFB, 15.3.1859/451; DNL, vol. 29, 1911, p. 312. Hoevenaar 
must have taken over Soerawinangan (previously owned by LA Saportas) in 1863. At the end 
of that year the NHM, his financiers at Djatibarang and Adiwerna, were initially strongly 
resistant to his proposal to move to Soerawinangan to supervise in person the operation of the 
factory. See NFB, 12.12.1863/889. Hoevenaar became owner of Lemahabang at the end of 
1855, having bought it at auction from the bankrupt TC Boogaardt, and in the following year 
was listed as administrateur there (SU, Bijl. D). The significance of the latter (see below) was 
that it brought him into contact with one of the colony's leading import-export businesses, 
the Batavia house of Paine Stricker & Co., a firm with good connections both in Holland and 
the East Coast of the United States.
343 For the loan — apparently to enable him to buy out his co-owners in Djatibarang and 
Figure 12: The industrial project in Java in the closing decades of the nineteenth 
century: the Pangka sugar factory, North-Central Java c. 1890.
Source: Koninklijk Instituut voor Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde, Leiden, no. 10750
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A decade later, however, he was evidently sufficiently financially independent 
of the NHM and was able to switch his allegiance to the Nederlandsch-Indische 
Handelsbank344, one of a number of firms, both metropolitan and colonial, which 
began to supply capital — albeit in a modest way — to Java's sugar factories from 
about 1860 onward. As late as 1884, two years prior to his death, Hoevenaar was 
part of a consortium granted a concession for the laying of a railway along Java's 
north coast from Semarang to Cirebon, linking virtually all the area's sugar factories 
to the main ports.345 Meanwhile, back in the Netherlands he developed banking 
interests both in the town of Eindhoven, in the south-east of the Netherlands near 
to what became (as we shall see) his country seat at the village of Geldrop, as well as 
in Rotterdam, the commercial and shipping metropolis of the southern part of the 
country.
Empire Families and their Metropolitan Connections
Colonel Theodore Lucassen, Hoevenaar's erstwhile patron, would presumably have 
been gratified that two of his granddaughters married sugar industry executives in 
Holland, but — perhaps even more gratifyingly for a rising bourgeois — that others 
married into the French aristocracy. Moreover, one of his sons, the last child of his 
Indies-born first wife, obviously managed to squeeze enough money out of his sugar 
factory to retire to Mentone, in the South of France, one of the classic havens of La 
Belle Époque of the bourgeoisie. He died there in 1897, having survived his equally 
Indies Dutch wife by almost two decades.346
Judged by social as well as by economic criteria, however, Hubertus Hoevenaar 
himself, together with his wife Anna Holmberg, were even riper exemplars of a newly 
emergent Indies bourgeoisie that was at once colonial and metropolitan. Hoevenaar 
himself died in 1886, twenty years after retiring to patria and transforming himself 
into a country gentleman with a seat at Geldrop in Brabant, in the south-east of 
the Netherlands, not so very far from where his family originated. Anna Hoevenaar, 
however, survived her husband by almost two decades, and died in The Hague in 
Adiwerna — see NFB, 2.3.1860/571.
344 NHMR, 4796.
345 HP Hoevenaar of Geldrop was one of five partners granted a concession for laying a 
railway from Semarang to Cirebon. (At the end of 1884 they were asking for more time 
because they had still to come up with the guarantor money.) See JVFB, vol. 59, 1884, p. 17.
346 NP, vol. 5, 1914, pp. 269-77; & NP, vol. 53, 1967, pp. 168-78.
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1905, full of years and very far indeed from her birthplace in one of the more remote 
parts of Java's Northeast Coast.347
The casteel [castle] at Geldrop, where the widow Hoevenaar appears still to 
have lived almost up to the time of her death, had been made over into a dignified but 
hardly grand country house by the couple's efforts after their return from the Indies in 
1866. Prior to that, it had been a semi-ruinous set of buildings inherited by Hoevenaar 
from a distant relative, complete with the title of Heer [squire] of Geldrop. Judging 
by a plaque on the renovated building's outer wall, this was a feudal designation 
(obsolete as it was) of which Hoevenaar was rather proud. He and his wife were 
presumably proud, too, of the 'English' garden and park they created around their 
347 Gemeente Archief, Den Haag, Death Certificate 432, 9.2.1905, shows that, 'wonende 
te Geldrop' ['living at Geldrop'], 'Anna … Hoevenaar geboren [born] Holmberg de Beckvelt' 
died in The Hague at 10.30 on the evening of 7 February 1905. The witnesses were Jacob 
Cromer, thirty-two-year old bedienste [servant], and sixty-one-year-old Engelbertus H, 'zonder 
beroep' [without profession], both of The Hague.
Figure 13: A bourgeois dream: the Hoevenaar 'castle' at Geldrop in the 
Netherlands unchanged from the late nineteenth century.
Source: Kasteel Geldrop by Reval. Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 3.0-2.5-2.0-
1.0. Wikimedia Commons, http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Kasteel_Geldrop.
jpg#mediaviewer/File:Kasteel_Geldrop.jpg
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casteel, complete with an Orangery and a stud for breeding horses (only the shooting 
rights were missing, held by an adjoining and unaccommodating landowner).348
Along with the marriage of two of their daughters into the Dutch aristocracy 
(one of the sons-in-law, Mr HNC baron van Tuyll van Serooskerken, was on the 
board of the family firm)349, Geldrop and its grounds formed part of a bourgeois 
dream that was far from being confined to the Netherlands. It was also the dream, 
however, of Empire Families, in so far as it consolidated 'back home' the constantly 
renewed ties between colony and metropolis which dated back (in this case) to the 
late eighteenth century — and were to continue into the twentieth. These ties were 
to become of key significance in saving the industrial project in sugar when it was 
threatened with annihilation during the course of the 1880s.
The Indies Bourgeoisie, Capital and the Sugar Crisis of 1884
The Indies bourgeoisie did not stand alone. Indeed, quite the contrary. The Empire 
Families to which they generally belonged provided an organic connection to the 
metropolis, while at the same time Dutch metropolitan commercial and financial 
networks had long worked together with the colonial bourgeoisie. Indeed, the two 
groups were intimately linked.350
The career of Jan Hudig, author of Suikerlords and founder of the Koloniale 
Bank, demonstrates the point well enough. Born in the Netherlands in 1840 into 
an old-established Rotterdam merchant family, as a sixteen-year-old he had served 
an apprenticeship in Van Hoboken's dockyard in Rotterdam and spent three years 
in England before arriving in Batavia in 1864. His acquaintances there included the 
348 On the family and its country house, see Eugene Franken, Hubertus Paulus Hoevenaar: 
Kasteelheer en Ondernemer (forthcoming). See http://www.eugenefranken.nl/hoevenaar.htm 
(accessed 15 August 2014).
349 HCHO, 1899, p. 618. In 1899 the Directors were M Boek and DC Eibergen-Santhagens 
and Board Members were Mr HNC baron Tuyll van Serooskerken, J van Hasselt, MJE Henny, 
T van den Ben and (the family's lawyer) HWF Ligtenbergen.
350 For evidence of the substantial overlap between the 'colonial' and 'metropolitan' 
bourgeoisie of the era, see Claver, Dutch Commerce and Chinese Merchants, passim; Korthals 
Altes, Tussen Cultuurs en Kredieten, pp. 53-63, 89-98; Jan Rutger van Swet, 'President in Indie 
en Nederland: Mr. N.P. van den Berg als Centraal Bankier', PhD Diss, Universitiet Leiden, 
2004, pp. 51-216; NP van den Berg, 'Uit de Tijd van de Oprichting en de Eerste Jaren van 




young NP van den Berg, agent of the newly established Handelsbank (and later its 
Directeur); the President of the Javasche Bank, CFW Wiggers van Kerchem; and the 
head of the firm of Reijnst & Vinju, A van Delden. Hudig himself was employed 
in various agricultural ventures, mostly coffee, and he lived — very much in the 
Indies style — with a Chinese-Indonesian woman, Tjan Joe. Revisiting Holland in 
1874, he married a Dutch woman, MH van der Waarden, and then returned to Java 
the following year. In 1878 he was again in Holland, where he took the position of 
Secretaris of the NHM in Amsterdam. Resigning the following year, he travelled once 
again to the Indies, where he lived as a guest for a time of JTh Cremer — who was 
then well on his way to making a fortune as a tobacco planter, which was to carry him 
into the upper echelons of the Dutch business and political world. In 1880, sickness 
forced Hudig back to Holland, where in the following year he founded the Koloniale 
Bank.351 
Hudig was far from being an isolated figure, however. It was people like him, 
with a foot in the two worlds of Indies entrepreneurship and Netherlands capital, who 
were indicative of the community of bourgeois interests in colony and metropolis 
which would see the industry through a period in its history potentially disastrous for 
the Indies bourgeoisie and the industrial project they had promoted over the preceding 
decades. This was the period, in the middle months of 1884, when, like comparable 
industries worldwide, Java sugar was hit by a precipitate fall in the international price 
of sugar which reduced its sale price by as much as 40 or 50 per cent.
We shall return to this crisis and its impact on the industrial project shortly. 
Before doing so, however, it is important first to review the development of 
industrialised sugar production on Java in the decade or so prior to the crisis.
351 Schor 'Gedenkboek' pp. 1-11; NP, vol. 50, 1964, p. 260. For an extended account of 
Hudig's career, see Claver, Dutch Commerce and Chinese Merchants, pp. 105-9. On Hudig and 
his Rotterdam background, see also Gene M Moore (ed.), Conrad's Cities: Essays for Hans van 





6 Metamorphosis: Machinery, Science and the Manufacture of Sugar in Java on the Eve of the 
Crisis of the Mid-1880s
In July 1870, the fifty-year-old Jan Louis van Gennep, President [CEO] of the 
NHM's Batavia factorij, left Batavia by coastal steamer to begin a tour of inspection 
of his company's investments on the island's Northeast Coast.352 On his way back, he 
travelled inland through the Vorstenlanden of South-Central Java. Late in the month, 
having arrived by rail on a recently opened section of the line being built from the 
Vorstenlanden down to the coast at Semarang, he stayed for some days at the Court-
city of Surakarta (Solo).353 The city, the seat of the Soesoehoenan, head of one of 
South-Central Java's two ruling families, was also at the centre of a considerable belt 
of plantation activity that had begun there several decades earlier, in which coffee, 
indigo and sugar were well to the fore.354
Commensurate with his important position in colonial circles in the Indies, 
van Gennep, an old Indies hand who (as we saw earlier) had been in Java for over a 
quarter of a century, evidently spent some time with the Resident Tobias, the Dutch 
representative at the Soesoehoenan's Court. Indeed, he may well have stayed with 
352 JL van Gennep was born in The Hague on 25 April 1820, married (in Sourabaya, 1845) 
the Ambon-born Anna Paulina Morrees (1826-1863) and died in The Hague on 10 December 
1873.
353 JL van Gennep, 'Cultuurondernemingen op Java, 1870', Reisverlagen en Rapporten 
no. 70, NHMA. The railway between the Principalities and Semarang, first projected circa 
1860, had been partially completed in February 1870. See Houben, Kraton, p. 289. It closed 
in 2000.
354 Houben, Kraton, pp. 257-304; Bosma, 'Sugar and Dynasty', pp. 73-84.
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the Resident, and it was presumably 
Tobias who suggested that he might 
visit the Colomadu factory at 
Malangjiwan, a few kilometres to 
the east of the city. This enterprise 
was unusual in that it was the only 
industrial sugar factory in the colony 
owned by a Javanese, having been 
established almost ten years earlier 
by the Solonese aristocrat, Pangeran 
Adipati Ario Mangkunegra IV, in 
whose Principality it stood. What 
made Colomadu even more unusual, 
however, was that it also boasted 
the first 'Triple Effet' apparatus — 
the sine qua non of 'modern' sugar 
manufacturing from the 1860s 
onward — to be installed anywhere 
in the colony.355 Within the three 
interconnected, pressurised tanks 
of the Triple Effect, cane-juice from 
the mills was both cleansed and 
concentrated before being pumped to the Vacuum Pans, where it was further reduced 
into a mix of quasi-crystalline sugar and molasses. Its advantage, along with offering a 
much more fail-safe method of operation than had previously been available to sugar 
manufacturers, was that it worked on the basis of the recirculation of steam-heat 
between the various phases of its operation, thereby greatly reducing the factory's 
expenditure on fuel.
It did so, of course, at a price. Triple Effect apparatus did not come cheap. 
Indeed, because of both its size and expense, it had originally been considered as best 
355 It was, van Gennep reported ('Cultuurondernemingen op Java, 1870'), the only one in 
Java at that time 'die volgens het zoogenaamde systeme van Triple Effet werkt, met gebruik van het 
"acide carbonique"' ['that operated according to the so-called Triple Effet system, with the use 
of "carbonic acid"'].
Figure 14: Prince Mangkunegara IV, 
Javanese aristocrat and owner of the 
Colomadu sugar factory near Surakarta 
in South-Central Java.
Source: Koninklijk Instituut voor Taal-, Land- 
en Volkenkunde, Leiden, no. 7831
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suited to sugar refineries rather than colonial factories producing raw sugar. Just how 
big an investment it represented can be gauged from the fact that (in 1881) the NHM 
paid some 40 000 guilders (including freight and insurance) for a Triple Effect for 
one of its factories on the north coast of Central Java356, whereas the entire Colomadu 
operation — almost a decade prior to the installation of its Triple Effect — appears 
to have cost around 100 000 guilders when first built in 1861.357 Mangkunegara IV 
(1809-1881), however, was reckoned to be a very rich man, with an annual income 
said to be as much as 1 million guilders, and was also likely to have been a business 
associate of another very rich man, the 'Captain Chinese' at Semarang, Be Biauw 
Tjoan (1824-1904), one of the leading businessmen in the colony.358
The Pangeran had presumably purchased his 'Triple Effet' on the advice of 
his administrateur, the German-born Johann Robert Kampf (1822-1897), a sugar 
engineer who had worked closely with Thomas Edwards at Wonopringgo less than 
a decade earlier (and who was later associated with the beet sugar industry in the 
Netherlands).359 Maybe it came from French ateliers, like the magnificent chandeliers 
356 JVFB, vol. 56, 1881, p. 52.
357 A useful ally of the Dutch at the Surakarta Court, Mangkunegara IV had been advanced 
100 000 guilders by the Indies Government to build Colomadu (the sum was to be repaid 
over five years in coffee delivered from Mangkunegara's estates). See Houben, Kraton, p. 301.
358 I infer this relationship from the fact that when, early in the 1880s, Hermanus van 
Blommestein, proprietor at this date of both Kalimatie and Wonopringo, was in financial 
difficulties, his NHM creditors thought that he could turn for help both to Mangkunegara IV 
and to Be, with both of whom he was said to be 'on terms of the greatest friendship'. See 
[Extract] Factorij to A'dam, 22.7.1881, 'Dossiers Cultuurzaken … Wonopringgo & 
Kalimatie', NHMA, 7945. On Be Biauw Tjoan, see Rush, Opium to Java, pp. 77-8, 93-6.
359 Indeed, Edwards had proposed him to the factorij as his successor when he left 
Wonopringgo in 1862. See Factorij to A'dam, 7.9.1860/877 ('die daartoe bijzonder door den 
Heer Edwards is aanbevolen'). Instead, Kampf took himself to the Vorstenlanden and the employ 
of Mangkoe Negoro IV. Johann Robert Kampf was born in Prussia (Cleve) on 7 November 
1822; in Pekalongan, on 5 March 1860, he married Maria Louisa Neumman (who was born 
in Pekalongan on 16 November 1839, and who was the daughter of Maur Neumman, born 
in Germany, no date, merchant at Pekalongan, and of Jacoba Carolina Greuder, born in 
Pekalongan, no date). Kampf died on 22 September 1897 in Lemelerveld (the Netherlands). 
Lemelerveld — in Overijssel — was the location of NV Overijsselsche Beetwortelsuikerfabriek 
[Overrijssel Beetsugar Factory Ltd], established in 1865 (nl.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lemelerveld). 
This can scarcely have been a coincidence: it looks as if Kampf returned to Europe at some 
stage to work there.
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in the pendopo [audience hall] of the Pangeran's palace. However this may have 
been, the whole enterprise so impressed van Gennep — the factory was 'inderdaad 
een uitmutende inrighting' ['in point of fact a quite outstanding set-up'] — that he 
strongly recommended his company establish financial and commercial ties with 
Mangkunegara.
Something of the factory's impact on van Gennep can be grasped from an 
early photograph of Colomadu, taken in the late 1860s by the celebrated Batavia 
commercial photographers, Woodbury & Page. It may show administrateur Kampf — 
whom van Gennep extolled for his kunde en ijver [knowledge and energy] — dressed 
in whites, standing under the factory's massive portico: what it certainly makes clear 
is how formidable an enterprise Colomadu indeed was. To the left, a free-standing 
building houses the factory's boilers (evidenced by the towering chimney), while to 
Figure 15: The audience hall or pendopo of Mangkunegara IV's palace.
Source: Koninklijk Instituut voor Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde, Leiden, no. 3374
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its immediate right an impressively fronted (and presumably recently whitewashed) 
tile-roofed, stone or brick building would have housed the apparatus for processing 
the cane-juice once it had come from the mills. To its right again, is an open-sided, 
high-roofed and well-ventilated pavilion, presumably the place where the sugar was 
given its final drying — and packing.360
The Myth of the 'Dark Ages' of Sugar Manufacture in Java in the 
Mid-nineteenth Century
Mankunegara's pioneering advances at Colomadu notwithstanding, one of the things 
which has bedevilled our understanding of the history of sugar in nineteenth-century 
Java has been a lingering notion that the industry had to wait for the dismantlement 
of the Cultuurstelsel and the sugar crisis of 1884 before it could be technologically 
modernised. In one form, indeed, a now-fading orthodoxy has insisted that it took 
the crisis to shake the industry out of its purported 'lethargy' and institute a period of 
far-reaching technological and scientific innovation, directed by metropolitan capital, 
360 Steven Wachlin, with a contribution by Marianne Fluitsma & Gerrit Knaap, Woodbury 
& Page: Photographers Java, Leiden, KITLV Press, 1994, p. 127.
Figure 16: The Colomadu sugar factory in South-Central Java c. 1865. One of the 
most technologically advanced Java factories of its day also had the distinction of 
being the sole factory operating in the colony at that time that was owned by a 
Javanese.
Source: Koninklijk Instituut voor Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde, Leiden, no. 26962
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which signalled Java sugar's emergence from 'the dark' ages.361 In fact, nothing could 
be further from the truth.362
There existed, to be sure, a body of contemporary opinion which loudly 
asserted that the Java sugar manufacturers of the mid-nineteenth century indeed 
lagged behind other sectors of what was rapidly becoming an international sugar 
economy.363 Some of these assertions, moreover, appear well-founded. For example, 
361 This orthodoxy was reflected early in the twentieth century in a self-serving depiction 
of the 'bad old days', which had preceded the industry's 'modernisation' at the hand of the 
companies who presently owned it. A ripe example is to be found in the commentary of 
one leading industry apologist of the 1920s, who asserted that integral to the way in which 
sugar production was organised under the auspices of the Cultuurstelsel was a whole series of 
obstacles to the' progress and development' of the industry while 'the [prevailing] uncertainty 
about the future makes it risky to invest capital in machines etc.' (See Tichelaar, 'De Expoitatie 
eener Suikerfabriek', pp. 209, 216, 219.) Unfortunately, this 'orthodoxy' has found its way 
into modern literature. Hence, for example, Aard J Hartveld, in his otherwise invaluable 
— and widely cited — University of Wageningen doctoral thesis, commits himself (quite 
unnecessarily) to the argument that the sugar crisis of the mid-1880s was the vital turning 
point in manufacturing technology in Java sugar. Viz.: 'Around 1884 declining prices for 
Indonesian sugar on the international market caused drastic technological changes in the sugar 
industry … In order to retain their market position, the mill owners had to invest in new 
processing technology that improved the quality of their product and the efficiency of their 
mills … Both cultivation techniques and technology of sugar refineries [i.e. mills] underwent 
considerable changes. New crushing equipment and modern refinery technology had to be 
applied …' (emphasis added). See Aard J Hartveld, 'Raising Cane: Linkages, Organisations 
and Negotiations in Malang's Sugar Industry, East Java', Proefschrift, Landbouw Universitiet 
Wageningen, 1996, p. 47. The geographer Jock Galloway's essay on 'The Modernisation of 
Sugar Production in Southeast Asia, 1880-1940', The Geographical Review, vol. 95, no. 1, 
January, 2005, pp. 1-24 likewise carries the strong implication that such 'modernisation' only 
began in Java in the 1880s, though the author's graph (fig. 5, p. 9) makes it clear that by 1880 
Java (in contrast to the rest of the region) was already producing a very substantial amount of 
'modern' centrifugal sugar (as indeed, it had been for some decades) which was, virtually by 
definition, the product of 'advanced' factories.
362 Leidelmeijer Grootbedrijf, passim, had done much to explode the myth as early as the 
1980s. For a futher pioneering critique, see Bosma, 'Sugar and Dynasty', pp. 89-92.
363 Writing late in the 1860s, John Millard (De Suikerindustrie op Java, p. 15ff.) argued 
that uncertainty about the future of the Contract system and the system itself (not least the 
vacillating policy of successive colonial administrations vis-à-vis the 'free disposal' of the sugar 
that the Contractors produced — pp. 59-61) militated against the uptake of technological 
innovations. Yet Millard (himself the one-time administrateur of a Java sugar factory) was 
careful to qualify his remarks. The situation was one in which the manufacturers, he noted 
'de onmogelijkheid verkeren de resultaten der wetenshap geheel toe te passen' ['were in a position 
where it was impossible to apply scientific findings in their entirety; emphasis added]'. Millard 
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the NHM (who had reason to know) complained that the relatively low grades of 
sugar specified in the Government's sugar contracts were a disincentive to investment 
in improved manufacturing apparatus.364 
Over time, however, things changed. From the 1850s onward, in particular, most 
manufacturers were allowed to dispose (albeit erratically) of increasingly substantial 
amounts of their output on the open market. In turn, this undoubtedly created 
more enthusiasm for improved equipment. As Thomas Edwards, administrateur of 
the NHM's Wonopringgo sugar factory, remarked to his employers in 1856, '[the 
island's manufacturers] have already given evidence by the general adoption of steam 
machinery that they are ready to spend their money freely when a fair chance of a 
profit can be shown'.365 For example, three years later (as we have seen) the owners of 
the Kemanglen and Doekoewringin sugar factories (located like Wonopringgo on the 
north coast of Central Java) were able to negotiate the 'free disposal' of all the sugar 
they produced. They promptly used the potential advantage gained thereby (since 
sugar prices were on the rise) as collateral for a substantial loan to enable them to buy 
new equipment.366 This was not an isolated instance. As we have seen in the foregoing 
chapters of this book, and as we will futher discover in the pages that follow, notions 
of the 'backward' nature of Java's sugar industry during the decades extending from 
the 1840s to the 1880s simply do not stand up to examination.
How then to account for a 'black legend'? First and foremost, it has to be 
concluded that a contemporary critique of the 'backwardness' of the mid-century 
Java industry is hard to distinguish from a general polemic directed against the 
Cultuurstelsel by opponents in Holland. In part, moreover, this stemmed (as we 
roundly rejected any suggestion that the manufacturers were 'niet op de hoogte van hun vak' 
['not on top of their business'].
364 See, for example, the NHM factorij's observations in the mid-1840s that Derosne 
equipment in the mid-1840s produced sugar of higher quality than was stipulated in 
Government Contracts (Factorij to A'dam, 31.12.1845/246). Leidelmeijer Grootbedrijf 
(pp. 170ff.) likewise draws attention to the disincentive to technological advance inherent 
in the poor reception that Derosne 'steam' sugar got from the Dutch refiners. Worldwide, 
however, this does not always seem to have been the case. French refiners appear to have paid 
'remarkable' prices for 'Derosne' sugar from French colonies in the Caribbean — see Tomich, 
Slavery in the Circuit of Sugar, p. 205.
365 Edwards to Factorij, 2.8.1856/1036, enclosed in Factorij to A'dam, 9.8.1856/480.




have seen) from a refusal in the metropolis to legitimate the Creole technology that 
developed on the colonial frontier. For subsequent commentators and historians, 
however, acceptance of the 'legend' appears to stem from misundertandings about 
the complexity of the ongoing and essentially incremental nature of technological 
advance in manufacture throughout the international sugar economy during the 
middle decades of the nineteenth century. In particular, the fact that many of Java's 
factories boasted a variety of equipment, some of the latest design and some belonging 
to an earlier era, was — very emphatically — not evidence of 'regressive' tendencies. 
Rather, it was perfectly in line with the situation of such industries worldwide. 
Improvement, it is worth reiterating, was incremental and continuous, rather than 
sudden and total. In Cuba itself, despite its deserved reputation as the ne plus ultra 
of industrial progress in cane sugar manufacture, 'mixed' systems incorporating both 
the new and the old were the order of the day, and patchy, uneven technological 
development was totally characteristic of all the more advanced sectors of commodity 
sugar manufacture worldwide.367
In short, just as elsewhere, the industrial project in sugar was a piecemeal affair 
in Java in the mid-nineteenth century: new-fangled and obsolete machinery and 
techniques rubbed shoulders. In the late 1860s and 1870s, however, the arrival of 
Multiple Effect apparatus in one of its several forms — since, along with 'Triple Effet', 
there were the alternative possibilities of 'Double Effet' and 'Quadruple Effet'— 
was the single most important development in the technology of sugar production 
since the appearance of the Vacuum Pan a quarter of a century or more earlier. The 
Multiple Effect heralded the arrival of continuous process manufacture, which began 
with the milling of cane and ended only in the Centrifuge and the packing shed. 
The adoption of continuous process technology — along with its associated science 
— not only took the guesswork out of manufacture but also, at least as importantly, 
created a basis for expanded productive capacity.368 Its adoption in Java, along with 
other major new appurtenances of industrialised manufacture, was hence an index to 
367 See e.g. M Moreno-Fraginals, The Sugar Mill: The Socio-Economic Complex of Sugar in 
Cuba, 1780-1860, New York, Monthly Review Press, 1976, pp. 81-175; Curry-Machado, 
Cuban Sugar, pp. 23-30; for Louisiana, see JA Heitmann, The Modernisation of the Louisiana 
Sugar Industry, 1830-1910, Baton Rouge, Louisiana State University Press, 1987, pp. 48ff.; 
and for Martinique, see Tomich, Slavery in the Circuit of Sugar, pp. 191-7.
368 See e.g. the suggestive comments on this score in Griggs, Global Industry, Local Innovation, 
pp. 186-7.
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the technologically evolved state of significant numbers of Java's sugar factories in the 
decade or so before the crisis of the mid-1880s.
The Indices to Progress: The Multiple Effect, Grinding Mills and Boilers 
circa 1870-84
Initially, few other manufacturers followed Mangkunegara IV's initiative in installing 
Multiple Effect apparatus at Colomadu. Was Surakarta, despite the large amounts of 
sugar being manufactured in the Principalities by the 1860s and 1870s, too 'remote' 
from Java's main colonial production areas? Had its 'Triple Effet' not come up to 
expectations? Was the expense still considered too great? For whatever reason, prior 
to 1877 very few sets of such apparatus appear to have been installed on the island. 
Thereafter, however, the colony's manufacturers, faced with a secular decline in sugar 
prices which had set in a decade earlier, took up the Multiple Effect with alacrity. 
As well as improving the quality and quantity of sugar produced, through removing 
many of the hazards attendant on rule-of-thumb methods in open cleansing and 
evaporating pans, Multiple Effect apparatus also brought very substantial savings 
in the costs of fuel. In 1881, for example, the NHM's Batavia factorij reported to 
Amsterdam that it was buying a 'Triple Effet' for its Kemantran sugar factory on 
the north coast of Central Java, arguing that it would effect a big reduction in the 
present 'huge' costs of firewood. Indeed, it was reckoned that firewood had been 
costing Kemantran around 22 000 guilders a year for the previous six years; and a 
net annual saving of 17 000 guilders was anticipated from the installation of the new 
apparatus.369
In this latter respect, moreover, it must be assumed that the industry's decades-
long timber consumption had taken its toll on easily reachable woodlands. Indeed, 
it was around this time that some manufacturers began to invest in the purchase of 
leases on areas that were suitable for 'farming' timber.370 To be sure, by reducing the 
number of (skilled) manual operations in the boiling house, the Multiple Effect also 
promised significant savings on wages. Nonetheless, reduced fuel bills were critical. 
By the mid-1880s, when the industry was hit by a sudden and dramatic fall in the 
369 JVFB, vol. 56, 1881, p. 52.
370 E.g. HCHO, 1888, pp. 255-6 shows that the Lucassen family had no other business 
interests in Java apart from their sugar factories — the only exception being a joint interest in 
two erfpachtpeerceelen [long-leasehold properties] in Brebes Regency (Tegal Residency) which 
produced firewood [brandhout], fish and sometimes coconuts.
186
G Roger Knight
price of sugar, it can be estimated that as many as one-third of the colony's sugar 
factories were already equipped with the Multiple Effect in one of its several forms. 
In the sugar belt that ran along the north coast of Central Java, for example, the 
Wonopringgo factory installed a 'Quadruple Effet' from the leading French firm of 
Fives Lille in 1879.371 Elsewhere on the north coast, in the adjoining Tegal Residency, 
Kemanglen and Doekoewringin, which were smaller operations and were still in the 
hands of members of the family who had built the factories some forty years earlier, 
installed similar though rather less grand apparatus a couple or so years later. Other 
factories soon followed suit.372 
Nonetheless, the installation of Multiple Effect apparatus was only one 
dimension — albeit a crucial one — of developments in Java's colonial sugar factories 
during the 1870s and 1880s which set the industry apart from its erstwhile Asian 
counterparts and underscored its global importance. Critical advances in machine 
technology and 'sugar' science were evident throughout the manufacturing process 
that turned raw cane into sugar. In 1884, for example, when the Dutch owner-
manager of the Kalibagor sugar factory in South-Central Java published a short 
account of his enterprise, he remarked on a number of things. One was a recent and 
significant improvement in the grinding of cane consequent on the installation over 
the previous decade of two steam-operated sets of mills.373 Steam power, as was widely 
recognised, created the potential for a more efficient extraction of juice because it 
allowed a greater degree of pressure to be brought to bear on the cane. In some 
locations, steam power had been adopted in the 1850s or even earlier.
371 'Overzicht van de Installatie van Wonopringgo' [c. 1905], File 'Wonopringgo', in 
NHMA, 7945.
372 See the listing of sugar-manufacturing equipment in the KV, 1875-1882. The detailed 
listing stops in 1882, however, and in any event is demonstrably incomplete prior to that 
date. In some key sugar districts, the number of Multiple Effects in use prior to 1884 was 
very high. For example, in Pekalongan-Tegal (the north coast area of Central Java, which 
accounted for around one-tenth of Java's sugar exports), around two-thirds of the factories 
were so equipped when the crisis broke. See the information relating to the sugar factories 
in the KV, i.e. Pagongan (KV, 1881); Adiwerna (KV, 1879); Doekoewringin (KV, 1882); 
Kemanglen (KV, 1880); Djatibarang (KV, 1881); Pangka (KV, 1878); Kalimatie (KV, 1878). 
Other similarly equipped factories were Balapoelang (JV, NI Handelsbank, 1882, vol. 10, 
NA Handelsbank); Kemantran (JVFB, vol. 57, 1882, p. 49); Maribaia (JVFB, vol. 58 1883, 
pp. 51-2); Klidang (JVFB, vol. 58, 1883, pp. 51-2).
373 JWA van Soest, De Suikeronderneming Kalibagor, Semarang, Bisschop, 1884, p. 21-4.
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Even so, as late as 1869, more than half of the nearly 100 sugar factories working 
on Government contract in Java were still operating exclusively with water power; 
some 27 had auxiliary steam engines (generally for when water ran short) and only 
11 relied exclusively on steam power for grinding their cane.374 By the mid-1880s, 
however, steam had become increasingly common, both because of the efficiencies 
it offered and because the Indies Government became increasingly concerned about 
the detrimental effects on peasant farming of the diversion of water to the sugar 
factories' mill-race. According to the colonial authorities in Java, in 1871 there had 
been 362 stationary steam engines working in the sugar industry in Java, whereas by 
1881 the number had almost tripled to 998 (it stood at 1232 ten years later).375 To 
be sure, some caution is needed in interpreting these figures, not least because some 
steam engines were undoubtedly auxiliary to water-wheels in the grinding of cane, 
and others were used to provide steam for Vacuum Pans and Multiple Effects (as well 
as to run Centrifuges). Even so, the increase is impressive — and almost enough in 
itself to dispose of the myth of technological 'backwardness' prior to the crisis of the 
mid-1880s.
In some parts of the Java industry, the change-over to steam milling was slow. 
In the important sugar-producing region centred on the Residencies of Pekalongan 
and Tegal on the north coast of Central Java, in particular, it was not until the 1890s 
that the switch from water power as the motive force in grinding cane was complete. 
Given the particular circumstances in which the industry operated, however, this was a 
rational response to environmental circumstances rather than an indicator of inherent 
'backwardness', evaluation of development risks in the mid-nineteenth century being 
distorted here by a New World perspective that pays no attention to differing local 
circumstances. As far as the Java manufacturers were concerned — although the 
peasantry in the locality of the factories presumably saw it rather differently, since it 
was their irrigation systems that were thereby impacted upon — water was a 'free' 
374 The position in the colony as a whole in 1869 was that 57 of the factories operating 
on Government contract (i.e. at that stage about 80 per cent or more of Java's industrial 
sugar factories) used exclusively water-wheels; 27 had auxiliary steam engines and 11 worked 
exclusively with steam engines. See KV, 1870.
375 The data, based on the KV of the relevant years, is in Table 1, 'Use of Steam Power 
in Manufacturing Industry, 1870-1940,' p. 46 of WAIM Segers, Manufacturing Industry 




resource. In particular, for those factories located near the island's central mountain 
ranges, rainfall was often sufficient to replenish streams and rivers, even in the 'dry 
season'. If not, an auxiliary steam engine might well be — and often was — installed. 
Sticking with water power made good economic sense, since it avoided the necessity 
for costly purchases of firewood or (imported) coal. The essential point, however, 
was that, unlike the industry's situation in the Caribbean, where in many places 
watermills were simply not a practical alternative (it was either cattle-mills, windmills 
or steam)376, they were precisely that in Java, where in many areas water was ostensibly 
in plentiful supply.
Moreover, quite emphatically, the relative slowness with which sections of the 
industry moved from water to steam did not preclude the installation of new and more 
powerful grinding mills, together with the adoption of new and improved milling 
techniques. In respect to the latter, by the early 1880s the practice of double-crushing 
the cane was beginning to be adopted at a number of Java factories. At the Kalibagor 
sugar factory, for instance, with its two mills, the arrangement was for the cane to be 
passed initially through the bigger, more powerful one, and subsequently for the cane 
remnants to be ground again [herperst] in the second, smaller mill.377 What happened 
at Kalibagor was indicative of developments of this kind elsewhere in the industry.378 
Indeed, there is substantial evidence from the mid-1870s of a continuous, ongoing 
installation of new machinery related in one way or another to the grinding of cane. 
Inventories of equipment, including the dates of installation, preserved for a number 
of factories on the north coast of Central Java, for example, reveal just how much new 
equipment in this category was put into place there in the decade prior to the sugar 
crisis of 1884-45 and the subsequent 'reconstruction' of the industry.
In 1882, for example, the Kalimatie factory in Pekalongan Residency, owned 
by the second generation of the Dutch colonial family who had built it some forty 
years earlier, was equipped with a new mill (of the Rousselot type patented a decade 
earlier) from the Liverpool firm of Fawcett Preston in the United Kingdom.379 
376 Tann, 'Steam and Sugar', p. 65.
377 Van Soest, Kalibagor, p. 24.
378 KV, 1886 records double crushing of the cane as being adopted at a number of factories, 
including Kalimatie. KV, 1888 says some factories were even crushing cane thrice.
379 For this and other information in this paragraph, see (except where separately noted) 
PA van Blommestein to Factorij, 4.3.1879 & 6.10.1885; 'Overzicht van de Installatie 
van Wonopringgo' [n.d., c. 1908]; 'Beschrijving van de Installatie Kalimatie' [c. 1908], 
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Fawcett Preston had also supplied a middelmolen [middle mill] for Kalimatie in 1874, 
which had subsequently been complimented, five years later, by a voorpersmolen 
[preliminary mill] from the French firm of Fives Lille.380 Other apparatus from Fives 
Lille and Fawcett Preston — notably sets of vlampijp-bouilleur ketels381 [steam boilers 
of significantly improved efficiency] — were installed in this and neighbouring 
factories at various dates between 1875 and the early 1880s.
There were, of course, factories that prior to the crisis were shockingly run-
down and inefficient. Anton baron Sloet van Oldruietenborgh's once-resplendent 
Poerwodadi factory in Madiun Residency was one of them.382 Nonetheless, there 
is no reason to suppose that developments at Kalimatie were exceptional, nor that 
they were confined to one part of the colony. Further east, in Surabaya Residency, 
for example, the Djombang factory could boast by 1884 an assortment of new 
equipment from the celebrated Nottingham firm of Manlove, Alliott & Co in the 
United Kingdom, including a new (steam) mill383, while to the west of Kalimatie, in 
Cirebon Residency, a new steam mill had been installed at the Soerawinangan sugar 
factory some three years earlier, prior to the Campaign of 1881.384 
NHMA, 7945. 'Fawcett Preston Engineering was founded in 1758, by George Perry, as the 
Liverpool branch of the Coalbrookdale Foundry at Ironbridge. It became an independent 
Liverpool company and built up an international reputation, particularly for sugar machinery 
…'. See http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk (accessed 15 August 2014).
380 The engineering firm of Fives Lille emerged (between 1861 and 1865) from the merger/
combination of several pre-existing French enterprises. Its sugar machinery division, founded 
in 1870, was the successor of the mid-century Derosne et Cail companies, already famous in 
the middle decades of the nineteenth century for the manufacture of machinery of this kind. 
See fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fives-Lille.
381 The full name is Vlampijpbouilleurketel (my thanks here to Margaret Leidelmeijer and 
Aart te Velde): around the boiler there were small pipes, through which hot combustion 
gases were forced. In this way it was possible to heat the boiler more quickly thanks to the 
larger heating surface that the arrangement of pipes brought in its train. See QAD Emmen, 
Rietsuikerfabrieken op Java en hare Machinerieën, 4th edn, vol. 2, Tegal, De Boer, 1930, 
pp. 356-62 and the illustrations/diagrams therein.
382 See the file on 'Poerwodadi voor 1888' in NHMA, 7944.
383 See 'Particularieten omtrent de Sf. Djombang', 22.11.1884, in NHMA, 7966. Manlove 
Alliott had been established in 1837 and (in 1914) the company described itself as 'Engineers, 
Colonial and General. Specialities: Engines, Boilers, Sugar Machinery, Oil Mill Plant, Power 
Laundry Plant, Centrifugal Machines, Refuse Destructors. Employees 400'. See en.wikipedia.
org/wiki/Manlove,_Alliott_%26_Co._Ltd.




Of important developments in sugar milling in the third quarter of the 
nineteenth century, only machines for shredding the cane before it was ground — 
which hence facilitated the work of the mills — appear to have been absent from 
the Java industry prior to 1885. Such machines (the 'Ross Cane Cutter' prominent 
among those in use) were certainly in use in Java's industrial sugar factories in the final 
decade of the century, but one leading authority reported their presence there as in 
de laatste tijd [only very recent]. They were used in combination with the increasingly 
wide-spread practice of macerating partially milled cane with water or cane-juice in 
order to obtain a considerably increased juice extraction.385 Again, it looks as if in 
Java, as elsewhere, maceration as a wide-spread manufacturing process only dated 
from the period after the sugar crisis of 1884, when sugar makers worldwide became 
increasingly desperate to increase the efficiency of their operations.
Even so, this was emphatically not a sign of some newly discovered interest in 
technological advance in the factory. Quite the contrary: the situation in this respect 
after 1884 had deep roots in ongoing developments over the preceding decades which 
stretched back into the middle years of the century. International comparisons are 
important here, and a singularly revealing one is between Java in the 1870s and early 
1880s and the burgeoning sugar industry to its south in north-eastern Australia's 
Queensland. As recent scholarship has demonstrated, contemporary Queensland 
lagged substantially behind Java in terms of the installation of the Vacuum Pan, which 
only arrived there in the 1870s, almost forty years after its first 'pioneering' appearance 
in Java. (As we saw in an earlier chapter, Java's industrial sugar factories were already 
extensively equipped with Vacuum Pans by the late 1850s — and such Pans had 
begun to be installed twenty or more years before that.) Likewise with Multiple Effect 
apparatus: though its first appearance in Australia dated from 1878, it only began to 
be installed there in any numbers almost a decade later, and hence somewhat later 
than in Java. However, for reasons that perhaps had to do with the availability of 
firewood as well as with the greater efficiency of cane-grinding, 'sugar mills relying 
on steam power to drive the crushing rollers were very common in Australia during 
385 Griggs (Global Industry, Local Innovation, p. 191-2) notes that they were beginning to be 
used in the technologically rapidly advancing sugar industry of colonial Queensland at about 
the same time. For example, CSR (probably the most progressive of the Australian sugar 
owners) installed a shredder at one of its Queensland factories in 1889. The 'Ross' cutter itself 
was only patented in 1896. See http://www.vintagemachinery.org under EW Ross & Co, 
Fulton NY & Springfied OH, USA (accessed 15 August 2014).
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the late 1860s and 1870s'386, whereas, as we have seen, their installation in the Java 
industry was altogether less pronounced.
Other comparisons show Java in an even better light. As we saw in an earlier 
chapter, some Multiple Effects, for example, may have been installed in a few locations 
(probably refineries) in the Indian subcontinent late in the nineteenth century, but 
elsewhere, in Mauritius, the Phillippines and East Asia, they were notable for their 
absence from raw sugar manufacture until the opening decades of the following 
century. The weight of evidence, in short, is that Java sugar in the decade or so 
prior to the crisis of the mid-1880s was no laggard in respect to the technology of 
manufacture, and it compared well with other contemporary industries elsewhere in 
Asia and adjoining regions.
Science in Field and Factory
Technology, of course, was not everything. Improved machines did much to make 
the grinding of cane more efficient, either directly through the installation of better, 
heavier mills or through significant improvements in the efficiency of the boilers 
powering the mills in cases where steam had supplanted water power. Even so, a 
greater expression of juice from the cane brought potential problems in its train. In 
particular, it meant that the juice now contained a greater percentage of impurities 
that might adversely affect the final quality of the sugar. It was at this point that 
the 'sugar chemist' — already present in the industry — became ever more vital to 
the success of the entire operation. In the case of the Java industry, dating from the 
1850s, there was a recognition in official circles (the industry being primarily in the 
Indies Government's orbit until the 1870s and 1880s) that the chemistry of sugar 
manufacture needed to be investigated. At this time, the Dutch colonial authorities, 
both in The Hague and in Java itself, sponsored the work of several chemists whose 
concerns were with what happened both in the cane field and in the factory. Their 
work (despite some discontinuities) formed the basis for developments that saw the 
Java industry brought firmly into the sphere of applied chemistry during the middle 
decades of the nineteenth century.
Of particular importance here was the work of the Utrecht University's 
Professor GJ Mulder, scientific advisor to the Dutch Colonial Office (whom we 
386 Griggs, Global Industry, Local Innovation, pp. 175-94. The quotation comes from p. 179.
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met in the previous chapter in the context of his clash with Thomas Edwards), 
and his erstwhile disciple PFH Fromberg, who carried on major research in the 
Indies Government's Landbouwchemisch Laboratorium (Chemical-Agricultural 
Laboratory) at Buitenzorg (present-day Bogor) in West Java in the 1850s and 1860s. 
As well as his prominent role in field science, he oversaw experiments in Java in the 
most effective handling of cane-juice during its clarification and reduction into a 
viscous liquid.387 This pioneering Dutch work was important, above all, because it 
addressed questions relating to sugar cane — a subject of minimal interest, of course, 
to the savants of the German beet sugar industry that had otherwise rapidly become 
the front-runner in matters relating to sugar science. German research was heavily 
focused on the conversion of liquid sucrose into sugar and, needless to say, was little 
concerned with the milling of sugar cane. The work done by Mulder, Fromberg et al., 
dealt, however, with the Java-specific cultivation of cane — and, very prominently, 
with issues concerned with the expression of cane-juice in the grinding mill (and to 
some extent with its subsequent treatment along the production line).
To be sure, there were disputes among the savants and their Government 
backers as to whether scientific investigation should focus on the cultivation of cane 
rather than the manufacturing process. Fromberg was of the former persuasion, 
arguing in essence that the manufacturers themselves could be relied upon to operate 
efficiently in their own sphere (as Edwards had indeed asserted). Mulder, though, 
was a keen (not to say ferocious) advocate of the need to understand the chemistry of 
the milling of cane and to improve thereby the whole process of juice extraction.388 
Despite such disputes — which appear to have contributed to the shutting-down of 
the Indies Government's Buitenzorg laboratory in 1860, two years after Fromberg's 
death — there is no lack of evidence that the middle decades of the nineteenth century 
saw a deal of Dutch scientific expertise brought to bear on the problems facing the 
Java sugar industry in both field and factory. It was an important forshadowing of 
what was to come.
387 GJ Mulder (1802-1880) was one of the most outstanding chemists of nineteenth-century 
Holland, and a man with an international reputation. His academic career had begun in 
Rotterdam (1828) and continued at the University of Utrecht (1840). He acted as advisor to 
both the NHM and the Dutch Colonial Office, and it was on his advice that the Landbouw-
Chemisch Laboratorium [Laboratory for Agricultural Chemistry] was established in the 
Indies in 1851 (at Buitenzorg/Bogor, in West Java) with PFH Fromberg at its head. For an 
account of Mulder's and Fromberg's careers, see Leidelmeijer, Grootbedrijf, pp. 195-8, 202-3.
388 Leidelmeijer, Grootbedrijf, pp. 209-29.
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From around 1860 onward, as one student of the North American cane sugar 
industry has remarked:
[c]hemical analysis transformed the … sugar factory by rapidly supplying 
answers to problems that had previously perplexed the operator … Management 
increasingly relied on analytical data to control processes … Exact weights and 
volumes were now a crucial parameter of plant efficiency and product quality.389
In this context, moreover, European beet sugar industries — particularly those of 
newly Imperial Germany — largely set the pace. This was reflected in the fact that 
German know-how and personnel became increasingly evident in Java. The early 
career of Samuel Cornelis van Musschenbroek (1857-1914), subsequently a leading 
figure — indeed, perhaps the leading figure — in Java's sugar industry, was a prime 
case in point. Born and educated in the Netherlands, he had initially arrived in Java 
to work in a sugar factory newly acquired by distant relatives. Subsequently, however, 
early in the 1880s, he took himself to Germany and spent almost two years studying 
the chemistry of sugar — as well as observing the formidable political clout of a well-
organised industry. He came back to apply both lessons in the Dutch colony. He was 
one of the driving forces behind the establishment in Java in the mid-1880s of the 
research stations that were eventually fused into the Java industry's world-famous 
Proefstation [Research Institute] in Pasuruan, in the heart of the East Java sugar belt.390 
In the decade before the formal establishment of resarch stations, however, 
chemists were already active in Java's more advanced sugar factories, creating in the 
process the embryo of the well-staffed and elaborately equipped factory laboratories 
that later became so characteristic of the Javanese sugar industry. Dates varied: at 
Kalibagor, for instance, it was 1884 before the cane-juice was routinely subjected to 
chemical analysis by a chemist. Significantly, the chemist concerned was said to be 
employed in other sugar factories in a neighbouring Residency.391 Likewise, in the less 
'remote' sugar factories owned or managed by the NHM in the north-coast sugar belt 
of Central Java, a German chemist (a Dr Ostermann) was already employed at the 
beginning of the 1880s — and possibly even earlier.392 It was no accident, therefore, 
389 Heitman, Louisiana Sugar Industry, pp. 27-9.
390 Leidelmeijer, Grootbedrijf, pp. 235-6; G Roger Knight, Commodities and Colonialism: 
The Story of Big Sugar in Indonesia, 1880-1942, Leiden & Boston, Brill, 2013, pp. 98-111.
391 van Soest, Kalibagor, pp. 20-1.
392 Extract letter [Superintendent] Steven Everts to Factorij Batavia, 15.1.1881/30, NHMA, 
7936. Dr L Ostermann subsequently played a key role in the establishment of the Proefstation 
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that in 1885 the pioneering Proefstation West Java [Research Station West Java] was 
established in this same area or that it was 'under the direction of a chemist and a 
specialised physicist — both Germans'.393
Donald Lucassen and the Diffusion Process for Extracting Sucrose
What also excited the attention of Java's sugar industrialists in the early 1880s, was a 
way of processing cane which might offer better extraction rates than did conventional 
milling. This was the system of diffusion.394 Adapted to cane processing from the 
beet sugar industries of northern Europe, where slicing the beets and submerging 
them in water was the standard way of extracting their sucrose through osmosis, it 
involved the mechanical chopping-up of the cane stalks before their submersion. The 
resultant sucrose-rich liquid — singularly free of the impurities that grinding the 
cane invariably brought to cane-juice — was then drained off and heavily reduced 
before being processed in the normal manner through the Multiple Effect, Vacuum 
Pan and Centrifuge. To some industry leaders it seemed — possibly — the way of 
the future. Among them was Donald Lucassen, second-generation owner of a sugar 
factory on the north coast of Central Java. (His father was the Colonel Lucassen 
whose pioneering activities we explored earlier in this book.) The younger Lucassen 
had been born in Java, lived there for much of his life and was to die there — in the 
East Java town of Malang — in 1892.395
His long stay in Java (contrary to many stereotypes) evidently did nothing to 
stifle his bent for improvement. In 1888 he encountered a fellow-manufacturer from 
Louisiana in the workshops of the firm of Fives Lille, great French fabricators of Multiple 
Effect apparatus — and of equipment for the diffusion process. The American, Harvey 
Wiley, was convinced by Lucassen 'that the diffusion cells designed and fabricated 
by the … Fives Lille Company were superior to those of its competitors'. Wiley 
evidently thought highly of his new acquaintance, whom he correctly identified as 'an 
West Java [Experiment Station West Java], was Directeur of the Mestfabriek [Fertiliser Factory] 
Semarang, a firm that both produced and imported fertiliser for sugar factories, and became 
co-owner of a sugar factory in the Principalities. See Leidelmeijer, Grootbedrijf, pp. 238-9.
393 JVFB, vol. 60, 1885, p. 14.
394 See e.g. Heitman, Louisiana Sugar Industry, pp. 52, 59-62.
395 Donald FW Lucassen was born in Batavia in 1837, died in Malang in 1892 and was the 
owner of Doekoewringin. He was married to Adriana Casparina Minetta van Benthem van 
den Bergh (born in Zaltbommel in 1839, died in Heemstede in 1916).
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influential planter from Java who was 
instrumental in the Javan diffusion 
tests on sugar cane'.396 Indeed, 
early in the decade, Lucassen had 
formed part of a small commission 
set up in Java to investigate the 
potential for diffusion in the island's 
sugar factories.397 One factory in 
Cirebon Residency (Djatiwangi) 
had experimented with diffusion 
as early as the mid-1870s398, and 
Lucassen himself appears to have 
installed some quantity of diffusion 
apparatus at his Wonopringgo sugar 
factory late in the following decade 
— as, indeed, his presence at Fives 
Lille implied.
In fact, however, diffusion 
was not the way of the future, at least 
not in Java. One authoritative report 
on the situation in the colony in the 
1890s noted the potential of this adaption of beet sugar technology to the processing 
of cane, 'without it having gained general acceptance'. Diffusion certainly got more 
sucrose out of the cane than did grinding, but it needed more skilled workmen if it 
was to succeed, and a great deal of fuel was consumed in boiling down the resultant, 
much diluted cane-juice.399 One verdict, passed early in the twentieth century, was 
396 Heitman, Louisiana Sugar Industry, p. 143.
397 Its members consisted of GMW Zuur (owner of Djatiwangi), Lucassen, Steven Everts 
(Superintendant of Sugar Factories for the NHM) and JS Bowles (co-owner of Kadhipaten). 
See John Millard, Riet en Bietsuiker in Verband tot de Suikerindustrie op Java: Voordracht ter 
Aanprizing van eene Proef met Diffusie op Java, Gravenhage, Couvee, 1884, pp. 44-5. For 
Zuur (born in Leiden in 1831, died in Bandung in 1911) and his career, see http://www.
myheritage.nl/æ/djatiwangi-suikerfabriek-djatiw (accessed 15 August 2014).
398 Millard, Riet en Bietsuiker, p. 44.
399 Prinsen Geerligs, Korte Handleiding, pp. 25-6.
Figure 17: Donald Lucassen: a leading 
figure in the on-going modernisation 
of the Java industry in the 1870s and 
1880s.
Source: Koninklijk Instituut voor Taal-, Land- 
en Volkenkunde, Leiden, no. 8061
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that '… as yet [diffusion] has not yet met with general approval, and has even turned 
out a complete failure in most cases'.400 
The Metamorphosis of the Java Sugar Factory
These several developments, touching on the milling of cane, the possibilities for 
the supplanting of milling by diffusion and, arguably most important of all, the 
introduction into the factory of Multiple Effect apparatus of one kind of another, 
reflected — and were reflected in — the unique metamorphosis of the Java sugar 
factory during the course of the nineteenth and early twentieth century. The 
Wonopringgo factory that Thomas Edwards had managed in the 1850s remained 
operational on the same site until it finally closed down more than three-quarters of 
a century later in 1933, at the height of the inter-war depression that came near to 
annihilating the entire Java industry. Whether Edwards would have readily recognised 
the final successor to the enterprise of the 1850s, however, is a moot point, since in the 
intervening years it had undergone a great increase in physical size and appearance, 
with an interior totally redesigned and re-equipped. Yet its location had not changed, 
and the changes that had taken place over the decades were incremental rather than 
radically and dramatically transformative. Moreover, Wonopringgo's owners and/or 
financiers were and remained the NHM, the Dutch company into whose hands it 
had come in the 1840s.
These elements of continuity — or at least some of them — were common to 
much of the Java industry. The point is most readily illustrated, not from the history of 
Wonopringgo itself, but from that of a factory some fifty kilometres away, in the same 
'sugar belt' that had grown up on this part of the north coast of Central Java during 
the middle decades of the nineteenth century. The 1920s (the leap forward in time 
here is justified by the purpose of the present argument) was a period of unparalleled 
prosperity for colonial sugar capital. Among the industry's predominantly Dutch 
owners, the new-fangled aerial photography — an invention that dated only from the 
First World War — was much in vogue as a way of showing off and recording their 
achievements. One such photograph is particularly revealing. It shows the Pagongan 
factory on the outskirts of the town of Tegal, on the north coast of Central Java. 
Pagongan had started out, a hundred years or so earlier, as a simple cattle-operated 
mill of the kind that had existed throughout the coastal districts of Central and East 
400 Prinsen Geeligs, Cane Sugar, pp. 107-13.
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Java prior to the inauguration of the Cultuurstelsel in 1830. Almost two decades 
later, at the end of the 1840s, its fortunes had changed and it began to evolve into a 
recognisably modern sugar factory.
The basis of the transformation was the fact that the van Blommestein family, 
who already operated one such sugar factory further east along the coast, near the 
small town of Batang, was successful in securing a Government contract for Pagongan 
as well.401 The family's prior history was crucial to what happened next. The family 
patriarch, Hermanus van Blommestein, had held the position of harbour-master at 
Semarang prior to becoming a sugar Contractor for the Indies Government in the 
late 1830s. This position involved the collection of port duties and the like, and 
would have brought him into close contact with the town's large Chinese-Indonesian 
mercantile community. The connection served his family well later in the century 
when Hermanus's son, Adriaan van Blommestein, found himself in financial 
difficulties. Most immediately, however, it led the family in the 1850s to transfer the 
contract at Pagongan (de facto if not de jure) to a number of associates, among them 
the leading Chinese-Indonesian businessman in the town of Tegal itself. Identified in 
Dutch transliteration as one Tan Siong Kang, he was (presumably) a scion of the Tan 
business dynasty from Semarang.
Not only Chinese money was involved in Pagongan, however, since one of 
the guarantors of the Pagongan contract — and hence presumably a stakeholder of 
some kind — was the Semarang-based firm of Dorrepaal & Co. By the late 1840s, 
the firm was already on the road to becoming the biggest single financier of the sugar 
industry in the whole of Central Java.402 The NHM factorij was also an interested 
party. Pagongan was one of that small minority of factories operating in the early days 
of the Cultuurstelsel with 'free disposal' of all the sugar it produced. That is to say, its 
owners could sell their sugar freely on the open market, rather than having to deliver 
it to the Indies Government at a fixed price. This enabled Pagongan's owners to 
401 The key references to the mid-century situation at Pagongan discussed in this and the 
following paragraphs are to be found in the voluminous file on the factory and its history 
in VMK, 8.4.1870/17 & NFB, 6.3.1858/364. The contract between Tan and the NHM 
stipulated that Tan would consign output for 1858, estimated at 5000 piculs to the factorij, in 
return for a loan of 36 000 guilders, payable in Tegal in monthly amounts. Ostensibly at least, 
Pagongan was taken over in 1863 by A Beijer & JC van der Palm (NFB, 6.3.1858/364). On 
Tan specifically, see chapter 4, above.
402 On the genesis of the firm, see Bosma & Raben, pp. 119-21.
198
G Roger Knight
consign the factory's output to the NHM, in return for working capital and possibly 
more substantial and long-term finance. Trust was obviously not paramount in the 
arrangement. As part of the deal, Tan Siong Kang had to hand over to the NHM's 
local agent a key to his Tegal warehouse, where Pagongan's sugar would be stored.
The upshot of all this manoeuvring was that the factory was substantially re-
equipped with, among other things, a steam engine running its grinding mills — 
something of a rarity in this part of Java in the mid-nineteenth century. This was 
the beginning of a series of developments that can be viewed from the air, as it were, 
in the 1920s photograph. Hidden away in the centre of this (by then) middle-size 
sugar factory of the late colonial era was what we can safely identify as the 'original' 
Pagongan. This was the one built by Tan Siong Kang and his associates around the 
middle of the nineteenth century on the site of the original cattle mill. Thereafter, 
the factory, like Topsy, 'just grow'd'. At a rough guess, by the 1920s the factory's 
Figure 18: Like Topsy, she 'just grow'd': the Pagongan sugar factory, North-
Central Java, from the air in the 1920s, showing its mid-nineteenth-century core.
Source: Courtesy of the author
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footprint had increased tenfold — the photograph shows big 'new' sheds (dating 
from 1905) at the front and older ones on each side. They virtually conceal the earlier 
building. Meanwhile, Pagongan's output had grown accordingly: in the 1850s, it 
produced around 300 MT (5000 piculs) of sugar annually, whereas by the time the 
photograph was taken it was approaching 9000 MT.403 In short, on the same site, and 
without any serious discontinuity of operation, Pagongan — now owned by a big 
Dutch conglomerate, the Javasche Cultuurmaatschappij — had been transformed 
from a cattle mill into a fully industrialised manufacturing unit.
In global terms, this was a highly unusual if not unique development — certainly 
among major producers for the international market. Worldwide, the evolution of 
industrial manufacture during the course of the nineteenth century posed serious 
problems for many existing producers. The old 'estate-cum-factory' unit — with 
its notionally finite capacity for expansion — was placed under threat, and either 
dissolved into larger units of production or remained as a major impediment to further 
progress.404 Factories needed to be relocated and radically restructured in relation to 
their agrarian context in order to meet the requirements of the industrial project in 
sugar. Writing of the situation that faced the Cuba industry in the second half of the 
nineteenth century, one of its foremost historians argued that the development of 
fully industrialised production was dependent on the appearance of
a new kind of mill … a separate phenomena, requiring such a radical 
transformation that it could not grow out of the narrow foundation of the 
old type … [The latter] was simply liquidated. The big sugar industry was a 
separate phenomenon, springing from new concepts and using none of the 
elements of the old mill. All that went before … had to be demolished and a 
new factory built.405 
Elsewhere, the converse happened. In the case of the 'French' Caribbean, its 
leading historian contends that
403 Figures from NFB, 6.3.1858/364 & ASNI, vol. 39, no. 1, 1931, p. 92.
404 For a preliminary discussion, see Ulbe Bosma & G Roger Knight, 'Global Factory and 
Local Field: Convergence and Divergence in the International Cane-Sugar Industry, 1850-
1940', International Review of Social History, vol. 49, no. 1, April 2004, pp. 1-26.
405 Moreno-Fraginals, The Sugar Mill, p. 83. This was perhaps a somewhat exaggerated 
account, but it is noteworthy that Laird Bergad, in his richly documented study of Matanzas 
province, remarks that in the 1880s '[o]ver and over again the story is similar. Old mills 
[Ingenios] were abandoned or fell into disrepair, production plummeted or ceased, debts 
accrued and properties were auctioned to the highest bidder' (Cuban Rural Society, p. 295).
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the existing estate system froze the framework for organising land, labour 
and the technology of sugar manufacture. It was difficult for already existing 
plantations to increase significantly the scale of their operations or to modify 
their technical and social organisation … the re-organisation of production 
was inhibited and the existing constraints on production were reproduced and 
strengthened.406
The contrast with Java was pronounced.407 One of the singular features of the Java 
sugar industry — Pagongan was no exception — was that its factories enjoyed a 
literal continuity of existence for a century or more, up to and beyond the end of 
colonialism itself. A quite remarkable metamorphosis from proto-industrial (and in 
some case from pre-industrial) sugar manufacture to the fully industrial modern sugar 
factory took place there within the physical framework of production which came 
into existence in the 1830s and 1840s. Factories changed hands and a significant 
number of new ones were added, particularly in areas subsequently 'opened up' for 
sugar after the initial period of expansion in the mid-nineteenth century. Nonetheless, 
the network of factories established under the auspices of the Cultuurstelsel remained 
in place, added to here, subtracted from there, until the inter-war depression of the 
1930s — and beyond. One great survivor was the Sragi factory in Pekalongan, dating 
in its original form from the late 1830s. It was still in production on the same site at 
the time of writing in the early twenty-first century.
This metamorphosis of the Java sugar factory was made possible by the 
agrarian dimension in which the industry came to be located in the middle decades 
of the nineteenth century. Java, in this context as in others, took a singular path. By 
international standards, the sugar industry that developed in Java during the middle 
decades of the nineteenth century — at least that part of it (the major part) that 
grew up under the aegis of the Cultuurstelsel — was uniquely situated in regard to 
406 Tomich, Slavery in the Circuit of Sugar, p. 76.
407 Jock Galloway's remarks ('The Modernisation of Sugar Production in Southeast Asia', 
pp. 3-5) about the 'rise' of the 'centralised factory' in Java betrays his unfamiliarity with the 
literature, especially the literature written in Dutch. In reality, Java did not (for the most part) 
develop a central factory system such as existed in the Caribbean, notably Cuba, by the early 
twentieth century. Instead, it continued to rely predominantly on factories that were, on 
average, rather small by international standards, and on whose rayon or areaal [i.e. the area 
officially accorded to the sugar factories for the rental of land for cane planting] cane was 
raised by direct farming organised and supervised by the personnel of each factory. See e.g. 
Knight, Commodities, pp. 54-8.
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its access to land. As we saw in a previous chapter, each of the 100 or so 'contract' 
factories set up under the Stelsel between the 1830s and 1850s was assigned a so-
called beschikkingskring or kring. From fields within the kring, the factories contracted 
to the Indies Government obtained their raw material and drew much of their labour. 
The essential point about the kring, however, was that it proved — unlike the legally 
delineated unit of the estate or plantation — to be a flexible basis for expanding 
future production. With the phasing-out of the Cultuurstelsel, as far as the production 
of cane was concerned during the course of the 1880s, the kring became what was 
usually designated as the factory's rayon or 'procurement zone'. It could be increased 
in size (albeit within limits imposed by the Indies Government), and within it cane 
could be raised in innovative and highly productive ways.
In consequence, the Java industry was not hamstrung by an agrarian-cum-
agricultural matrix that confined its future growth. Almost fortuitously (as it would 
appear), the Cultuurstelsel had created a basis for the industry in the lowlands of rural 
Java that allowed ongoing modernisation without the need for radical reconstruction. 
The agrarian matrix, constructed to supply the industry with land and labour under 
its aegis during the 1830s and 1840s, had the capacity to expand in tandem with 
the requirements of industrial manufacture. Matching machinery to 'plantation' 
was vital. Back in the 1820s, for example, the British-colonial firm of Trail & Co, 
operating with recently updated, imported machinery in the proximity of Batavia, 
where labour was scarce, lamented that it was largely 'the want of hands' that have 
'prevented our carrying on the culture of the sugar cane upon a sufficiently large 
scale to correspond to the powerful execution our machinery is capable of …'408 The 
situation facing the industrial project operating under the aegis of the Cultuurstelsel 
two decades later was substantially different. An inherent degree of flexibility in the 
agricultural matrix created during the decades of the mid-nineteenth century allowed 
for a sufficient degree of expansion to sustain an ongoing process of technological-
scientific advance without a prior requirement for the reconstruction of the entire 
unit of production. As was rarely the case elsewhere, the field did not constrain the 
factory.
The upshot (as we have seen in detail in the preceding pages) was that by 
the early 1880s — on the eve of the international sugar crisis of 1884 — the Java 
industry, by virtue of the technologically advanced state of a significant number of its 
408 Trail & Co to NHM, quoted in NFB, 11.4.1826/5.
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factories, was well placed to survive the major upheaval. By the same token, moreover, 
the industry had attained a position in respect to both the technology and science 
of sugar production that placed it well ahead of any of its erstwhile counterparts 
elsewhere in Asia and the Indian Ocean and — broadly speaking — on par with 
most other major cane sugar producers worldwide. As such, Java sugar had come 
to constitute a major industrial project. It is to the future of that project — how it 
evolved through the crisis years of the mid-1880s and beyond — to which we can 
now turn by way of conclusion.
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The Future of an Industrial Project: The 1880s 
and Beyond
During the middle decades of the nineteenth century (1830s-1880s), Java became, 
perhaps somewhat surprisingly, a world leader in the industrialised manufacture of 
sugar. It thereby laid the foundations for the Dutch colony's transformation into 
the 'Oriental Cuba', an Asian counterpart of the foremost of the sugar industries in 
the New World. It did so, as we have seen in the preceding account, on the basis of 
a number of complementary developments. One was the determination in Dutch 
colonial circles from the late 1820s onward to develop a proto-command economy in 
the Indies, with a view to exploiting the agricultural resources of Java, in particular, 
as the basis for large-scale production of 'world' commodities — the profits from 
which would flow back to an impoverished Holland. Though not envisaged initially 
as such, sugar became the centre-piece of the new Cultuurstelsel or System of [State] 
Cultivations (even though coffee continued to supply the greater part of the island's 
exports until sometime in the 1880s); and the state's largesse, in the form of capital 
loans, working capital, commandeered access to land and to local, servile labour was 
absolutely crucial to the establishment of the industrial project.
The Indies Government's achievement was twofold. Its ability to harness to 
the Stelsel — and in so-doing greatly expand — an elaborate labour-service regime 
that it had inherited from the pre-colonial state combined with a transformative 
'peasantisation' of the island's rural social-economic formation. In tandem, these 
developments created an agrarian basis for sugar production which had few or no 
parallels elsewhere in the international sugar economy of the period. The upshot 
was a sugar complex, embedded in a much larger 'peasant' economy based on the 
cultivation of rice and second crops, which eschewed plantations and slaves and 
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operated instead in the context of the forced labour of peasants and of 'cane-gardens' 
comprising fields taken from peasant farmers on a rotational basis. Very neatly, though 
largely contingently, the Stelsel exploited peasants without (formally) expropriating 
them, though its effective operation depended to a degree on a skewed access to 
resources in 'village' Java which was vital to the supply of labour that the industrial 
project required.
Even so, many of the state officials who put the Cultuurstelsel into place over 
a couple of decades in the middle of the nineteenth century had only limited time 
for the high technology and major capital expense of an increasingly developed and 
ongoing industrial project in sugar. Indeed, some of them suspected that such a 
project might have a disruptive impact on the order of Javanese rural society. Despite 
the degree of colonial reconstruction of the rural world under the auspices of the 
state which took place over the course of the nineteenth century, the conservation of 
the 'peasantry' was nonetheless a prime concern of what was becoming — from the 
mid-century onward — an increasingly formalised and self-conscious bureaucracy. In 
these circumstances, the driving force behind the industrial project was not so much 
the Indies bureaucracy as the Indies bourgeoisie.
Almost despite itself, the Cultuurstelsel fostered the growth of a 'colonial' 
bourgeoisie whose family ties linked it both to the Indies bureaucracy and, even more 
importantly, to its metropolitan counterpart. Indeed, it did something to invigorate 
the latter. As with Cuba and metropolitan Spain at around the same time, it would 
be possible to make out a case for the 'peripheral' tail wagging the metropolitan 
dog. Be that as it may, the critical point for the furtherance of the industrial project 
in sugar was that this emergent bourgeoisie — of sugar manufacturers, merchants, 
speculators and rent-seekers — came to its support at a vital moment. It did so just 
when the Indies Government lost interest in the further implementation in Java of 
the technological revolution in sugar manufacture which was the hallmark of the 
international sugar economy as beet fought it out with cane during the middle 
decades of the nineteenth century.
What the bourgeouisie engendered was a Creole industrial enterprise centred 
on sugar. They imported both the machinery (initially with subventions from the 
colonial treasury) and the people needed to maintain, repair and rebuild it. In 
conjunction with a skilled local workforce, they created a nucleus of engineering 
and scientific know-how which kept the industry moving forward. Backed by the 
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quasi-governmental Netherlands Trading Society (NHM) — which in this matter 
was closely aligned to bourgeois interests in the colony — and by other major trading 
concerns and individual capitalists, sugar manufacture was able to generate sufficient 
profit to finance the continued industrialisation of production.
In the mid-1880s, however, the Indies bourgeoisie ran into difficulties when 
the world price of sugar suddenly collapsed after a slow decline over a decade or more. 
At this point, their deep-rooted and constantly renewed connections with Holland 
came to the rescue of sugar capital (if not of particular capitalists), and it proved 
possible to reconstruct the financial basis of the industry, albeit on a footing that 
removed much of the overall control from colony to metropolis. Such was the secular 
history of finance and management in the industry, however, that the dichotomy 
is a largely misleading one. From the 1830s onward, a situation had developed in 
Java in which both state and bourgeois capital came together to finance the ongoing 
development of the sugar industry. The Cultuurstelsel, far from suppressing the growth 
of mercantile capital in the colony, created rich opportunities for it. The trade in sugar, 
increasingly in 'private' hands circa 1850 onward, appears to have constituted the 
largest source of such capital accumulation, though other export commodities also 
played a role, as did a parallel growth in imports. An equally critical point, however, 
was that the emergence of an Indies bourgeoisie meant that support for the industrial 
project in Java sugar was intimately bound up with its long-standing interface with 
its metropolitan counterpart. A crucial consequence of this association was that the 
industrial project was able to weather the mid-1880s crisis rather than succumb to it.
A glance at what happened — or rather, did not happen — in the notionally 
comparable sugar colonies of Mauritius and the Philippines in the late nineteenth 
century is instructive. Both were seemingly well-placed around the middle of the 
century to undergo similar developments to those which occurred in Java circa 1850 
onward. Subsequent to the crisis, sugar production in the Dutch colony reached its 
apogee during a period of renewed and ongoing expansion which began in the late 
1880s and lasted until the onset of the inter-war depression of the 1930s (an event 
that reduced the industry, temporarily, to a mere shadow of its former self ).409 During 
this period, the Java industry, having lost markets in the West which had sustained its 
409 For a review of developments in the late nineteenth century, see Knight, Commodities 




mid-nineteenth growth, developed a vital 'Asia Connection'. In so doing, it became 
the prime supplier of industrially manufactured sugar to markets in China, India and 
Japan. The Java industry sustained this connection by building a labour-intensive 
agro-industry in Java itself which compensated for the island's relative paucity of land. 
In short, the industrial project in sugar had a great future in Java. In the immediate 
circumstances in which the Java industry found itself in the mid-1880s, however, it 
looked as if it might have no future at all.
By this time, the majority of Java's colonial sugar factories were well on the way 
to making the transition to a fully industrialised mode of operation, predicated on the 
incorporation into the production line of Multiple Effect apparatus to bring about 
continuous process manufacture. While this involved manufacturers in considerable 
financial outlays, it was judged as justified in terms of the improved quality and 
quantity of the product and, importantly, in terms of substantially reduced fuel costs. 
The upshot was that it kept the Java industry well abreast of other advanced sectors 
of the international sugar economy in terms of the technology of manufacture. 
Elsewhere in Asia itself (with a few exceptions in the Indian subcontinent) there was 
no parallel until the early twentieth century to what was already taking place in Java 
two or three decades earlier. In short, nothing could be further from the truth than 
the old canard (promoted by late colonial industrialists and financiers seeking to 
boost their own achievements) that in the wake of the crisis of 1884, metropolitan 
capital moved to take over a moribund 'state enterprise' that was desperately in need 
of re-capitalisation and modernisation.
Nonetheless, the effects of that crisis — the sudden emergence of what would 
now be called a 'bear market' in the international sugar economy — threatened to 
nullify all the manifold advances of the preceding decades. Precipitated by a crisis of 
overproduction — itself a consequence of the struggle for hegemony in world markets 
between cane and beet sugar — and by stagnating demand, it saw the industrially 
manufactured form of the commodity ('centrifugal' sugar) lose between one-third 
and one-half its value in the course of a few months.410 Worldwide, industrial sugar 
producers and their financiers were faced with bankruptcy. The situation of the Java 
410 The most richly detailed modern account of the crisis of 1884 and its aftermath (on 
which I gratefully draw in what follows) is to be found in Claver, Dutch Commerce and Chinese 
Merchants, pp. 109-48.
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industry was no exception. By 1885, several locally based firms with a big stake in the 
industry had gone to the wall, while others teetered on the verge of collapse.
Yet all was not lost. The steep drop in price meant that industrially manufactured 
sugar was now within the reach of consumers for whom it had previously been, at 
best, an expensive and rare luxury. This was particularly the case in Asia, where newly 
modern people in newly modern cities were looking for newly modern commodities 
— white, factory-made sugar among them. Those industrial sugar manufacturers 
who were able to accommodate themselves to the much lower price for their product 
prevailing after 1884 were able to enter expanding markets largely closed to them 
hitherto by the lower price of (and consumer preference for) artisan-made sugar, 
some of it locally produced. This transformation of the commodity's Asian market, a 
transformation that was embryonic in the closing decades of the nineteenth century 
and was still continuing in and beyond the 1930s, was something from which the 
industrial project in Java sugar was able to benefit. Indeed, its future lay there.
In the 1880s, however, that future was still some way off, and the industry 
was saved most immediately, as we have already seen, by timely interventions made 
possible by the long-nurtured connections between the 'Indies' bourgeoisie, who 
owned and ran the bulk of the Java industry when the crisis hit, and their metropolitan 
counterparts. In smoke-filled rooms along the 'grand canals' of the Heerengracht and 
Keizersgracht, in what was then the commercial heart of Amsterdam, plans were 
set in motion to rescue a colonial industrial project in which so many friends and 
relatives had a stake.
By and large, the plans worked. The colony's sugar factories came increasingly 
into the orbit of Netherlands-based financiers. Under their aegis, metropolitan 
capital played an important role — albeit only in the short term — in substantial 
reconstruction of the basis on which the production and sale of the commodity 
was financed. In the longer term, however, it was not metropolitan finance that 
underpinned the industry's survival and, crucially, its resumed growth. Rather, it was 
the industry's ability to finance its expansion on the basis of retained profits. In part, 
this was predicated on a business culture, in a uniquely financially self-contained 
industry with few 'outside' investors, which privileged such investment in place of 
the payment of generous dividends. As a business strategy, however, it also relied on 
the sheer amount of money that was to be made from a highly sophisticated (not to 
say ruthless) exploitation of Java's agrarian resources.
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As this suggests, finance was only a part of the explanation for the industrial 
project's salvation. What also mattered — and mattered very substantially — were 
economic and social conditions in the lowlands of East and Central Java, where 
the overwhelming majority of the island's sugar factories were located. There, a 
combination of agrarian circumstances in the 1880s and 1890s proved instrumental 
in keeping the project afloat. What the industrial project needed to 'get it back on its 
feet' was an access to land and irrigation water which was not unduly trammelled by 
considerations of the 'opportunity cost' of growing cane relative to other crops, and 
a workforce that was numerous enough to keep wages low and workers malleable. By 
and large, this was what it got.
The old arrangements under which the industry had secured raw material and 
labourers during the heyday of the Cultuurstelsel had been completely phased out by 
the mid-1880s. Compulsory labour- service in sugar fields and factories was a thing of 
the past, as was the state's seasonal requisition of land for the growing of cane. These 
arrangements were replaced, however, by new ones that, in terms of access to land (if 
not to labour), maintained the industry's hegemony over rural resources. Under the 
new dispensation, sugar factories rented the land they needed from peasant farmers in 
quantities and at a price that sometimes owed a great deal to the connivance of local-
level state officials and almost invariably to that of suitably bribed village headmen. 
In some parts of the island, at least, the industry also managed to come to mutually 
advantageous understandings with better-off, 'big' peasants who might use their 
influence with their less economically strong clients. The industry was also generally 
successful in maintaining control over the irrigation water, often in short supply, so 
vital to the success of the newly planted cane.
Throughout all this, the colonial Government of the day was, on balance, 
sympathetic to the industry's interests. To be sure, there was plenty of room for 
clashes with a state bureaucracy that had a paternal view of 'its' peasants — and that 
regarded the undermining of peasant self-sufficiency as likely to jeopardise its control 
over the countryside. Even so, the fact was that the Governor-General for much of 
the 1890s — a crucial decade for the industry's survival — was notoriously partial 
to the sugar interest. Indeed, his own family owned a large sugar factory and he was 
a good friend of the ambitious chairman of the newly established sugar industry 
syndicate. He helped emasculate measures proposed by his own senior officials which 
might otherwise have circumscribed the industry's activities.
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Yet states do not act in a vacuum. A rural recession in the 1880s and 1890s 
(which caused Dutch officials a decade later to speak of 'declining' or 'diminished' 
welfare in the countryside of Java), played into the industry's hands — and into 
those within the state who sought to promote its interests. The prevailing low price 
of rice, in particular, reduced friction over the opportunity cost of growing cane, 
while also helping ensure that wages could be cut or held down in conjunction with 
bringing the cheap labour of women and children into the industry workforce on an 
apparently totally unprecedented scale. In short, though in a different format that 
had major implications for the way in which fieldwork in Java sugar subsequently 
evolved, the industrial project was able to continue to draw on access to rural 
resources. These resources, in the case of land, might aptly be described as 'privileged'. 
In the case of labour, they depended both on the island's burgeoning population and 
on a restructuring of the 'peasantry' which the industry, in tandem with the larger 
workings of the colonial state in the mid-century decades, had brought in its wake.
The upshot of these several factors, operating in conjunction, was that the 
industrial project in sugar in rural Java was able to ride the crisis of the mid-1880s in a 
robust fashion. Between 1885 and the early 1900s, the output of Java's sugar factories 
increased from under 400 000 to around 1 million MT, and exports increased in a like 
manner. The 'secret' of the industry — whose achievements in this respect brought 
international renown — lay in three things: first, its exploitation of locally available 
labour to create a sophisticated 'agro-industry' in the field, characterised by huge 
labour inputs organised along quasi-industrial lines; second, intensive supervision 
that was both informed and informing; and third, a programme of Research and 
Development which led the world in the international sugar economy of the day. 
With some notable exceptions, the colonial sugar companies operating in Java in 
the late nineteenth and early twentieth century were not able to afford the massive 
factory complexes of their occidental coeval and sometimes rival in far-away Cuba. 
Nor, given the Lilliputian world of peasant Java in which they were embedded, were 
such complexes necessarily practical or feasible. What the industrial project in Java 
sugar could not achieve in terms of economies of scale in the manufacturing sector, 




The Inter-war Depression and its Aftermath411
The way for the industrial project appeared to be ever upward (barring a number 
of potentially serious problems in the agricultural sector in the 1910s). Then came 
the inter-war depression. It was not so much the depression per se that impacted so 
massively on colonial Java's sugar producers, but the realignment of major sectors 
of the international sugar economy associated with it. To be sure, per capita sugar 
consumption declined worldwide for a period in the early 1930s. But the real problem 
for the Java producers was a trend toward economic autarchy in their major overseas 
sales areas — a trend that the depression exacerbated but did not cause.
411 For an overview, see Bosma, Industrial Sugar Plantation, pp. 214-30. The major regional 
histories of the industry all conclude with the inter-war depression and its immediate 
aftermath, e.g. Elson, Javanese Peasants. Notable among the exceptions is the succinct treatment 
of the subject by Pierre van der Eng, Agricultural Growth in Indonesia: Productivity Change 
and Policy Impact since 1880, Basingstoke & London, Macmillan Press, 1996, pp. 224-30. 
His prime focus, however, (as is clear from the title of his book) is on the role of the sugar 
industry in the history of agricultural growth in Indonesia. Peter Boomgaard, in an essay 
written some twenty years ago ('Treacherous Cane: the Java Sugar Industry', in Bill Albert & 
Adrian Graves, The World Sugar Economy in War and Depression, 1914-1940, London & New 
York, Routledge 1992, pp. 157-69) confines his remarks to the inter-war decades, leaving the 
broader field to the distinguished Indonesian historian, Mubyarto (e.g. 'The Sugar Industry', 
Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies, vol. 5, no. 2, 1969, pp. 37-54), who drew valuable 
attention, albeit in fairly summary fashion, to a number of critical themes. There remain a 
number of specialist studies of developments in the second half of the twentieth century, but 
these deal primarily with the rise of 'smallholder' cane production. See in particular Colin 
Brown, 'The Intensified Smallholder Cane Programme: First Five Years', Bulletin of Indonesian 
Economic Studies, vol. 18, no. 1, 1982, pp. 39-60; Hartveld, 'Raising Cane'; Ernst Spaan & 
Aard Hartveld, 'Socio-Economic Change and Rural Entrepreneurs in Pre-Crisis East Java, 
Indonesia: Case Study of a Madurese Upland Community', Sojourn: Social Issues in Southeast 
Asia, vol. 17, no. 2, 2002, pp. 274-300; Mubyarto, 'The Sugar Industry: From Estate to 
Smallholder Cane', Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies, vol. 13, no. 2, 1977, pp. 29-44; 
Frans Hüsken, 'Cycles of Commercialisation and Accumulation in a Central Javanese Village', 
in G Hart et al. (eds), Agrarian Transformations: Local Processes and the State in Southeast Asia, 
Berkley & Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1989, pp. 303-31; Kano, Husken 
& Suryo, Beneath the Smoke of the Sugar Mill. See also G Roger Knight, 'From Merdeka to 
Massacre: The Politics of Sugar in the Early Years of the Indonesian Republic', Journal of 
Southeast Asian Studies, vol. 43, no. 3, 2012, pp. 402-21. The potentially useful work on 
Java sugar by the veteren commentator Alec Gordon is ultimately ruled out of court by its 
author's simplistic level of analysis, his tiresome dogmatism and the patent inadequacy of his 
'scholarship'. His best work is his earliest, viz. 'The Collapse of Java's Colonial Sugar System 
and the Breakdown of Independent Indonesia's Economy', in F Anrooij et al., Between People 
and Statistics, The Hague, Nijhoff, 1979, pp. 251-66.
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Java had reigned supreme as a supplier of industrially manufactured sugar in 
one form or another to markets in East and South Asia for more than a quarter of 
a century. Beginning in 1930, however, it lost that position to new, industrial sugar 
producers elsewhere in Asia. These producers were in the Japanese 'sugar empire', 
which was based in Taiwan and in Japanese-mandated territories in the south Pacific 
(and which, fatally for Java, began to get a firm grip on the vital China market). They 
were also in the Indian subcontinent, where a long-established sugar industry took 
on a wholly new life from the late 1920s onward. Java sugar became, quite suddenly, 
bereft of customers. Within scarcely two years, around 80 per cent of capacity 
stood idle, and there were commensurate lay-offs of workers and personnel with a 
correspondingly huge reduction in the amount of land brought under cane.
It might have been the end, but it wasn't. Indeed, by the time that the Second 
World War engulfed South-East Asia at the beginning of 1942, Java's factories were 
turning out rather more than 50 per cent of their pre-depression peak production. 
Historically, ultra-cheap labour and land-costs had, courtesy of the depression, 
tempted the sugar companies to renew their operations. The sugar companies made 
the supposition that their product would be so cheap that it could find a sale on the 
global 'spot markets', which were all that was left of the global sugar market once it 
had been carved up by imperial preferences and protective tariffs. Thereafter, the going 
got increasingly rough. Between 1942 and 1945, the Japanese occupation authorities 
closed down most factories (since there was no obvious outlet for their output, 
given that they had sugar enough in Taiwan and the newly conquered Philippines) 
and wrecked others in an unsuccessful attempt to turn sugar into aviation fuel. 
More destruction followed between 1945 and 1949, as the Dutch and Indonesian 
Republicans of a variety of persuasions strove for supremacy in the struggle for 
Indonesian independence which began in the immediate wake of the Second World 
War. At times, the struggle became bitter and violent, and sugar factories fell victim 
to Republican scorched earth tactics and the general mayhem of the period.
Even so, when the Dutch finally conceded defeat at the end of 1949, the new 
Republic inherited an industrial project that was still important enough — in terms 
of export potential and a growing domestic market for centrifugal sugar — to be 
revived once more. By the time that the industry was nationalised (between 1957 and 
1959), there were fifty or so sugar factories operating in Java, around two-thirds of 
the number that had been working prior to the Second World War. Nationalisation 
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placed the industrial project under the de facto control of the Indonesian army, and 
it became even more a state-run concern when the army took control of the Republic 
itself in the mid-1960s. Java sugar had by this time totally disappeared from the 
international market, its output completely absorbed by domestic sales. In fact, it could 
not satisfy the growing market in the Republic for industrially manufactured sugar, 
which accordingly began to be imported in significant quantities. Late twentieth-
century moves to shift the bulk of the production to the so-called Outer Islands met 
with some success — and meant that Java ceased to be anything but a minor supplier 
to the Indonesian market. Some of the island's by-now antiquated factories, relics 
from the days of steam, became tourist attractions or were closed down for good, 
while a few others were (partially) re-equipped and kept in production.
As an 'industrial project', however, Java sugar had ceased to have any relevance. 
It had still been the case in the 1920s and 1930s that those of Java's sugar factories 
falling into the 'state of the art' category could reasonably be seen as harbingers of the 
industrial modernity in the Indies/Indonesia for which both Indonesian nationalists 
and some Dutch colonialists strove. Even as late as the 1950s, the modernising 
Sultan of Yogyakarta (South-Central Java) included a brand-new, automated sugar 
factory along with an engineering works in a trio of industrial operations which he 
got underway there. From then on, however, sugar manufacture could no longer 
be considered as anywhere near the cutting edge of twentieth-century industrial 
technology. The new wave of industrial projects established in Indonesia under 
Suharto's New Order post-1967 pinnacled not in sugar but in aero-space ventures. 
Sugar remained in Java because it provided work in rural areas where no other work 
was available, and attempts to perpetuate its production there fused with talk of 
using it as a 'green fuel' to make ethanol. (During World War Two, the Japanese 
had been half a century or more ahead of their time.) Meanwhile, big sugar business 
increasingly relied on production in the Outer Islands or on imports, legitimate or 
otherwise. Even though, at the time of writing, it still accounted for around 60 per 
cent of Indonesia's sugar output, the industrial project in Java sugar, after 150 years 
was well on the way to becoming, in terms of the technology of manufacture, little 
more than a quaint curiosity.
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